Tipping Points

The SAIS Europe Journal of Global Affairs was established by the students at SAIS Europe in 1997 to provide a forum for the discussion and dissemination of ideas about current issues in the field of international relations. The Journal aims to provide a formal outlet for thought-provoking scholarship from students and faculty at SAIS Europe and other graduate institutions, and welcomes work from experts and practitioners.

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Submissions

Articles for submission to the Journal are accepted on a continuous basis. Article selection for the print edition takes place in March. Submissions will be judged according to the academic merit and relevance to the selected theme. Articles may be submitted at the Submissions Team to the address specified online. Authors should also include a current biography, contact information, and an abstract of the article.

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Letter from the Editor

Dear Readers,

I am pleased to present the 20th edition of the SAIS Europe Journal of Global Affairs, which follows the single thread of tipping points in our societies, but encompasses the perspective from a variety of disciplines. A tipping point is the apex of an event or movement in a system, after which it transitions into something completely new. This edition's theme, "Tipping Points," aims to examine how various factors and events over time are catalysts for systemic and lasting changes. The theme was chosen in anticipation of unfolding world events that are shaping our current political climate, like the 2016 U.S. election, Brexit, and the unsuccessful coup in Turkey. We wanted to encourage dialogue not only on current trends but also on past events that could in hindsight be considered a critical point in history. During the transformation, the future course of events is still undetermined. By identifying what those transitions look like, after the fact, can help us shape our expectations looking forward.

The theme was intended to be specific yet apply to a variety of disciplines – environment, technology, national security, economics, development, and history. The Journal includes perspectives of students and academics from many nationalities, and exemplifies the excellence of SAIS, as many authors are from the SAIS academic community. This year's Journal covers the subject of tipping points through a wide range of topics, such as the new green economy, the Danish People's party, La Grieta in Argentina, and state security in Africa. It also includes a commentary on the potential of an Ital-exit from the EU and an interview on transitions throughout history.

The SAIS Europe Journal is the product of strong teamwork, as a graduate student-produced publication. I want to applaud the team's vision in disseminating the theme throughout the year in the SAIS community. The team this year wanted to keep the broad framework of past Journal issues, but also branch out and create our own identity. We solicited submissions from around the globe to reach diverse and global perspectives. I encourage you to visit the website at www.saisjournal.org. Additional articles will be published there and past issues are archived. We are proud to present the 20th edition of the SAIS Europe Journal of Global Affairs and hope it fosters additional dialogue on current and past world events.

Sonia Sharan
Editor-in-Chief
April 2017

Letter from the Director

Dear Scholars of International Affairs,

I am delighted to open the 20th issue of the SAIS Europe Journal of Global Affairs, a journal which is entirely directed, organized, and edited by SAIS Europe students. I am now finishing my third year as Director and am always impressed by the great energy, devotion, and thoughtfulness that students dedicate to the Journal. This year is certainly no exception; indeed, given the epic changes that have jolted the global establishment over the past year, the editors have understandably had an especially challenging time. But they have certainly risen to the occasion.

Quite appropriately, the theme of this year's Journal is, "Tipping Points," consistent with a world in a state of transition. The contributions are impressive in terms of breadth and depth, with scholarly articles addressing cutting-edge topics such as transitioning to the Green Economy, the rise of populism in Europe, and migration. The themes of the issue embrace the functional and regional traditions of SAIS and the analysis is widely applicable to pressing policy challenges of our times. It is well-worth the read.

In short, I am confident that this issue will be of great interest to serious students of international relations, continuing a long tradition of student-led scholarly work forthcoming from SAIS Europe. On behalf of the Administration, I would like to thank everyone who contributed to this issue at all levels, in particular Editor-in-Chief Sonia Sharan, her entire editorial team, and authors of submissions, whether they were accepted or not. A great deal of effort goes into producing high-quality academic journals, from planning and managing the review of submissions to production. The social returns on their efforts will no doubt be high and the dedication of the entire editorial board is much appreciated.

Sincerely,

Michael G. Plummer

Director, SAIS Europe and

Eni Professor of International Economics

April 2017

Changing Times:

A Historical Perspective on Tipping Points

Editorial Staff

Margaret MacMillan is the Xerox Foundation Distinguished Scholar at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs and has been the Warden of St. Antony's College of Oxford University since 2007. She was previously Provost of Trinity College and professor of History at the University of Toronto. Her publications include History's People (2016), The Uses and Abuses of History (2010), Peacemakers: the Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to Make Peace (2001), and Women of the Raj (1988). Peacemakers won, among other awards, the Duff Cooper Prize, the Samuel Johnson Prize for non-fiction, the Hessel–Tiltman Prize for History, and the Silver Medal for the Council on Foreign Relations Arthur Ross Book Award. She received a BA in History from the University of Toronto and a BPhil in Politics and DPhil from Oxford University.

The following interview is an edited version of a discussion between Margaret MacMillan and members of the editorial staff on March 28, 2017. Some grammatical and wording changes have been made to maintain written consistency.

Our Journal's theme this year is 'tipping points,' which we are loosely defining as a moment where change is inevitable but the direction of that change remains undetermined. To what extent do you believe we should focus on tipping points to understand events as opposed to looking at gradual change?

If you look at what we would call tipping points, you can see that the change has usually been occurring gradually, sometimes under the surface. There's a very interesting book by Gail Collins, who writes for the *New York Times*, called *When Everything Changed,* about the 1960s, when suddenly it seemed that there was a feminist movement. She points out that, in fact, there was a lot happening before the high-profile stuff in the '60s. But she also says that at some point things were different, and things had changed. So, a tipping point is perhaps when you recognize that change has occurred. You usually recognize it afterwards, but when you're in the middle of a tipping point you don't always recognize it. Although, we always speculate. Look at the Trump presidency, and people ask: is this a tipping point for American democracy? Will things be irrevocably changed? Or have they already been irrevocably changed? I don't know. As an historian, I find it easier to judge things in the past than the present.

What role do individual leaders play in determining the build-up to, and outcome of, tipping points? To what extent can we attribute the outcome of tipping points to these individuals, and how much are they the result of other external factors?

Tipping points seems to be an accumulation of pressure, so I think it very unlikely that a single individual can bring this about. A tipping point is more of an accumulation of forces which are moving for change in one direction or another. And at some point, they have made enough change that things really do seem to be different.

You could argue that the invasion and occupation of Iraq was a tipping point, or that the years immediately after the Cold War were one. There was this period of peace that lasted for about ten years but by about the beginning of the 2000s we had recognized that the war was still with us, and the power of the United States and of its allies was shown to be limited.

I think tipping points are made up more of forces pushing in one direction or another. This doesn't mean that those forces will necessarily make a difference, but they often do. But I always think that a tipping point is a point at which you say: yes, it really has changed. And I think it's unlikely for an individual to do that. I think an individual is embedded in a society, is subject to these pressures, and is sometimes able to manipulate these pressures. But I think a tipping point is something that has broad societal implications.

Building on that idea, how do you

make the distinction between moments that have substantively caused societal change and those that have not?

That is something that you only know later. Every year people predict what will be the major developments in the next ten years, and they often miss what they are. There may be, for example, something happening now with artificial intelligence that very few people understand. This could turn out—twenty years or ten years from now—to have really made a difference to humanity.

The point about tipping points is that it's difficult after them to go back. With climate change, have we reached a tipping point where the Earth is going to get hotter and hotter and the weather is going to get more and more severe? And a lot of scientists would say, yes, that whatever we do now, we will not be able to go back to where we were. It's just impossible. We've gone beyond that point.

What do you think are the biggest events changing the world today?

One of the big changes, I think, is the shift of power to Asia. It may be expressed not in military power, but in economic power and soft power. Asia, and in particular East Asia, may come to be seen as more stable, better managed, delivering more to their citizens, than countries in Europe. We have tended to think that the normal situation is one where the West is in charge, and we might have gone beyond a point where other centers of power may ultimately turn out to be more powerful.

Beyond that, I don't know enough about what is happening in technology, but the development of artificial intelligence makes us question whether we are reaching a tipping point where much of what we do and many of the skills that we have are no longer needed. The prediction is that, with driverless cars and trucks, around a million truckers will be out of work. Those jobs are going to disappear, and new jobs may not be created. We may be entering a new sort of society where work is something that not everyone is expected to do. We may be reaching that tipping point. It used to be that in previous big technological revolutions, like the Industrial Revolution, jobs were destroyed but new jobs were created. We may now be in a situation where jobs will be destroyed, but new jobs won't be created at the same rate. That may be a tipping point that affects the way we look at work, and the ways we look at supporting those who can't find work. You can't go back. A technological revolution is not something you can undo. We can't control it.

What causes of historical tipping points can we observe today?

I think there are tipping points in ideas and ideologies. We've seen that right throughout history. We're celebrating the 400th anniversary of the Reformation and Martin Luther's theses. Who would have thought that one person expressing those views

would be a tipping point? However, what he was doing, of course, was expressing something that had been there. There had been lots of complaints about the Church, and lots of calls for reformation before. In 1516, that was a tipping point in people's understanding. Another tipping point in ideas was the French Revolution, where there were enough people who felt that something had to change. It reached a point, a bit like a fire that was ready to be lit. Something has to light it, and sometimes it doesn't. It was similar in Russia with the Russian revolution. There was a lot of discontent with the regime in Russia before the First World War. There was very nearly a revolution in 1905 which didn't happen, but by 1917, the forces pushing for revolution and the disintegration of the old regime had reached a point where they couldn't be tamped down. Or take the disappearance of Austria-Hungary. It was shaky, but it reached a point during the First World War when it couldn't be saved. People just broke away and said: we don't believe in it any more. Ideas or ideologies can be very powerful.

With religion, it's interesting. Nobody I know would have predicted at the end of the Cold War that, twenty years later, religion would be the thing that so many people would be concerned about, but there it is. I don't know if that's a tipping point, but certainly you can see that the pressure is building up. Ideas are very important and need to be recognized. The notion of tipping points is an interesting one. The more I think about it, I see it as the sense that you cannot go back to where you were.

If tipping points occur after pressure has been built up, how do you prevent it from breaking out into violence, as it did in the French or Russian revolutions? How do you guide these moments' outcomes?

The trouble with build-ups of pressure is that it is like a volcano and it just explodes. Society can be fortunate enough to let the pressure escape in time. You can have an enlightened elite which will recognize that things need to change. In Britain, for example, there was real pressure to have parliamentary reform in the beginning of the 1830s. There were enough people in the ruling class that said: "you have to change something because otherwise we've had it." Of course, they had the example of the French Revolution in mind. You got the same thing in the U.S. before the First World War with the Progressive movement. There was a lot of concern with corrupt elites and oligarchs, and with gilded rich people not paying taxes. But within the governing classes there were enough people like William Howard Taft and Teddy Roosevelt who recognized that something had to change. Sometimes, you can make changes in time. You can have change without violence when pressures build up, but it depends a bit on the elites, funnily enough. I suppose it also depends on those who are leading the forces of change, and wheth-

er they are prepared to compromise. And sometimes they are not. Robespierre wasn't prepared. Lenin wasn't prepared. Others in Russia were, but he was more ruthless and more determined.

De Tocqueville always said that the most dangerous time for an authoritarian regime is when it begins to give way because then people lose confidence in it and demand more. When everything is in play, what really sustains regimes—the whole regime, not just the people ruling—is everyone believing in it. In the French Revolution and in Russia, even those people who benefited from the regime stopped believing in it. I think that's what the Chinese communists are worried about— that people don't believe in them. It's like the Hans Christian Andersen story of the emperor who has no clothes. It was fine as long as everyone believed that the emperor had clothes, but as soon as one person says: "well actually, no he doesn't" …

Along that vein, there has been a lot of talk recently about the erosion of trust in democracy, even though, theoretically, democracies are supposed to be more responsive to these moments of pressure.

I think democracy is more responsive—at least it offers safety valves, which is why I think that India is more resilient than China. India has problems, but it's not as brittle as China. It does have safety valves: it has a free press, it has elections, it has a ju-diciary, it occasionally throws its governments out. And China doesn't have that. You know the great Winston Churchill line about how democracy is the least efficient of all governments except for all the others. All forms of governments have their strengths and weaknesses. But think of how badly wrong dictatorships go. They leave much more mess in the world than democracies.

What is the role of fear, and especially the fear of change, in shaping tipping points?

Fear can be a very strong emotion, and a lot of people don't want change. We have grown up in a world in which we look for progress and we think change is a good thing. But not everybody does, and a lot of people find it disturbing. I think that part of the support behind the Tea Party and behind those who voted for Donald Trump is that feeling that change is going too fast, that there are too many people that we don't know coming to live near us, and too many people with different customs. Fear of change can make you cling to what you think are certainties. And it perhaps makes you hunker down and draw the wagons around, because you don't want to live in this rapidly changing world. It is a very understandable and very powerful emotion. We had it before the First World War, where people said: "things are moving too fast and we don't like it. We don't want to live in this world where everything is changing every five minutes. We want to live in secure communities

we know. A very interesting book just came out in England by David Goodhart. He divides all people into what he's called the "Anywheres" and the "Somewheres". He says that the "Anywheres" are comfortable with the world; they're international, they live in places like London or Oxford, they move freely around the world, they have skills that are transferable. The "Somewheres" are firmly rooted in their communities; they want to be firmly rooted in their communities, and they don't like change. And the "Anywheres" don't understand them. I think he's exaggerating it, but it's an interesting point of view that helps to explain some of the vote for populist parties. These parties call on emotions of: "it's our history, it's our villages, it's our society." These parties are born out of this fear of change, but they are often quite prepared to dismantle their institutions and to not know where things will end up. Steve Bannon says "destruction is creation," and that you just throw everything over and see where it lands. I find that a terrifying view because he won't pay the price of it, but others will. I agree with gradual and incremental change if possible because I think it causes less harm to people.

So far, we have been discussing tipping points in more of a negative light, even though they can be quite positive. Is there reason to be optimistic about the tipping points we are reaching in our society today?

I think the change in the status of women is something. There are those that would try to roll it back, but I do not think that they will succeed. There is also now the sense that we all live on one planet, that planet is vulnerable and fragile, and that if we are not careful we will make a mess of it. That's important, as is the sense that we are responsible for each other. There is some sense of shared humanity which I think is important. Part of what the Arab Spring was about was that sense that we want a better world, and we want to build that world and live with our neighbors in peace.

You have made several comparisons between the world pre-1914 and the world today. That was a time of enormous interconnection between the countries and leaders of the world. Are the forces linking our modern world together—our awareness of a shared world and environment, new communication technology—strong enough to counter the nationalism, the protectionism, or other divisive forces we are seeing?

It's in the balance at the moment. The Internet has been linking people together, making instantaneous communication around the world possible, but it's also made the spread of extremist ideas possible. The bad side of the Internet is that you can get small groups forming and identifying each other in opposition to others. You can get the appearance of white supremacist groups, for example, who might not have been so powerful in the past because they were scattered and might not have linked up. Now they're linking up, and that's dangerous.

In the end, the Internet itself is neutral. What I think is interesting now is the debate about who controls what we call the information highway. Should the Internet be like a toll road or should it be like a public highway? I tend to argue that it should be a highway because it is a common good and serves everyone, not just those who can afford to be on it.

What is the one thing you hope to see in coming years to manage these changes?

There are many things. I would like to see a revitalization of democracy, a rebuilding of political parties, a reestablishing of trust between the public and the politicians. That would mean a number of things. It could mean, in the US for example, controlling campaign finance. Some countries have very strict rules on campaign finance, as does Canada. This means that you do not get very rich and very powerful people exerting an inordinate influence on government. They will always try, since people try to promote their interests. But I think that what's happened in the United States is that there are very strong people who exert too much influence on the democratic system because of their money. I do not think that money should buy you influence in that way.

I would like to see the political parties being rebuilt, and I would like to see people engaged in civil debate. One of the things I find more distressing about what happened in the UK with the referendum and in the US elections is that people weren't willing to talk. People were shouting at each other. People did not want to understand that they both benefit from sharing the rules of the game. If you share the rules, it's like being in a secure organization: you can have really important discussions, and you can move society one way or another without destroying the rules themselves. If you don't have that sense of a shared organization, we're all in trouble. I think we have lost that sense.

What I think is necessary is trust, in each other and in politicians. Political parties form a very useful role in mediating between the public and the government. We've forgotten about that, and we tend to see them as impediments. However, I think that they are very useful in bringing together views, and developing clear platforms. The whole point of political parties is compromise, as is the point of democratic culture generally. You can't get everything that you want, but what you try to do is work out what people can live with. For me, that seems to be an admirable view. When people say "well, politicians are always compromising," I say: yes, that's what you want! I think we have to respect that not all people have the same views. We have to find out how to work together.

Title Page Photo by: Julie Mae Gabato, Bologna Institute for Policy Research (BIPR)

Migration:

Causes, Conflict, and Policy Solutions

Irene Rivera Calderón

Migration is one of the most contentious and relevant issues of our time, as evidenced by the increasing numbers of migrants and displaced persons and by inflammatory political discourse throughout the world. This paper discusses the underlying causes of recent migration flows and "crises," such as the civilian-centered nature of recent conflicts, persistent underdevelopment, climate change, and political impasse that prevents conflict resolution and adequate management of migration flows. Further, the paper focuses on policy reforms to (i) tackle the root causes of migration and (ii) minimize the costs and maximize the benefits (both social and economic) associated with migration. Such policies include a pan-European approach to relocation to ease the burden on EU border countries, increasing legal avenues for migration in the US, and integration policies to preserve social cohesion. Taking a long-term view, the paper aims to present a balanced view of the challenges of migration and to summarize policy reforms anchored upon recognition of the extensive human costs – and unrealized benefits of – one of the most defining issues of our era.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the fact that migration is almost as old as humanity itself,[1] and obviously helped shape societies throughout the world, few topics are as contentious or as relevant today. Migration is a fact of life for many of those who hail from the world's

poorest countries – at least for those lucky enough to survive often dangerous journeys. Meanwhile in many advanced economies, particularly in the United States and the European Union, anti-immigrant fervor is contributing to the rise of populist politicians. The rising number of migrants and increasing focus on migration reflects multiple trends, including the civilian-centered nature of recent conflicts. The overwhelming failure of developed countries to respond to influxes of migrants – and to manage the integration of existing migrant populations – has added fuel to the fire in Brussels and Washington alike. However, along with climate change, migration will be a defining issue of our era. This generation has a unique opportunity to implement sensible policies that (i) tackle the root causes of migration and (ii) minimize the costs and maximize the benefits associated with migration. Doing so successfully will require almost unprecedented levels of international as well as public-private sector cooperation, in a time when many developed countries are exhibiting little appetite for international engagement. Still, policymakers have no choice but to work toward sustainable, long-term solutions. The failure to do so can only lead to more deaths on the Mediterranean and every other human smuggling route, increased fragmentation in the US and the EU, and lost opportunities to benefit from the orderly movement of ideas, technology, and labor. The remainder of this paper explores (i) the types and underlying

causes of migration, (ii) future trends likely to impact migration, and most importantly (iii) suggested policies to promote the sensible management of migration.

Types of Migration and Underlying Causes

International institutions that work on migration issues typically distinguish between two broad categories of migrants, based on each group's perceived reasons for migrating. "Voluntary" or "economic" migration usually refers to population movements spurred by economic reasons, when people "choose" to migrate in search of better livelihoods. "Forced" migration refers instead to population movements stemming from violent conflict, persecution, or other situations that oblige people to seek refuge elsewhere.[2] Per the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ("1951 Convention") and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ("1967 Protocol"), a "refugee" is a forced migrant "who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion."[3] Internally-displaced persons (IDPs) constitute a third and important category, referring to people who have not crossed international borders but were nonetheless forced to leave their place of origin due to conflict, environmental degradation, extreme poverty, etc.[4]

While these distinctions are important for framing the debate on migration and targeting policies to address various causes of migration, it is much more important to recognize the blurred nature of the divide between voluntary and forced migration as well as internal movements of people. After all, how "voluntary" is it to move from a place that offers no viable means to provide for one's family? Would someone who truly had a "choice" knowingly risk death for an improbable shot at prosperity? The complex reasons that lead people to migrate often make it difficult to draw a clear distinction between voluntary and forced migration, which in turn makes it difficult to identify and provide adequate protection to refugees as required by international law.[5] The term "mixed migration" denotes migration flows that include both "forced" and "voluntary" migration.

Migration that takes place within legal channels (often indicative of voluntary migration, except in the case of some asylum-seekers) is referred to throughout this paper as "orderly migration," per the terminology used by the International Organization for Migration.[6] Some examples of this include students pursuing degrees in other countries and skilled workers granted work authorization. As implied by the preceding discussion, however, the main cause of voluntary migration is underdevelopment and lack of economic opportunity in many countries, which often leads to migration via unauthorized and sometimes dangerous channels. Such international movements, which take place outside the established legal frameworks for migration, are instead referred to as "irregular migration" and are the primary focus of the forthcoming discussion.[7]

Despite decades of growth in emerging economies, few countries have advanced from low-income to middle- or higher-income status, and gaps in wealth and overall well-being remain large.[8] In particular, job creation has not kept pace with growing working-age populations in much of the developing world, and wages remain lower than in developed economies despite years of growth.[9] Additionally, fast economic growth in low-income countries is actually leading to increased migration, since more people now have the economic means to migrate, and gaps between rich and poor countries remain quite large.[10] The following paragraphs present examples from various regions to illustrate the complex causes behind voluntary migration.

The United Arab Emirates offers an interesting example, given the open economic and labor policies that have led it to become one of the most migrant-dependent countries in the world.[11] Migrants to the UAE hail primarily from lower middle-income South Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, and many are employed as domestic workers. Poverty and lack of economic opportunities in South Asia have led millions to take advantage of the UAE's

temporary guest-worker program, called the Kafala Sponsorship System. This system has drawn criticism in recent years due to alleged human rights abuses against domestic workers.[12] The fact that people continue to migrate despite accusations of worker abuse only serves to illustrate the complex nature of economic migration movements and the precariousness of the situation, which leads people to move regardless of such warnings.

Migration from Central America to the United States constitutes another example of the complex forces behind migration. Both political instability and poverty have driven migration to the US over the last few decades, primarily from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.[13] Initially driven by civil wars in the late 1970s and 1980s, current migration from these countries reflects two harsh realities: these countries remain among the poorest in the region,[14] and they are also some of the most violent places in the world.[15] Even though many consider Central American migrants in the US to be economic migrants, the Obama administration recognized that endemic violence in certain Central American countries had reached extreme levels and that some migrants fit the definition of refugees and should be granted asylum.[16] Once again, the combination of economic hardship and violence – often a vicious, reinforcing cycle – highlights the difficulty in drawing clear distinctions between voluntary and forced migration movements.

As noted above, forced migration usually results from violent conflicts such as civil wars, and often leads to loss of national protection that warrants refugee status determination. While there are sometimes legal avenues to migrate from forced migration situations, most forced migrants and refugees must initially move through irregular, often difficult and/or life-threatening channels. The most relevant contemporary example is the large outflow of migrants fleeing Syria's brutal civil war, now entering its sixth year, which has resulted in almost 5 million refugees.[17] Many Syrians have crossed the Turkish-Syrian border, often attempting to reach Europe afterward.[18] Iraq and Afghanistan, ravaged by over a decade of war, are also heavily represented among those trying to reach Europe.[19] Dadaab in Kenya – the largest refugee camp in the world – hosts hundreds of thousands of Somalis because decades of conflict have rendered their country essentially a failed state.

The situation in Syria, where government forces repeatedly and brazenly target civilians, highlights why the population of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has reached the unprecedented number of 65 million – civilians are no longer collateral damage in conflicts. In perhaps the clearest example of loss of national protection and the changed nature of conflict in the 21st century, the Syrian military deliberately targets men, women, and children in rebel-held

parts of the country as part of its military strategy.[20] Additionally, the protracted nature of modern conflicts (of which Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan are again prime examples) constitutes another reason why the population of concern to UNHCR has increased. Modern Afghanistan, for example, has hardly known peace. [21] And in Somalia, civil strife, famine, and al-Shabab's reign of terror have lasted for so long that an entire generation of children has been born and raised within the confines of Dadaab.[22] Finally, climate change has also contributed to the increase in the population of concern to UNHCR. For example, some experts have cited climate change as a contributing factor to instability in Syria[23] and the Sahel region of Africa, owing to desertification and drought.[24]

LOOKING AHEAD: FUTURE TRENDS THAT WILL IMPACT MIGRATION

In the short to medium term, two primary factors will impact migration. The first is the outcome of current conflicts, particularly whether parties can find a political resolution to the Syrian conflict. Migration policy changes in key migrant destinations (i.e., the US and the EU) will be the other shaping force. Both factors will have long-term consequences.[25] Nonetheless, political solutions to current conflicts could lead to decreases in the number of people attempting dangerous border crossings. Additionally, migration policy reforms to speed up asylum applications or increase legal avenues for migration could have imminent consequences for millions of people

currently inhabiting refugee camps and detention centers. Unfortunately, neither seems likely to occur any time soon due to political impasse, a topic discussed in more depth in subsequent sections.

On the other hand, climate change and economic development will influence future migration trends over the long term. As mentioned above, the impact of climate change is already being felt across Africa and the Middle East, as prolonged droughts, desertification, and more frequent natural disasters are already eroding livelihoods and leading to displacement.[26] This presents a particular challenge, given that the existing international legal framework for protecting refugees was established half a century ago, well before policymakers recognized the imminent threat of climate-induced migration.[27]

Economic development will be the other long-term determinant of future migration trends, given that so many people migrate in search of better economic opportunities. Here statistics offer a slightly more encouraging (albeit still cautionary) tale. Emerging economies have grown relatively quickly over the last several decades, and certain countries (most notably China) have lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.[28] Despite these positive trends however, developing countries still lag far behind advanced economies, and are unlikely to "catch-up" in the near future. Additionally, global migration trends seem particularly influenced by

relative levels of income and prosperity – meaning that many people will still migrate as long as inequality continues to grow between rich and poor countries, even if incomes are rising in absolute terms.[29] Nonetheless, the extent to which developing countries achieve economic growth (and transform such growth into overall wellbeing) will help shape future migration trends. Recent recognition of the inescapable link between migration and development by the OECD and other international organizations is a positive sign.[30]

The Need for Better Management of Migration

Conflict, underdevelopment, and climate change will continue to affect us for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, history suggests that people will find ways to move while the underlying causes of migration persist, regardless of efforts to stop it. No wall can be high enough, no border patrol sufficient; as long as there is demand for migration, people will find creative means and routes.[31] It is therefore in everyone's interest to implement sensible policy solutions to manage migration flows in a way that (i) minimizes the human and economic costs associated and (ii) maximizes benefits for both sending and receiving countries.

Beyond the obvious need to reduce the human toll of irregular movements, migration can (if properly managed) offer economic and social benefits to sending and receiving countries alike.

The harsh anti-immigrant rhetoric that currently plagues political discourse in Europe and the US overlooks important points: migrants offer significant opportunities to stimulate the economies of both Europe and the US. Firstly, Europe faces a troubling demographic picture: an aging population threatens productivity and the viability of healthcare and pension systems.[32] In the US on the other hand, immigrants typically work in jobs that Americans are unwilling to perform[33] and are particularly important for sustaining the agricultural industry.[34] Both Europe and the US thus stand to gain substantial benefits from better integration of migrants into specific industries and locations. Furthermore, studies have shown that overall, migrants tend to contribute more in taxes than they receive in social benefits.[35] Still, both the EU and the US would benefit from bringing unauthorized workers into the formal economic sector and expanding their respective tax bases.[36] Finally, although the social and cultural effects of migration cannot be measured as directly as the economic benefits described above, the interaction of multiple cultures has clearly helped shape modern American culture, particularly in its large and diverse urban centers. In Europe as well, demographic changes due to immigration are redefining traditional ideas of what it means to be European.[37] This presents unique challenges as described below, but can also present unique opportunities for cultural enrichment.

For sending countries, migrant communities abroad often represent a vital source of capital. Importantly, remittances constitute a significant source of income for the families left behind in many sending countries.[38] Beyond remittances, sending countries can also benefit when migrants return home with additional skills gained abroad. The effects on human capital are again harder to capture, but studies indicate that the positive benefits can be significant for countries where migrant populations are returning from abroad. One positive example at the intersection of social, cultural, and economic benefits, are studies documenting the positive effects on entrepreneurship among returning migrants in places as diverse as Mozambique and rural China.[39] Similarly for sending countries, the opportunities for cultural enrichment stemming from increased international engagement are hard to measure. Still, one can find examples of migration contributing to changing cultural norms in unambiguously positive ways. An extreme example is the case of female genital mutilation, a dangerous practice in parts of Africa. Although the practice continues to be documented even among immigrant communities in the industrialized world, a 2005 UNICEF report documented how migration is helping reshape social conventions that lead to such harmful practices.[40]

Despite these benefits, however, it is imperative to recognize the economic and social costs of migration in order to devise effective policies to minimize them. Downward pressure on wages given increased labor supplies is an obvious issue – although it is important to remember that in many cases, immigrants do not compete directly with receiving-country populations because they tend to work in other industries.[41] Nonetheless, industrialized countries are still reeling from the devastating effects of the recent financial crisis, and employment levels have not recovered. Europe faces particular challenges with extremely high youth unemployment in certain countries (e.g., Spain and Italy).[42] In the US, technological change and other factors have limited employment opportunities for low-skilled workers – an issue that President Donald Trump capitalized on during his campaign by blaming unauthorized immigrants.[43] For sending countries, on the other hand, "brain drain" effects can hinder development, particularly in countries were persistently poor conditions discourage return migration.[44]

In addition to the economic challenges of migration in a time when developed countries themselves experience financial duress, social costs from migration can be high and can impact both state and human security. The failure to integrate migrant populations into society can lead to increased social frictions and, in the worst of cases, to radicalization among immigrant communities. This is particularly evident in Europe right now, where countries have struggled

to identify and to contain terrorist threats stemming from migrant communities.[45] This is less prevalent in the US, which has higher violent crime rates generally and where Caucasians are more likely to commit violent crimes such as mass shootings.[46] Nonetheless, high-profile devastating attacks in recent years have fueled fears that immigrants pose a security threat to both the state and its citizens. These attacks include the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing (perpetrated by a naturalized Chechen refugee), the 2015 San Bernardino shootings (perpetrated by an American couple of Pakistani descent), and the 2016 shooting (by an American of Afghan descent) at an Orlando nightclub – the deadliest mass shooting in US history.

Importantly, we must also remember the human security threats to migrants themselves as an important social cost of migration. This can range from dangers and abuses during the journeys (often facilitated by criminal smuggling networks),[47] to lack of legal protections from workplace abuses for migrants working in the underground economy.[48] All of this underscores the need for effective policies to minimize the costs of migration to states and migrants themselves. As recent events in Europe and the US demonstrate, human and state security are inevitably intertwined: the failure to manage migration in a way that preserves social cohesion is now threatening the daily functioning of our societies.

TOWARDS BETTER POLICIES FOR MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

Respect for universal human rights should lie at the core of global efforts to manage migration. All migrants – regardless of whether they are irregular migrants, voluntary or forced, refugees or IDPs – should be treated with dignity and respect per the principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. During times when the President of the United States has called Mexican immigrants "rapists" and "bad hombres," and the potential next president of France has compared Muslims praying in public to Nazi occupation,[49] it is more important than ever to remember that "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world…".[50] In addition to respect for universal human rights, the fundamental principles enshrined in the legal framework for the protection of refugees should also govern migration policy reform. Chief among these is the principle of non-refoulement, which holds that no one can expel or return a refugee against his or her will to a territory where he or she "fears threats to life or freedom."[51] In addition, the 1951 Convention states that its provisions must be applied to all without discriminating on the basis of sex, age, disability, sexuality, etc., and that refugees should not be penalized for migrating through irregular channels, given that this is often unavoidable when seeking asylum. The 1951

Convention also establishes standards for the treatment of refugees (including access to work, education, the justice system, and documentation) which states should respect and promote via their asylum and integration policies.[52] The following sections discuss policy measures that could aid in the management of voluntary, forced, and mixed migration, keeping in mind the principles described above.

The EU has a clear need to amend the Dublin Regulation, which requires asylum applications to be processed in the first EU country that migrants reach (even if their intended destination is usually Germany or Sweden). This places a disproportionate burden on primary receiving countries such as Greece and Italy. Even though so-called "Dublin transfers" to the first country of entry have been suspended in the face of recent influxes, countries such as Greece and Italy are still responsible for registering and determining the status of hundreds of thousands of migrants in their territories.[53] More importantly, the financial burden of border controls, maintenance of temporary camps, and processing of asylum applications falls almost entirely on the border countries – which also happen to have the weakest economies in the EU.[54] As many observers have pointed out, the March 2016 agreement with Turkey to stem the flow of migrants is only a temporary solution, and one that raises serious concerns over the possibility that Turkey will not provide adequate protection to people with legitimate asylum claims.[55]

The EU thus needs policy reform to ensure adequate burden sharing. This could be achieved by setting quotas for resettlement (and possibly establishing fines for countries that choose to opt out), and creating an EU-wide border control force and processes together with a common budget.[56] In addition, the EU needs to establish uniform procedures for processing asylum applications, determining the status of asylum-seekers, and for the treatment of migrants in the interim – all of which currently vary greatly among member states.[57] Importantly, as well, the EU needs a pan-European approach to refugee relocation, resettlement, and integration. This means conducting needs assessments at a macro level throughout the EU, to identify the specific places and industries where Europe stands to gain the most from additional workers, given the demographic deficit that will imminently weigh on its health and pension systems.

"Yes, Europe is slow. It is painful. It has deep incisions like the withdrawal of a member state… [But] where Europe — in global competition, in protecting our external borders or migration — faces issues together, it must find answers together. No matter how arduous and tough that is." -German Chancellor Angela Merkel's 2016-2017 New Year's address, in the wake of an attack perpetrated by a Tunisian asylum-seeker that left 12 people dead at a Berlin Christmas Mar-

ket. [58]

The need for a common European approach to manage migration – one that ensures adequate burden-sharing, uniform processes, and a pan-European approach to resettlement – is clear. Unfortunately, however, it faces an uphill political battle due to the complexities of the EU experiment. The principles of strength through unity vs. national sovereignty were bound to result in a difficult balancing act. In the wake of recent terrorist attacks and prolonged financial strain, however, public opinion seems to be tilting toward national sovereignty at the expense of European unity. The "Brexit" vote, the vote against pro-EU Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi, and the apparent ascension of the anti-EU French far right all point to public sentiment turning against the European project. If these trends hold, the possibility of implementing EU-wide migration policy reform seems remote. The possibility that Chancellor Merkel could lose upcoming elections – due largely to public anger at her relatively open stance toward migrants – could deal a final blow to such hopes. Nonetheless, those who believe in a united Europe (and its ability to tackle common challenges) might find hope in the outpouring of support that has defied the hateful rhetoric and anti-globalization push. From Lampedusa to Lesbos and other places in between, private citizens are galvanizing to support migrants, and volunteer organizations such as Proactiva Open Arms are tackling

this humanitarian crisis in the absence of political will. [59]

The situation in the US is unfortunately similar with hateful anti-immigrant rhetoric now endorsed at the highest levels of government. Given the country's particular history of immigration and the large number of unauthorized migrants in the US, it is also crucial to develop practical policy reform. In the interest of social cohesion and basic human rights, lawmakers should create a legal pathway to citizenship for law-abiding residents with deep ties to their communities. This is particularly urgent for people who were involuntarily brought to the US as children, have grown up in the country, and have little ties to their families' countries of origin. [60] To engage in large-scale deportations as the President has vowed, without consideration of existing social ties and family history, would not only be cruel and logistically difficult: it risks igniting social tensions in a country were Hispanics constitute the largest ethnic minority. [61] As an alternative policy measure, the US should reassess its involvement and financing of the "war on drugs" in Latin America, which contributes to the violence and instability that fuel migration. [62]

Both the EU and US should also consider three additional policy avenues. The first is increasing legal pathways for migration, which currently overwhelmingly favor high-skilled workers. [63] Increasing legal pathways to migration (including for low-skilled workers) could reduce reliance

on irregular migration routes. And if properly designed (i.e., on the basis of rigorous data analysis) such policies could target work permits to industries and geographic locations that would benefit the most. In addition, both the US and EU should promote policies aimed at fostering sustainable development in poorer countries.[64] Increased funding for foreign aid is a clear example of a step that industrialized countries can take to this end, as is supporting the budgets of international institutions engaged in development work. The US and EU should also lead efforts to combat climate change.

Along with policies to promote safe and orderly movement of people, migrant integration needs to be at the top of policymakers' agendas in both the US and EU. A country's ability to integrate migrants into broader society is essential for minimizing the economic, social, and security costs of migration, and thus maximizing its benefits.[65] For example, studies have identified a strong correlation between integration policies and the public's perceived level of threat from immigrants. While correlation does not imply causation, this is consistent with the idea that inclusive integration policies have potential to minimize perceived threats (thus promoting social cohesion), while the opposite is true of exclusionary policies.[66] However, unlike other policy areas where many experts agree on what needs to be done (e.g., develop pan-European migration framework or provide

a path to citizenship for immigrants brought to the US as children), there is likely no specific "one-size-fits-all" integration "recipe," since countries have had different (and longer vs. shorter) experiences with migration.[67] Nonetheless, there is broad recognition that integration is a "multidimensional process" involving access to education, healthcare, labor markets, etc., and that failure in one aspect is tied to outcomes in another.[68] Additionally, civil society and international organizations have recently given increased attention to integration policies around the world, leading to increased efforts to study best practices and gather data to aid policymakers.[69] While a review of the merits of different integration measures is beyond the scope of this paper, it is essential to highlight that policymakers (particularly in the US and EU) must devote significant efforts to developing integration policy suitable for each country. Such efforts should of course be grounded on the increasing body of research regarding what has worked (or not worked) in other places in the past.

Additionally, the international community as a whole must take several steps to improve the management of forced migration and refugee situations. At the institutional level, international actors can take various measures to improve global management of migration and refugee crises, particularly within the UN system. This should include taking formal steps to manage the impact of climate-induced

migration. One possibility would be to expand the refugee definition in the 1951 Convention to include people who lose national protection as a result of climate change (e.g., as in the case of island nations that will likely cease to exist due to rising sea levels). Such measures should be accompanied by new processes and resources allocated to assist people displaced by climate change, even if they do not fully lose national protection.

Observers frequently note that, when the UN Security Council issues a resolution condemning an action or conflict that could lead to population displacements, it rarely supports these measures with a clear mandate for action or resources to support peacekeeping operations.[70] One possible (albeit difficult) option might be to amend the UN Charter to require such resolutions to include a clear mandate for action, an action plan, and an allocation of resources to further the aims of each resolution.

Coordinating humanitarian operations, which often involve peacekeeping forces from multiple different countries as well as military forces, has also proven a challenge.[71] Here the UN could benefit from harmonizing the training provided to peacekeeping forces among member states. The UN should also establish clear policies and procedures to govern the interaction between peacekeeping and military forces, which could reduce tensions, improve coordination, and increase predictability in peacekeeping operations. Additionally, the large amount

of international institutions and agencies (both within and outside the UN system) involved in humanitarian intervention and crisis management has also presented coordination challenges during previous crises.[72] The recent integration of the IOM into the UN system is a welcome development in this regard, since it should contribute to smoother information sharing and collaboration between the various entities involved in managing migration and refugee crises. Similarly, the cluster approach to managing conflicts has improved predictability and coordination during crisis response.[73]

Perhaps the most needed change – and the most difficult to achieve – is reforming the Security Council system that allows any veto-wielding member (collectively the "P5") to singlehandedly derail efforts to seek political solutions to conflicts. Although the introduction of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept was an encouraging development, the Syrian conflict has demonstrated that R2P is only useful when Security Council members are already in agreement.[74] The Director-General of the UN in Geneva is among the experts who have called for restructuring the UN Security Council.[75] Among the many proposals to amend the Security Council and the veto system, however, the only point of agreement seems to be the near-impossibility of reforming the system, as it would require the unlikely acquiescence of the P5. Political scientist David Bosco, for example, argues that the veto sys-

tem is impossible to change; and that a less-than-effective Security Council in its current state is better than no Security Council at all, which he considers the only other possibility.[76] Others acknowledge the difficulty in reaching an agreement, but argue that the US should nonetheless call for abolishing the veto. Such a measure would elicit widespread support among the non-veto wielding UN members, and put the "onus of obstruction" on the P5 states that oppose it.[77] The UN General Assembly has discussed potential reforms to the veto system, with proposals including abolishing the system, restricting the use of veto power, and expanding permanent membership and granting veto power to new members.[78] This paper takes the position that the P5 should commit to seriously assessing the issue and reaching an agreement. Even if the P5 cannot agree to abolish the veto, establishing limitations to its use would be an improvement, and opposition to such reforms would likely draw international condemnation that could influence behavior in the long term.

Budget shortfalls within the UN system, particularly UNHCR, constitute an additional institutional obstacle to managing migration.[79] Member countries thus need to recognize that the work of such agencies in responding to humanitarian crises and refugee situations is not only a moral issue. Ensuring the protection of refugees, including successful resettlement or return, can promote conflict resolu-

tion and reconstruction and lower the chances of radicalization among victims of conflict. Therefore, providing adequate funding for the work of these agencies should be a priority. The private sector also has a role to play in providing funding to support the successful operations of UNHCR and other important international agencies.

Finally, the international community, led by the UN, UNHCR, and civil society groups should work to increase public awareness of migration issues. Such a publicity campaign must aim to debunk the myths commonly associated with migration, and educate the public with well-supported facts and figures regarding migration. If public opinion constitutes one of the main impediments to sensible policy reform, then governments, international institutions, and civil society have an urgent responsibility to educate the public on the realities faced by migrants, the benefits that could be reaped form more effective management of migration, and – importantly – the damaging consequences we will face in the case of inaction. Once again, Director-General Møller of the UN office in Geneva has highlighted our failures in conveying the realities of migration, and called upon the international community to remedy this.

To conclude, this paper has largely focused on policy reforms that could be undertaken by the US and EU because these entities have the most resources, and could thus make

a large positive impact if politics did not stand in the way. However, it must be emphasized that the developing world is currently doing most of the work – with many less resources – in confronting the worst humanitarian crises of our era. This is most evident in the cases of Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, all emerging economies that are nonetheless housing the overwhelming majority of displaced Syrians,[80] and in the fact that Kenya has housed the world's largest refugee camp for the past two decades. The industrialized world would thus do well to remember its own times of need in devising migration policies that are pragmatic, yet anchored upon our common humanity. Scenes of Hungarian police forcibly removing Syrians from Austria-bound trains, for example, served as a powerful reminder that Hungarians themselves sought refuge in Austria as little as 60 years ago. In keeping Germany's doors relatively open, Chancellor Merkel has shown true leadership informed by historical perspective, even if her policies face increasing pressure in the months to come. And regardless of who sits in the Oval Office, the Statue of Liberty will continue to stand tall in New York harbor, the engraving on its pedestal reminding everyone of the United States' true history: "Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, The wretched refuse of your teeming shore."[81] It rests on this generation of policymakers to reform our institutional and legal framework for migration in line with these values.

This will be difficult, certainly, but not impossible; for possibility in the face of challenge is, after all, perhaps the most quintessential of American and European values.

Irene Rivera Calderón grew up in Vega Baja, a small coastal town in Puerto Rico where she first became interested in migration and development issues. Prior to the Puerto Rican debt crisis of the past several years, which has begun to reverse migration trends in the region, Puerto Rico was an important destination for Dominicans and Haitians fleeing poverty and violence via dangerous maritime routes. She is currently a first-year international development concentrator at SAIS Europe, focusing on finance and development. She graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 2012 with a BA in international relations and minors in economics, Chinese, and international development. Prior to attending SAIS, she was an Associate at Promontory Financial Group in New York City.

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Notes

1 According to National Geographic, the earliest records of modern humans appeared in Ethiopia around 200,000 years ago, and humans began to leave Africa around 60,000-70,000 years ago (National Geographic - The Genographic Project 2016).

2 See the FAQ published by UNHCR regarding the use of the terms migrant, forced migrant, and refugees (UNHCR 2016a).

3 UNHCR 2010.

4 UNHCR 2016.

5 UNHCR 2016a.

6 IOM 2016.

7 IOM 2016.

8 OECD 2016, 23.

9 OECD 2016, 29.

10 OECD 2016, 23.

11 International migrants constituted around 85% of the country's total population and 90% of its private workforce as of 2013. The UAE has high numbers of both skilled and low-skilled workers (Malit and Youha 2013).

12 Malit and Youha 2013.

13 Zong and Batalova 2015.

14 The World Bank 2016.

15 Plagued by drug-related organized crime and gang violence, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala are three of the five countries with the highest murder rates in the world (Chishti and Hipsman 2016).

16 In response to large influxes of unaccompanied children from Central American countries,

the White House allowed certain children to enter the US as refugees. In July 2016, the Obama administration expanded this initiative to allow certain families to qualify for refugee status. This drew heavy criticism from Republican lawmakers, who accused the executive branch of worsening America's "border crisis." The Center for Migration Studies in New York, on the other hand, highlighted the administration's recognition that "this is primarily a refugee flow, not an economic one" (Davis 2016).

17 UNHCR 2016b.

18 This includes about 2 million Syrians in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon and 2.8 million Syrians registered in Turkey. Over 884,000 Syrians applied for asylum in the EU (primarily Germany and Sweden) between the outbreak of the war and October 2016 (UNHCR 2016b).

19 More than 80% of people who reached Europe by boat in 2015 came from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan (BBC 2016).

20 Human Rights Watch 2016b.

21 The country was essentially a battlefield for Soviet-American rivalry during the Cold War period, before being governed by the Taliban until the US invasion in 2001(Peace Direct 2015).

22 Birrell 2016.

23 Baker 2015.

24 Security Council Report 2016.

25 Even if the Syrian war ended tomorrow, the country is now in shambles and reconstruction efforts will take decades and huge sums of money (The World Bank 2016). Implementation of policy reforms in advanced economies – including longer-term measures to deal with permanent resettlement and integration of migrant populations – will also take many years.

26 Even by conservative estimates, over 200 million people will likely be displaced by the middle of the 21st century, as climate change threatens water availability and agricultural productivity, and leads to more extreme weather events (Sunjic 2008).

27 Hollifield and Salehyan 2015.

28 OECD 2016, 29. In addition, other encouraging recent trends such as impact and sustainable investing could channel unprecedented amounts of private capital to social-impact ventures in developing countries (Brest and Born 2013; Global Impact Investing Network 2016). Mobile technology

innovation is also helping increase financial inclusion (African Development Bank 2013); and corporate social responsibility is growing throughout the world (McPherson 2016).

29 OECD 2016, 19.

30 OECD 2016, 24.

31 The Migration Policy Institute, for example, considers this one of the top challenges for migration policy in 2017, noting that migrants and smugglers have found creative new ways to circumvent recent crackdowns (Katsiaficas and Ruiz Soto 2016).

32 McKinsey Global Institute 2005.

33 Misra 2015. Here it is important to recognize, however, that the employment rate among low-skilled immigrant workers is higher than the employment rate of native-born low-skilled workers (OECD/EU 2015, 81). This is true in half of all OECD and EU countries, but the difference is particularly stark in the US. Thus, while migrants may be working in industries that low-skilled native-born workers tend to avoid, this fact sheds light on the threat perception of many blue-collar American workers – immigrants may not be directly "taking" their jobs, but immigrants with little or no education (i.e., the labor market peers of native-born low-skilled workers) tend to fare better (in terms of employment at least).

34 US Chamber of Commerce 2016; Walshe 2013.

35 OECD 2014.

36 Executive Office of the President 2013; American Immigration Council 2016; Stratfor 2015.

37 Kunzig 2016.

38 The World Bank 2014. In the small Pacific island nations of Tonga and Samoa, for example, remittances account for 24% and 20% of GDP, respectively. As of 2013, Tajikistan was the most remittance-dependent country in the world, with remittances constituting a massive 49% of GDP (The World Bank 2015).

39 In an attempt to quantify the impact of return migration on entrepreneurship, Batista et al. found positive effects in the case of Mozambique, and suggested that even larger benefits are likely in other African countries. They even suggested that open policies to encourage migration should be considered a form of "efficient aid" (Batista et al. 2016). Another study from 2011 found that return migration

could help increase entrepreneurial activity and thus revitalize rural economies in less developed parts of China (Démurger and Xu 2011).

40 "Due to our migration and the passing of time, we have come to think differently, and we now see the harm caused by our tradition" – a Somali woman living in the Netherlands quoted in the report. The report also notes the experience of a Senegalese community that decided to abandon the practice, following the encouragement of immigrant communities in the US (UNICEF 2005).

41 Misra 2015.

42 Lynn 2016.

43 It should be noted that experts consider technological change and rising productivity, not immigration nor trade, to be the leading factor behind the decline in US manufacturing jobs (Clifford 2016). Nonetheless, as highlighted earlier this is an issue of relativity and perception, because low-skilled immigrant workers have a higher employment rate than low-skilled native-born workers in the US, even if the competition is less direct than it seems.

44 OECD 2007.

45 Leiken 2005.

46 FBI 2011; Follman, Aronsen, and Pan 2016.

47 Fox 2013.

48 Walshe 2013.

49 President Trump has an extensive record of making inaccurate and inflammatory remarks against immigrants (OnTheIssues 2016). France's Marine Le Pen made such comments at a 2010 rally in Lyon. She was later tried and acquitted of inciting racial hatred (BBC 2015).

50 United Nations 1948.

51 UNHCR 2010, 3.

52 UNHCR 2010, 3.

53 The EU implemented a moratorium on Dublin transfers back to Greece in 2011; Hungary stopped accepting them in 2015, and Germany decided a few months later that it would suspend Dublin rules for Syrians who reach German territory (The New York Times 2015).

54 Vimont 2016.

55 The agreement allows the EU to send migrants to Turkey under certain conditions, in exchange for financial support to Turkey, eventual access to the Schengen area for Turkish citizens, and a relaunch of Turkey-EU accession talks. While initially successful at reducing the

number of migrants that EU countries process, the deal has been fraught with accusations that the EU is not holding up its part of the deal, and further undermined by political instability in Turkey. Moreover, the deal faced heavy criticism due to concerns about violations of migrants' rights in Turkey, which ratified the 1951 Convention with reservations that preclude granting of full asylum to non-Europeans (Human Rights Watch 2016a).

56 The European Commission adopted a mandatory migrant relocation scheme in 2015, however this is being implemented slowly and is being challenged by several EU members at the European Court of Justice (Vimont 2016, 9). A common budget must of course allocate financial responsibilities in a proportional manner among member states, reducing the current undue strain on Greece and Italy.

57 Vimont 2016. Countries such as Greece, for example, are said to lack the institutional capacity to process the large numbers of applications received (The New York Times 2015).

58 Jones 2016.

59 Gunter 2015.

60 Legislative measures to address this have been proposed on multiple occasion but have always met defeat in Congress. The stalled DREAM Act is one example of this, as is President Obama's defeated immigration reform proposal (Smith and Roberts 2016).

61 Although growth has cooled among the population (Korgstad 2016), Hispanics comprise 17.6% of the US population (US Census Bureau 2016)

62 Planas 2017.

63 European Political Strategy Centre 2015; Kaushal and Fix 2006.

64 OECD 2016.

65 OECD/EU 2015.

66 Callens 2017.

67 According to a 2015 OECD study, integration challenges do not increase in proportion to the immigrant population (OECD/EU 2015, 11). This suggests the existence of "economies of scale" regarding integration measures, and seems consistent with the idea that countries with a longer history of migration and larger populations of migrants (e.g., the US) have developed better ways to integrate them into society.

68 OECD/EU 2015, 19.

69 The Migrant Integration Policy Index is a prime example of this. This index compares data across eight policy areas and 167 indicators for 38 countries (including European countries and the US). The tool aims to provide policymakers with reliable data to compare efforts to integrate migrants into society in various places, and most recently named Sweden as the country with the most effective integration policies (Huddleston et al. 2015).

70 Jessen-Petersen 2016.

71 Jessen-Petersen 2016.

72 Jessen-Petersen 2016.

73 UN OCHA 2017; Jessen-Petersen 2016.The "cluster approach" refers to specific responsibilities for different aspects of humanitarian response, which are pre-assigned to international agencies (both UN and non-UN) by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) to ensure proper coordination and predictability in responding to humanitarian crises (UN OCHA 2017).

74 The "Responsibility to Protect" concept emerged in the early 2000s, following the international community's failure to prevent mass atrocities in Rwanda and the Balkans during the 1990s. Its core tenant is that national sovereignty implies a responsibility to ensure the safety of citizens, and that the international community has a "responsibility to protect" civilians when national governments fail to do so, even at the expense of national sovereignty. The UN formally adopted the concept at the 2005 World Summit (International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect 2017). UN Security Council Resolution 1706, related to the conflict in Darfur, marked the first time it was invoked in relation to a specific conflict (Teitt 2009). The concept has gained little traction during the Syrian civil war, with Russia and China using veto power to block actions against the al-Assad government (Adams 2015).

75 Møller 2016.

76 Bosco 2012.

77 Bloomberg Editorial Board 2012.

78 UN General Assembly 2010.

79 Jessen-Petersen 2016.

80 UNHCR 2016b.

81 Excerpt from "The New Colossus," a poem by Emma Lazarus engraved on the Statue of Liberty (Lazarus 1883).

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The Transition to a Green Economy:

An Analysis for a More Sustainable Future

Gabriel Gordon-Harper

Humans are exploiting the Earth's natural resources at a rate which cannot sustain global economic growth in the long-term. In the last decade environmental economists, most multilateral institutions, and many national governments have announced their support for a transition to a more efficient market-friendly manner of conducting global economic affairs, a green economy. The International Chamber of Commerce defines the green economy as "an economy in which economic growth and environmental responsibility work together in a mutually reinforcing fashion while supporting progress on social development."[1] This paper offers an overview of what makes a "green economy," proposes policies which can help achieve that model and analyzes the potential effects of a green transition on communities vulnerable to this economic change.

INTRODUCTION

It is becoming common knowledge that the global economy cannot maintain its positive level of economic growth if mankind continues to consume the world's natural resources at the current rate. Only 20% of commercial fish stocks remain underexploited. Water supply is projected to satisfy only 60% of world demand in 20 years. Greenhouse gas emissions are predicted to warm the Earth's average temperature between 3-10 degrees Celsius, the results of which will likely cost 7% of global GDP per annum to mitigate by 2050.[2] In fact, 60% of ecosystem goods and services have been degraded or are unsustainably exploited.[3]

Environmental economists blame these crises on a "gross misallocation of capital" and stress that it is imperative that the globe quickly transition to what they call a "green economy."[4] The motivation for this transition has gained traction amongst the majority of transnational institutions. The United Nations, World Bank and IMF all have created programs such as the Sustainable Development Goals and the Green Climate Fund in order to assist in the transition to a green economy. Meanwhile detractors, such as the new US President Donald Trump claim this move could cost the world trillions of dollars by depressing economic growth, particularly in certain economic sectors on which large communities of blue collar workers depend. Even amongst those who agree with scientists about the dire

potential social costs of depleting the world's environmental resources differ as to how government should intervene to ensure a well-managed, egalitarian transition.

What is this so called "green economy"? What type of investment will this multi-industry global transition require and what role does government intervention play in this process? This paper aims to answer these questions by defining the green economy, reviewing, and analyzing the mechanisms that economists plan to leverage in order to implement the transition and critiquing the manners by which this transition will affect different sectors of society.

DEFINITION – THE GREEN ECONOMY

In 2011, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) published the seminal green economy report, defining the green economy and laying out a global strategy to achieve the transition towards such an economic structure. Entitled "Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication," the report defines a green economy as an economy which results in "improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities.[5] In its simplest expression, a green economy is low-carbon, resource efficient, and socially inclusive. In a green economy, growth in income and employment are driven by public and private investments that reduce carbon emissions and pollution, en-

hance energy and resource efficiency, and prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services."[6]

The world's major transnational and private sector institutions have by now all contributed their own definitions to enhance or clarify UNEP's definition. The International Chamber of Commerce sums up all definitions elegantly as "an economy in which economic growth and environmental responsibility work together in a mutually reinforcing fashion while supporting progress on social development."[7]

In a green economy, economists assign natural resources their appropriate and otherwise unaccounted for economic value based on the services that they provide to human society. Calculations also account for costs of environmental degradation which, rather than being externalized onto society, are added to corporate and national balance sheets.[8] Taxes, subsidies, regulations, and public programs incentivize reallocation of global finances so that the cost of economic activity reflects the true social and environmental cost of doing business.

Transition Toward a Green Economy

Protecting the environment is no longer a niche political issue. On the eve of the Great Recession, the annual Pew Research Center poll of top concerns for US voters found that environmental sustainability was tied with jobs and family incomes as the top two concerns, garnering 57% each.

Decades of political movements, conferences, and fundraising have institutionalized the environmental movement. It is represented in civil society by myriad nonprofits like the World Wildlife Fund and the Environmental Defense Fund, codified into laws like the Clean Air Act and Montreal Protocol and enforced by government and multilateral organizations like the US Environmental Protection Agency and UNEP. As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, multilateral institutions, governments and corporations became increasingly concerned with preventing long-term disasters, and the ability of the Earth's natural resources to maintain their sustenance of human societies became a viable talking point both in the White House and on Wall Street.[9]

It is estimated that US $6.6 trillion worth of environmental, social and governance related costs were externalized in the year 2008 globally. That is 11% of the US $60 trillion world economy. A study conducted in 2010 by UNEP FI and PRI predicted that between years 2008-2050, should business continue as usual, externalities will increase by 62% relative to the global economy. This is equivalent to 5.6% of market capitalization of companies represented in the Index, 56% of those companies' earnings.[10]

How can society and governments realistically change the global economy to prevent these external costs from being incurred?

GREEN ACCOUNTING

Green accounting is the process of quantifying the value associated with the goods and services that natural resources provide in order to: (1) Understand the economic implications of the depletion of natural resources; (2) Create effective policies and regulations that conserve natural capital for later use; (3) Calculate the quantity of investment required for a green transition.

To overcome the tragedy of the commons, green economists such as Partha Dasgupta recommend that a calculation of natural capital, or natural resources from which human society derives economic benefits, should be added to human and physical capital as one of three elements of the full total stock of capital employed by an economic system. This system is known as full cost accounting. Stocks of natural capital would then be factored into a nation's gross domestic and national products. Thus, just as the depletion of an oil company's reserves of crude reduces its value, the depletion of a nation's natural resources reduces that nation's GDP. After all, a nation with depleted reserves of natural capital has reduced its total capability for producing future economic output.[11]

Green economists are not environmental conservationists. As explained by economist D.W. Pearce et al. in a "Blueprint for a Green Economy," one of the first economic studies bridging the natural capital approach with the concept of sustainable development, economists understand that some natural capital must be converted to physical capital for economic activity and growth to occur. What matters to green economists is not the conservation of natural capital but rather maintaining a rate of natural capital substitution. This natural rate of capital substitution respects environmental thresholds, and thus a breach of this rate would limit future substitution and therefore prevent economic activity.[12]

There is a vast value of natural capital on Earth. Diverse and extensive ecosystems, for example, provide recreation, water regulation and carbon storage to the human population. The value of avoiding greenhouse gas emissions by conserving forests is roughly US $3.7 trillion. An abundance of diverse species on earth provide food, fiber, fuel, and pollination of agricultural and natural capital plant life. The contribution of insect pollinators to human agricultural output is valued at US $190 billion per year.[13]

Developing knowledge regarding the true economic value of the goods and services derived from natural capital allows economists and lawmakers to devise market tools, policies and regulations to effectively and appropriately incentivize economic behavior that minimizes the depletion of natural capital.

FINANCE

Green economists predict that the transition to a global green economy will require a significant investment

of resources sustained over time. This investment will be necessary to fund the research and implementation of green technologies, the building of new infrastructure to support those technologies, and to soften the social losses incurred as unsustainable industries are phased out. In total, UNEP estimates that the annual financing required to transition to a global green economy ranges from US $1.05 trillion to US $2.59 trillion, which roughly represents 10% of all current annual global investment, or 2% of world GDP.[14]

UNEP's "Towards a Green Economy" provides detailed recommendations as to where these finances must originate and how their delivery can be incentivized. Most significant investments will originate from concentrated pools of assets such as the large pension systems, insurance companies, and sovereign wealth funds. Microfinance firms are already playing a critical role, by designing programs which enable the world's poorest to invest in resource and energy efficient development strategies that increase their resilience to the pending risks posed by environmental degradation. Though the public-sector controls significantly less funds, it will play a vital role in freeing up the flow of private finance as well as directly funding the green transition.

In recent years, opportunities have emerged for large-scale financing of the green economic transition. Rapid growth has occurred in green capital markets while market instruments like carbon finance have increased their efficacy. Moreover, trillions of dollars of green and social investments were allocated as part of recession stimulus packages.[15]

The trends for these investments are proving positive. Investment in renewable energy increased by a factor of four to US $162 billion between 2004 and 2009.[16] Over the first three years of the operation of the European Union Emissions Trading System, between 120 million-300 million tons of carbon emissions were reduced.[17] Long term public and private investors, banks, and insurance companies have increasingly acquired portfolios that capitalize on opportunities presented by the increasing profitability of green industries. This has been accompanied by a trend of advances in disclosure and sustainability reporting in the private financial sector, thus providing a strong public relations motivator for change in the industry's investment practices. Of the US $121 trillion of total global financial assets, 7%, or US $8.5 trillion, exist in portfolios subject to considerations regarding environmental, social and good governance sustainability.[18]

POLICY

In sectors of the economy where market mechanisms alone do not adequately incentivize the investments necessary to finance the transition toward a green economy, governments must collaborate with the private sector to establish stable and clear regulatory frameworks.

While public funds represent a significantly smaller proportion of global finance than the private sector funds, there are a variety of methods by which public funds can be leveraged to contribute to the green transition. Infrastructure and public services, such as mass transit and energy, often require government involvement and offer myriad opportunities to increase sustainability at scale.[19] As part of its recession stimulus package the Korean government, for example, invested US $36 billion (3% of the country's total GDP) with the goal of creating 960,000 jobs in public services and green infrastructure. Projects included the development of mass transit and railroads, low emission fuels and vehicles, energy efficient buildings, the improvement of water management, and protection of ecosystems.[20]

Public procurement practices offer another opportunity for governments to encourage the development of the green economy. The public procurement process is typically high volume and long term. By increasing requirements regarding sustainability and equity, governments have the potential to support sustainable innovations by assisting green industries to create economies of scale, thus leading to the commercialization of green goods and services across the wider economy.[21]

A green transition will also require the elimination of government subsidies for industries, which deplete natural capital, such as fossil fuel. These subsidies create a lopsided market which incentivizes waste and inefficiency while creating artificial market barriers against the profitability of, thus investment in, sustainable activity. To assist poor populations that rely on such subsidies, innovative short-term public support programs have met with great success.[22] For example, after reforming fuel subsidies, Ghana, reallocated subsidy funds to eliminate certain school tuition fees and to increase healthcare services.[23]

Even in the absence of subsidies, the market will continue to exhibit price distortion until negative costs are internalized by polluting agents. This can be accomplished by means of such market-based instruments as corrective taxes, lump charges, and tradeable pollution permitting schemes. Resulting increased costs on polluters will increase the competitiveness of alternative industries and firms, which do not produce the same external costs, thus influencing investment and land use decisions while enhancing the gains firms can attain by expanding their corporate social responsibility policies.

In addition to market mechanisms, the transition to a green economy requires a cohesive regulatory framework, the result of which incentivizes green investment by increasing investor confidence in the sector. Regulations can set minimum standards for unsustainable activities and prohibit certain activities outright. They promote markets for sustainable goods and services, stimulate innovation in the field, and increase competition and efficiency. Regulations do run the

risk of limiting market access for small and medium size enterprises, especially in emerging markets. However, measures can be taken to safeguard market access for these types of firms within a green regulatory framework.

The transition to a green economy has the potential to create a significant number of net new jobs, as long as policymakers invest in training and workforce capacity building programs. Workers must be trained for new green industries, such as the renewable energy sector, as well as for new positions responsible for evaluating and increasing sustainability within the production cycles for current industries. Training for work in the information and communications industries is also imperative, particularly in least-developed countries. If unsustainable industrial activities around the world were to be digitalized, global greenhouse gas emissions could be reduced by 15% within ten years.[24] Governments must also provide temporary programs that offer financial support and professional development training to aid workers who lose their jobs as a result of the transition.[25]

As many environmental and social externalities have global, rather than local, effects, the actions undertaken by individual nations can produce negligible impact if not implemented in coordination with other nations. To resolve the resulting prisoner's dilemma, multilateral institutions have hosted an increasing number of international negotiations with the intention of establishing the legal and institutional frameworks that promote coordinated international sustainable activities. For example, the 1989 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer has since been ratified by 197 nations. Not only were harmful chemicals phased out on a global scale, but also in so doing, greenhouse gas emissions were incidentally reduced by roughly 11 billion tons, and 22 million new cataract cases for those born between 1985 and 2100 were avoided in the United States alone.[26]

Sustainable Development

Equally important as environmental sustainability in a green economy is the reduction of poverty and social injustice. The concern is twofold: first, that international economic development in the current business as usual economy is utilizing a level of resources that cannot be sustained to support development over the long term; second, that degradation of the natural environment negatively impacts the world's poorest populations in a disproportionate manner.

Sustainable development is commonly defined as, "Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."[27] From an economic perspective, this means that per capita welfare must not decline over time because of development.[28] The key features that determine a society's full range of economic opportunities are the total stock of capital available and the

quantity of that capital which is employed in the economic system. In a green economy, societies utilize their capital stock in such a manner as to increase economic activities and welfare of the present, while maintaining the discipline to save capital for the use of future generations.[29] However, currently over 60% of global ecosystem goods and services are utilized at an unsustainable rate or have become degraded.[30]

Economists are concerned not just with the quantity of capital employed in the economic system but also with its composition. At present, economic development in both wealthy and poor countries results in the rapid accumulation of human and physical capital at the expense and excessive depletion of natural capital. If natural capital is converted into human and physical capital at an unsustainably high rate then the process can become irreversible, with detrimental impacts on future generations, such as the stunting of economic growth.[31] It was for this reason that Pearce et al. proposed their natural capital-based full cost accounting scheme.

The concept of sustainable development refers not only to sustained long-term economic growth but also to poverty reduction because the degradation of environmental resources is linked to poverty. Over 600 million live on lands vulnerable to degradation, water stress, and ecological disruptions.[32] Poor populations are also vulnerable to the coastal erosion, more frequent storms and rising sea levels that will result from climate change. In fact, 14% of the human population, including 21% of all urban dwellers living in developing countries, are exposed to climate change risks due to their habitation of coastal low elevation zones.[33]

In addition to their vulnerability to environmental disasters, the world's poor lacks access to basic ecosystem services on a daily basis. 20% of those living in developing countries lack clean water, while 50% of the developing world, or 2.6 billion people, lack basic sanitation.[34] Protection of the world's ecosystems improves the lives of the global poor, as does mitigating climate change and improving sustainable energy security.

It is important to note that the transition to an environmentally sustainable economy will not reduce poverty in and of itself. Any green economy program must include at its foundation an orientation toward reducing poverty. The primary beneficiaries of ecosystem services payments, such as those dedicated to carbon sequestration in forests, must be poor forest communities. Sustenance farmers stand to benefit from the promotion of organic agriculture if complimented by extension and other support services.[35]

A Critical Assessment of the Green Economy

Economic Growth

Critics of a concerted effort to transition to a green economy typically warn that such a transition would

dampen economic activity, thus reducing income per capita. While they argue that all members of society would be vulnerable to economic harm, a central contradiction in the concept of a sustainable transition is that the poor in particular would suffer, as they are typically more vulnerable to economic fluctuations.

The debate around carbon emissions regulations in the United States exemplifies these arguments quite well. The three most common arguments made against the passage of effective climate policy in the US are as follows: First, it is argued that workers and communities whose livelihoods depend on the fossil fuel industry would face significant economic losses due to the shuttering of the fossil fuel companies that employ them. Secondly, fossil fuel companies, which are significant and highly localized contributors to the US economic and political system, will incur significant losses, roughly US $3 trillion. Third, by removing fossil fuels from the energy mix, as well as the subsidies that keep them cheap, US energy costs will increase significantly.[36] Additionally, many who are opposed to carbon emissions reductions in the United States also claim that by complying with international environmental agreements to reduce emissions and to offer financial assistance to developing countries to do the same, US competition in international markets will decline, thus further dampening economic activity.

There is no denying that sectors within certain industries would suffer from a green transition, along with the jobs those sectors support. The United States coal industry, for example, currently employs 9.8 million people.[37] The mining sector of the coal industry shed 38% of its jobs in the four years between 2012-2016. It is predicted that should the United States reduce carbon emissions by 40% by 2030, this would require a US $200 billion investment per year and cost the US fossil fuels industry 1.5 million jobs. The social effects of this transition are stark. In West Virginia and Eastern Kentucky, two regions that are heavily dependent on the coal industry, unemployment rates are double the national average and joblessness rates climb to 50% in some areas. Opponents of carbon emissions reductions policies in the United States point to these figures as the canary in the coal mine, so to speak, for how a green transition might affect the US economy as a whole.[38]

While adverse effects on particular job markets certainly result in a painful readjustment period for individual households, these numbers tell only half the story. New green technologies tend to produce significantly more jobs than the legacy industries they replace. Investment in the renewable energy industry produces 135% more jobs per dollar than investment in fossil fuel industries. In South Africa, that number is 113%, in Indonesia, 350%. In fact, should the United States reduce carbon emissions by 40% by 2030, it can be calculated that

US would lose 1.5 million jobs in the fossil fuels industry while gaining 4.2 million jobs in the environmental goods and services sectors and the supply chains that support them. This is a net gain of 2.7 million jobs for the US economy and a reduction of US net unemployment of 1.5%. On a global scale, it is predicted that the 2015 Paris climate agreement will result in a net gain of 0.5-2% of current total global employment, 15-60 million additional jobs.[39]

One of many reasons that investment in sustainable sectors results in net employment gain is that green technology is still in development. Thus, these industries require large quantities of infrastructure, as well as the development of supply chains and other supporting industries through their deployment phase. Fossil fuel technology has not changed dramatically in previous decades, apart from becoming increasingly automated, thus it requires less maintenance, less research, less infrastructure, less new supporting industries to be built, and less human capital.[40]

ARTIFICIAL PRICES

Detractors of policies that support the transition to a green economy also claim that current economic equilibriums offer the greatest efficiency. This ignores three important factors.

First, this claim does not factor in the cost of the externalities that these production cycles emit. Unless a full cost accounting regime is enacted, which quantifies environmental and social externalities as well as the value of ecosystem goods and services, the cost of unsustainable production will remain artificially low. Meanwhile society will continue to bear the US $6.6 trillion worth of environmental, social and governance related costs.[41]

Second, unsustainably produced goods and services across the world, particularly in the conventional energy and agriculture industries, are subsidized by local governments. This occurs because energy and agriculture offer core necessities to poor populations, while also providing essential ingredients for economic growth. Ignoring externalized costs, conventional energy and agriculture do produce cheaper products than the more sustainable competition; however, subsidies only further artificially depress the cost of production. In the long-term the economy will stagnate from the burden of climate change, local air particulates, pesticide run-off, etc. As mentioned previously, it is the poor who are most vulnerable to the adverse effects of these externalities. Should a government determine that subsidies are politically or economically necessary, governments should transfer these subsidies to other necessities that benefit the poor, such as health or education services. Subsidies also have a greater economic impact when invested in sustainable industries, such as renewable energy and organic agriculture. Such industries have been proven to create more jobs and, in the case of agriculture, improve the lives of the rural poor who work in

the fields.

Third, while the U.S. coal industry has suffered due to environmental regulations, the main cause behind the industry's current collapse has been the rapidly decreasing cost of renewable and low carbon emission fuel. In some U.S. regions, solar and wind energy are now price competitive to coal, meanwhile natural gas, which emits significantly less carbon than coal, has out-competed coal on price since the shale revolution began in 2008.[42]

A Disruptive Transition

The question that must be resolved is how to minimalize the disruptive effect of the transition to a green economy for communities who rely on unsustainable sectors for economic stability. Workforce retraining programs are commonly suggested to prepare these workers with the skills necessary to succeed in the green jobs market. A green job is typically defined as a job which contributes to environmental or social sustainability. A recent study claims that many coal industry jobs require relatively similar skills as do new opportunities in the solar industry, which is creating jobs at a rate 12 times faster than the US economy as a whole. The study recommends that the government and civil society donate the funds to assist workers retrain for comparable solar jobs, a cost of between US $180 million – US $1.8 billion.[43] Green jobs retraining already has been codified into national law. Former President Barack Obama's Power Plus Plan earmarked US $75 million for job retraining and economic diversification programs in the coal rich Appalachian region of the U.S. The program also guaranteed pensions and health-care benefits to retired coalfield workers whose former employers had become bankrupt.[44]

Unfortunately, studies have shown that job retraining programs typically only succeed when participants are young and willing to move, which is not the case with many US legacy industry workers, such as coal miners.[45] The solution to minimalizing the disruption of green transition in communities reliant on unsustainable industries requires much more comprehensive community development programs. Former US presidential candidate Hillary Clinton campaigned with such a plan, which offered US $30 billion to job retraining programs, continued President Obama's pension and health-care guarantees, funded redevelopment projects of abandoned mine and power plant sites, and invested heavily in regional infrastructure to support the development of new industry, particularly clean energy.[46] This type of holistic development plan, which complements job retraining with regional development, economic diversification, and expansion of social services, has been proven successful for assisting economic losers during transition.

Secretary Clinton lost the 2016 election and, as of publication, the Trump administration has yet to provide a succinct economic devel-

opment plan for coal dependent regions like Appalachia. Instead, the fledgling administration has pledged to return jobs to the region by cutting back Obama-era climate regulations in order to increase coal production.[47] Though politically popular, it is unlikely that this approach will meet with great success at decreasing poverty levels in coal dependent regions ,as the industry owes its decline as much due to competition with lower cost US natural gas as it does to green economy regulations. Policymakers must resist the populist temptation to fight the green transition. Rather, the transition to a green economy can and must be leveraged as an opportunity to enact forward-focused holistic policies to diversify fossil fuel-dependent regional economies and retrain workers for new sustainable labor intensive industries.

INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND ENFORCEMENT

Those that claim that the green transition makes countries less internationally competitive fail to understand two factors. First, while the concern that other countries will renege on international agreements is legitimate, the success of the Montreal Protocol has proven that this prisoner's dilemma is not guaranteed to scuttle international cooperation. The Montreal Protocol owes its success to the economic growth that resulted in investments to create Ozone friendly products. A more general green transition would also result in economic growth, due to the high growth, high profit, labor intensive nascent industries which will drive sustainability in the green economy, as well as recovered losses resulting from no longer emitting externalized environmental and social costs.

It could help increase confidence in green investments if an international agency with the authority to enforce green agreements were to exist. The United Nations has the authority to host climate conferences and levy sanctions when members of the Security Council agree to it, but the organization does not have the authority de facto to enforce international environmental treaties. The World Trade Organization has the mechanisms, influence, and experience of enforcing international agreements as they relate to international trade, but green regulations and policy are outside of the scope of the World Trade Organization. The creation of an authoritative international green economy institution could certainly increase the success of the transition, but as proven by the success of the Montreal Protocol, this is not necessary for the transition to lead to greater economic growth.

THE WAY FORWARD

The research is clear that a transition to a green economy will result in significant net gains for the economy and society as a whole, even though trillions of dollars of investment will be required and some jobs will be lost as industries adjust. In order to facilitate the transition to a green econo-

my, natural capital must be assigned economic values so that externalized environmental costs and benefits can be accounted for in the economy. Investment funds must be made available by the public sector, and policies and regulations must be implemented to incentivize private sector investment into sustainable industries. Recent successes, such as the passage of the 2015 Paris climate agreement, the positive economic effects of the Montreal Protocol, and the plunging cost of renewable energy point to an optimistic future for green economic growth. While conservative policymakers like Donald Trump are capable of slowing the progress toward a greener future, international momentum and economic trends appear to suggest that the transition will occur regardless. The question is whether humanity can achieve the transition before the world's natural capital has been irreversibly depleted.

Recognizing the intricate link between sustainability and eradication of poverty, in 2015 the United Nations established twelve "Sustainable Development Goals". These goals will organize and direct significant sources of funding toward such aims as affordable and clean energy, climate action, decent work and economic growth, and good health and well-being. By linking environmental sustainability and poverty eradication in its economic development plan so directly, the United Nations has likely played a significant role in advancing the global green economy agenda. With

research, economics, multilateral institutions and the momentum of initial success on its side, it appears likely that the world might just transfer to a green economy before it is too late.

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War and Land:

The Elusive Quest for Land Reform in Colombia

Pablo Villar

Most scholars agree that an unequal and unproductive allocation of land in Colombia has fueled violence. Less has been said on the effects of violence for reforming land's allocation and use. This article argues that violence has significantly reduced the possibilities of implementing an effective land reform in three ways. First, by weakening the institutions. The prevalence of violence has restricted the state's presence across the country's territory, diminishing its ability to defend (let alone reallocate) property rights. Second, by restricting the supply of reform. Violence has marginalized the left and other promoters of land reform. Third, by cutting the demand for reform. Violence has affected voters' preferences and their claims to elected politicians. The recent peace deal between the Colombian government and FARC therefore constitutes one of the biggest opportunities for reform since the early twentieth century.

Introduction

"It is a shame that the country is still debating whether peasants have a soul," wrote columnist Alejandro Reyes after Colombian voters rejected a peace agreement that the government and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia FARC reached in 2016.[1] Indeed, the agreement intended to implement a comprehensive land reform to address one of the main causes of a bloody, half-century conflict. Its rejection, which was partly fueled by the landowning elites, serves as a reminder of the great obstacles land reform has faced throughout the last century.

Social scientists agree that an unfair and unproductive distribution of land has fueled rural violence, but little research explores the connections between violence and land reform. In this context, land reform should be understood as "a change and restructuring in the land ownership regime, that results from an attempt to make it compatible with the general necessities of economic development" and with basic equality principles.[2]

This document explores three key channels through which internal violence has restricted the possibilities for effective land reform for the period of 1930 to 2016: capacity, supply, and demand. While the quality of Colombia's democracy has long been debated, scholars usually agree that it has had (at least) limited democratic institutions throughout its history. Therefore, this paper argues that the path towards effective reform has been tampered[1] by the state's limitations

to control its territory and guarantee property rights (capacity)[2] a lack of proposals due to the delegitimization of legal advocates for reform (supply),[3] limited public support for reform, especially since the 1990s (demand). The last section concludes and reflects on the implications in the international sphere.

Context: War and Land

Throughout Colombia's history, land has been poorly distributed and utilized. Colombia's land Gini coefficient increased from 0.85 in 1960 to 0.89 in 2009, and has consistently been one of the worst in the world.[4] In 2003, 0.4% of owners held 62.6% of land while the bottom 86.3% held just 8.8%.[5] Additionally, the country has historically been full of unproductive or misused land. Only 3.8 million hectares of the 42.6 million with vocation for agriculture and livestock were used for agriculture in 2002; a staggering 7.3 million hectares were unproductive.[6] While in 2012 only 13.3% of land had vocation for livestock, a relatively unproductive activity, over 30% was used for that purpose, mostly in large farmlands.[7] Steadily unequal tenure and inefficient use of land could be solved through comprehensive land reform involving redistribution and state support for marginalized owners and rural workers.

Unlike multiple Latin American countries, Colombia has been unable to successfully implement comprehensive land reform due to another unfortunate thread of the country's history: violence. Colombia has not

lived a day of real peace for at least a half-century. Between 1958 and 2012, more than 220,000 people were killed as a direct consequence of a conflict involving the state and multiple irregular armed groups, during which civilians have been the vast majority of victims.[8] Violence has reached every corner of Colombian society. By 2014, more than six million people had been violently displaced from more than 90% of the country's municipalities.[9] From 2006 to 2016, 42 members of Congress were found guilty of being connected with paramilitary groups, while 519 local government officials had been investigated for the same offence.[10] Unsurprisingly, land ownership has been inextricably related to violence.

CAPACITY: HISTORICALLY WEAK INSTITUTIONS

In general, any type of comprehensive land reform requires a strong and capable state, able to implement and sustain changes in the structure of property rights and economic incentives. In the case of Colombia, Berry highlights that the state has played a particularly important role in the distribution of land, since "the largest part of exploited agricultural land was once of public dominion."[11] Any change in the allocation of rural property has not solely required expropriating plots but granting, defending, and keeping track of new property rights. Unfortunately, the state has lacked the capacity to effectively do this. Reyes argues that "resistance, negligence, inability or opposition of the state

to recognize, formalize, provide titles and protect the rights of peasant communities" has transversely affected the nature of land possession.[12] The internal conflict has significantly affected the state's capacity, or willingness, to guarantee these rights.

The prevalence of violence has affected the institutional and physical reach of the state in protecting property rights. Despite some well-intentioned attempts to reform land ownership, the state "has either lacked the capacity and political will to implement the necessary transformations, or has chosen means and strategies that can't achieve the purposes of the legislation, or both." Local governments, for instance, have commonly alleged that a lack of resources impedes them from keeping track of ownership records. At the same time, the effectiveness of the judicial system has been tampered by the vast number of cases it receives and the pressure exerted on it by organized criminal actors. Furthermore, the geographical extent of the conflict, tied to Colombia's harsh terrain, significantly limits the physical presence of the state in many of the areas in which land distribution has been most problematic.

Each attempt at reform has been plagued by different types of violence and limited institutional capacity. The first effort to reform land ownership in the country was through the well-intentioned Law 200 of 1936 signed by Liberal President Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo (1934-1938 and 1942-1945). As the partisan conflict

intensified before its peak in *La Violencia* (1946-1957), the government proved incapable of simultaneously implementing the reform whilst containing the elites' pressure against it. Law 200 was particularly ambitious since it aimed to change the notion of private ownership, specifically that of the latifundio.[13] Safford and Palacios explain that this very change fueled conservative rage, since they viewed "the social function of property and expropriation for reasons of social utility" as "subversive and communistic."[14] Hence, the same roots of the internal conflict would impede the state to effectively implement a reform which "did not appease the growing conflict of land."[15] Ultimately, a counter-reform was signed in 1944 due to a shift in the government's priorities for rural development, in the early stages of the import substitution scheme.[16]

It was only in 1961, during the era of the National Front (1958-1978), that a new reform to land ownership was attempted by President Alberto Lleras-Camargo (1945-1946 and 1958-1962), through Law 135. The failure to implement this reform again fell on the government's inability to operate in violent areas. The institution in charge of implementing the reform, INCORA, was unable to effectively function in the areas where conflict was growing. Indeed, "more than half of its projects and 75% of the titles granted during the 60s were in 'red zones' of intense peasant conflict, influence of the guerrillas and strict military control."[17] Thus, the number

of expropriations was quite low and confined to isolated and poor-quality terrains.[18] The provisions of this reform were put to a virtual hold in 1972 with the signing of the Chicoral Accord.

The last attempt at implementing a structural land reform in Colombia came more than thirty years later: Law 160 of 1994, signed by Liberal President César Gaviria (1990-1994). This reform's reach and effectiveness were once again tarnished by limited state capacity, which was derived from the country's most violent decade in history. Law 160 was a market-based reform that intended to foster more equitable and productive access to land through enhancing access to ownership by small farmers and strengthening property rights, among others.[19] Nevertheless, between 1996 and 2005, "a person was kidnapped every eight hours, and a civilian or a soldier became a victim of a land mine every day,"[20] making it hard to envision a state – let alone a judicial system – capable of guaranteeing property rights. The enormous voids of state presence did not allow for the productive transformation that Law 160 promised.

SUPPLY: A STIGMATIZED LEFT

It is worth noting that despite continuous land issues and the presence of relatively democratic institutions in Colombia, only three reforms have been attempted during the last century (not counting the partial reform included in the current peace process). In other words, the supply of

reforms has been fairly limited. Part of the blame can be attributed to the delegitimization of the legal actors who have promoted reform, which are frequently parties on the left of the political spectrum. Unlike most Latin American countries, leftist political parties have been notably absent from the highest spheres of power in Colombia. The left has faced systematic and frequently violent exclusion by the traditional political and economic elites.

The Liberal Party might have been considered a leftist political party in Colombia's bipartisan system between 1930 and 1946, but pressures from the elites soon shifted its view to the center. Notably, Lopez's presidency in the 1930s was marked by multiple progressive policies, such as Law 200. Moreover, his Revolution on the March program was aimed at improving the standards of living of the poorest rural and urban citizens.[19] Lopez even held some contacts with the small Colombian Communist Party, quite a rarity in a country eager to keep the United States' approval. However, President Eduardo Santos paused most of Lopez's reforms "due to the large opposition he found, not only among Conservatives but within a significant portion of the Liberals themselves, large businessmen and landowners."[22] As such, the Liberal Party started drifting away from the left to a more centrist position in the spectrum – notably regarding land issues.

In the second half of the century, the Liberal Party kept distancing itself from the idea of a comprehensive land reform, leaving the issue in a programmatic void. During *La Violencia*, the economic and political elite from both parties were increasingly reluctant (or unable) to relate to the public's concerns on multiple issues. Consequently, a fractionalized and radicalized left began exploiting this void, frequently in the shape of peasant guerrillas. The largest faction, FARC, would become one of the most violent political actors of Colombia's recent history. Uribe asserts that "*La Violencia*" was a social process in which the political sectarianism covered up the expulsion of the peasants and the concentration of land."[23]

At the end of *La Violencia*, social unrest did not end up translating into policy change towards land-reform, but did transform into an elitist accord that perpetuated the dynamics of the past. After the brief intervention of General Rojas Pinilla to appease violence, the National Front (1958-1978) rose as "a system of power sharing between two dominant parties that left no room for the expression of dissent except by insurgency" especially towards land-reform.[24] To appease the unrest, the national elite promoted quite moderate social change.[25] In the midst of this Cold War period, political leaders of the National Front were incentivized to distance themselves further from any leftist agenda. Berry[26] argues that the attempted reform of 1961 by President Lleras-Camargo was in actuality more popular among

the US-led Alliance for Progress than among the left.[27] Overall, between *La Violencia* and the Constitution of 1991, there was no serious institutional advocate for land reform.

Due to the vacuum of a political sponsor for reform in the 1970s and 1980s, land policy remained marginal. Throughout these decades, governments used economic, ideological and security arguments to foster a market-based approach to the land. Agricultural policies focused on restricting imports—part of the larger national development strategy, which was based on the idea of economies of scale and implying benefits from land concentration.[28] Moreover, the threat of a communist takeover of power was underlying the government's arguments to dismiss redistributive agendas. Rural development policies became more "closely integrated with counterinsurgency initiatives" than with distributive or productive matters.[29] As guerrilla warfare increased throughout these decades, land policy was ultimately kept in the margins of the political landscape.

Perhaps one of the most striking moments of violent exclusion of the left was seen during the 1980s and 1990s, with the systematic extermination of Unión Patriótica (UP). The UP was a political movement created by the FARC and the Communist Party in 1985 as an effort to transition into politics—or to explore the legal political scene.[30] However, the UP was short-lived: about 4,000 of its members were executed by paramili-

tary forces in the 1980s and 1990s.[31] Aviles sustains that Colombian elites tolerated the existence of these paramilitary structures to contain the rise of leftist movements across the country.[32] The extermination of the UP serves as a reminder of the determination of some powerful groups to keep the left out of the national stage—partly to avoid land reform.

DEMAND: WHO'S FOR LAND REFORM?

The Constitution of 1991 brought about a diversification of political parties, which finally allowed for breathing room for the left to get involved in the country's political landscape. However, land reform has lacked the necessary popular support, or demand, to actually influence politics. Violent cohesion and the perceived connection between violent actors and the legal left can clearly be attributed to this very limited demand. Moreover, the rapid and often violent urbanization of the past several decades has diminished voters' interest in land reform.

The rise of right-wing paramilitary structures and their cohesive power has significantly limited both the demand and the supply of land reform. As land's value grew exponentially because of drug-trafficking, paramilitaries rose in the 1980s as both guardians of large landowners and robbers of mostly poor peasants. These criminal structures systematically used intimidation, civilian massacres and targeted killings as coercive tools to impede changes in the distribution of land

against their interests. The Colombian Center for Historic Memory found, for example, that paramilitary structures committed more than 1,100 massacres between 1980 and 2012 (close to 60% of the total).[33] Although some of these actions were committed for mainly strategic objectives, a great many had political motives, such as countering the guerrillas' leftist influence.

The mix of economic and political interests, which fueled unprecedented paramilitary violence against rural citizens, ultimately ended up transforming the structure of political power in the regions and in Bogotá, particularly during the 1990s and the 2000s. A study by Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris concludes that by 2004 the paramilitaries "achieved to substantially modify the political map of 12 departments [states], partially transform that of others, establish a parliamentary caucus, influence presidential elections, capture local power in multiple regions of the country and enter a negotiation process with the state."[34] The interests behind this partial takeover of power were clearly economic and political, with the use of land center stage. The paramilitaries defended the interests of local and national elites with stakes in drug-trafficking, large agro-industrial projects, cattle raising or simple usurpation of land. Thus, between the 1980s and the mid-2000s, paramilitary groups managed to coerce voters and the state at multiple levels against any attempt for land-reform.

The decades of the 1990s and 2000s were particularly violent not only because of paramilitary actions; guerrilla groups—namely FARC and, to a lesser extent, ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) significantly increased their military power as well. All these groups exerted violence against civilians and the state in a systematic and brutal manner. Just as the paramilitaries did, both FARC and ELN began exploiting drug-trafficking as a major source of revenue to fund their political actions. In 2000, at least 163,000 hectares were cultivated with coca, and many more were used for processing and transportation.[35] Thus, violent actions by the guerrillas to maintain strategic control over cocaine routes and crops, rather than to defend an ideological agenda, became common. Between 1996 and 2005 "intimidation and aggression, death and exile, were installed" as profits from cocaine grew.[36] Between 1970 and 2010, almost 25,000 people were kidnapped by the guerrillas alone; between 1996 and 2002, 16,040 people fell victim of this crime.[37] The nature and scale of guerrilla violence during these years, along with a failed peace process by President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002), made Colombians' political demands gravitate towards security and away from the ideological spheres the guerrillas once defended.

Colombians' demands for improved national security were clearly heard by President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010), who focused on eliminating guerrilla groups both militarily

and ideologically. Uribe was effective in cultivating an image of guerrillas as narco-terrorist groups, deprived of any ideological stance. A post-9-11 international context helped him create this image. Through his rhetoric, Uribe polarized an urban society against any sign of leftist ideology for the sake of improving the country's national security. The success of this policy earned Uribe an average popularity of 72% throughout his eight years of power, an enviable statistic by any standard, though an especially revealing one considering the multiple scandals that hit his office.[38] As the most popular president in Colombian history, Uribe led a government in which the official security services effectively spied on opposition members.[39] There is no doubt that, beyond strong economic indicators, the key behind Uribe's popularity was his effectiveness in combating the guerrillas; the support for land reform, however, was a casualty of that war.

The rapid urbanization of Colombia negatively affected the demand for reform, too. While all developing countries have experienced this demographic trend, it has often been violent and involuntary in Colombia. Ibañez argues that in "internal conflicts armed groups attack the population to reach their war objectives" and therefore internal displacement was a natural outcome in such a lasting conflict.[40] Given its long history of violence, Colombia is, after Sudan, the country with the second highest number of internally displaced people

in the world.[41] One statistic shows, for example, that on average, a staggering 34 people were displaced every hour in 2008.[42] Displaced people face multiple hardships when they reach their destinations, which naturally impacts their voting and partisanship.

The vast majority of internally displaced persons go to urban areas and face deep economic deprivations, which influences their political priorities. Ibañez finds that the capacity to generate income, due to difficulties to access labor markets and poor access to housing, significantly affect the economic wellbeing of the displaced.[43] Further, considering the weak and informal property rights in rural areas, the low-income rural citizens who are subject to displacement may fear supporting a reform that reallocates property rights. Thus, the apathy of the urban population, increased by the laments of more than six million displaced people, has certainly negatively affected the probability of comprehensive land reform.

CONCLUSIONS: CELEBRATE CAUTIOUSLY

It is impossible to trace any single massacre, homicide, sexual assault, or kidnapping to a single cause. A combination of economic interests, political power, revenge, or plain savagery may be behind each of these. But certainly, land has been behind many of these such atrocities in Colombia. The country's lands have allowed a few to grow aberrantly rich, whilst restraining a many struggle with meager

means. The struggle to achieve a more equitable distribution has taken many lives and has simultaneously made it even less likely. Throughout most of the last century, Colombia has perpetuated a vicious and violent cycle in which the causes remain unresolved and which is marked by a lack of state capacity, a scarce supply of solutions, and a dearth demand for them.

An unparalleled opportunity to interrupt this cycle has arrived in recent years which the country should pursue. The military campaign led by President Uribe, which was accompanied by an increased state presence, allowed the country to become more peaceful. President Juan Manuel Santos took the opportunity to begin serious peace talks with the FARC, which means that the chances for effective reform are higher now than ever. The deal, signed on November 24, included a land reform program that should encourage Colombians to believe that the causes of the conflict may be uprooted. However, an initial rejection of the deal in the polls on October 2, 2016—driven by the population's resentment to the FARC and landowners' interests[44]—signals that the path forward will be paved with resistance. The State will need to guarantee and determine property rights for land previously stained by the conflict, and will need to implement incentives for poor peasants in an increasingly restrained fiscal context. Political parties and elected officials need to push forth the provisions of the reform without ceding to elites' interests. Per-

haps most importantly, citizens need to actively claim and oversee the implementation of the accord.

The international community has been key for the peace process to earn legitimacy. Cuba, Norway, Venezuela and Chile helped build trust and accountability during the years of talks. The decision to award the Nobel Peace prize to President Santos after the plebiscite for the initial accord failed attests for a call to re-negotiations by the Committee. Further, a unanimous decision by the UN Security Council to back the demobilization of guerrilla members provides much needed legitimacy to a complex post-conflict stage. Many governments have promised resources to help the government honor its side of the deal. Thus, the Colombian state – even after the current government transitions out in 2018 – will be pressured to implement the accord, and its rural reform.

However, a changing international setting may reduce the government's accountability and the support it receives in the coming months and years. As American foreign policy becomes more reactive and less concerned about Latin America, aid and diplomatic support may be compromised. Growing nationalism in Europe might incentivize politicians to cut non-strategic international assistance. Moreover, increasing tensions in East Asia and the Middle East will possibly shift resources and attention away from Colombia. Thereafter, the quest for land reform will remain, as it has always been, the sole responsibili-

ty of Colombians.

While drug-trafficking and illegal mining remain profitable businesses and whilst unproductive land persists to be a rational economic decision, the resources that empower violence will continue to flow. The emergence of violent criminal gangs and the recent murder of social activists are only part of the evidence of the challenges ahead. But hopefully the state is now strong enough to overcome them. The state will only do so, however, if society demands it.

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27 The representatives of the left in Colombia thought that a radical change in the tenancy of land was necessary, such as that of the Cuban revolution. This led them to oppose the 1961 attempt for reform since it was not profound enough, but also contributed to their marginalization from the mainstream political scene.

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43 Ibañez (2008).

44 For example, the opposition, led by ex-president Uribe, openly disregards attempts to update the price of land. This clearly contradicts the market-philosophy he and his aides claim to defend.

Title Page Photo by: Pablo Villar

Italexit? A bad dream

Massimiliano Marzo

The current debate about the merits of the European Union is coming to a cornerstone, at least within the Italian and (to some extent) European public opinion. Forecasts about 2017 GDP project a growth rate of around 0.9/1 percent, one of the lowest rates among EU countries. Advocates of Italexit (i.e. the exit of Italy out of the EU) focus on the historical correlation that exists between Italian productivity and the exchange rate of the Italian Lira (the currency existing before Italy joined the Euro). Historically, a more depreciated exchange rate has been associated with a higher level of productivity. Supporting this obvious principle

does not acknowledge the fact that the real problem in the Italian economy is endemically low productivity. Thus, a key aspect missing from this debate is that productivity is considered gross or net of labor taxes. As pointed out by McGrattan and Prescott (2010, 2012), too often there are measurement problems delivering a productivity measure gross of taxation, which makes it quite complicated to ascertain the truth. Certainly the level of fiscal burden (especially on labor) in Italy is severely distorting measures of productivity and efficiency. Resorting to devaluation represents a simple rebranding of the problem. On the other hand,

the challenges for Italy are evident: low growth is associated with a future path of increasing nominal interest rates, making the management of the huge Italian public debt (forecasted to be about 133.1 percent of GDP by EC by the end of 2017) costlier. At the same time, both a prolonged recession and weak economic recovery are two of the key reasons for the troubled state of the Italian banking system, for which the Italian government has set out a 20 billion fund to cover potential losses on Non-Performing Loans. The ECB has already announced a reduction in their quantitative easing program, which will likely be followed by an increase of short-term policy rates, given the increased inflationary expectations.

With such a difficult situation at hand, many advocate to get out of 'EU-jail', by returning to the 'good old times' with a competitive devaluation scheme. The argument pro-exit is based on the very generous assumption that currency devaluation (post-exit) would reach only 30 percent versus the Euro. In this way, the cost of the exit almost balances with the cost of remaining in the Union (mainly due to the fiscal restraint expected to be put in place to control the increase of public debt). However, this might not come true, because of the increased level of international trade competitiveness. On the other hand, it is also true that the current rules of EU policy making are too restrictive to allow for serious restructuring of the Italian fiscal policy. A possible solution would be to allow for asset swaps, by replacing costly short-term debt with longer-term debt issued at lower interest rates. This is quite

easy, given that more than 70 percent of Italian public debt is in the hands of Italian entities (households and private sector, broadly defined). Unfortunately, this approach is not allowed under current rules. An alternative proposal (close, at least in spirit to what has been proposed by Andritzky et al., 2016), would be to allow different degrees of subordination on public debt issued by the same state: for example up to 60 percent of public debt to GDP bonds have an higher degree of seniority with respect to bonds exceeding, for example, a 100 percent ratio. Another solution would be to make any debt restructuring initiatives contingent to serious structural reforms upon fiscal revenue collection and other crucial aspects which have an impact on trade competitiveness. In any case, such reforms have certain and quantifiable costs. The redenomination of public debt into another currency (the old Lira), implies that the Italian exit out of the EU comes with high and uncertain costs. To reduce uncertainty about this issue, it would be better to start by solving some of the deep structural problems of the Italian economy and promoting a different set of rules to manage surpluses and deficits within the Euro Area. Without a clear signal on this issue (one that should indeed come from all EU members), it will be difficult to curb the current uncertainty.

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Widening La Grieta In Argentina:

How Cristina And Nestor Kirchner's Power-Consolidating Policies Leave Behind A Social Rift

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In December 2015, Argentina elected Mauricio Macri as their president. He inherited a daunting task: close the societal rift, or la grieta,[1] which the previous presidents, Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015), left behind. The Kirchners have one of the most contentious legacies in the recent history of Latin America. One part of the population views them as saviors, while the other believes they left behind a country on the brink of crisis. This paper attempts to answer the question: why did the Kirchner presidencies leave a legacy of a divided Argentinian society rather than a consolidated one? There are many reasons why la grieta widened under the Kirchners', including media wars and a confrontational foreign policy. However, this paper argues that the three biggest reasons why la grieta grew in Argentina are: institutional tampering, especially in the judicial branch, corruption, and economic mismanagement.

INTRODUCTION

Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's popularity was never more evident than it was in the 2011 Argentinian presidential election when she won 54.1% of the popular vote.[2] Indeed, the Kirchners have been popular in Argentina ever since Néstor became president in 2003, when they led the miraculous recovery of the economy. As the chapter of the Kirchners' regime comes to a close, Cristina remains immensely popular with the lower classes, despite her overall dwindling popularity. A majority of Argentinians (60%) voted to discontinue the *kirchnerista* brand of politics in the first round of the 2015 presidential elections, but this outcome does not tell the whole story. A societal rift, or as Argentinian journalist Jorge Lanata coined it, *la grieta*, has continually widened – especially during the latter part of Cristina's regime. Argentinian society is completely polarized amidst Cristina's "us versus them," friends or enemies rhetoric. Why is it then, that Néstor and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's presidencies leave a legacy of a divided Argentinian society rather than a consolidated one, which is the supposed aim of *kirchnerismo*? There are a multitude of reasons why this is the case, such as the media wars, a confrontational foreign policy objective, and an ongoing disapproval of the Argentine Pope Francis.

This paper begins by giving some background information on how the Kirchners consolidated their power. It will then focus on the three biggest reasons *la grieta* has grown in Argentina, especially during Cristina's two-term presidency: 1) institutional tampering, especially in the judicial branch; 2) corruption, with a focus on the Kirchners' wealth accumulation and the non-resolution of corruption cases; and 3) short-sighted economic policies. Overall, Néstor and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's success in stabilizing Argentina received not only regional – but international – acclaim. Nevertheless, as the Kirchners' popularity soared, so did their power, which they used to extend their grasp over the judicial system and increase the fortunes of bureaucrats friendly to the regime. These actions, along with economic mismanagement, decreased support for Cristina Kirchner and created a gap – or *la grieta* – in Argentinian society that the new president Mauricio Macri, who took office in December 2015, will find challenging to close.

CONSOLIDATING POWER

Elected in 2003, Néstor Kirchner acquired an economy that had defaulted only two years prior. Trust in the presidency was weak not only because of what happened in the economic crisis of 2001 but also because Néstor himself was relatively unknown; in fact, he won the election with only 22.2% of the popular vote because the runner-up, former president Carlos Menem (1990-1998), decided to withdraw from the second round run-off.

The Kirchners helped renew the

belief that an Argentinian government could fight the status quo and inspire hope in *la patria*.[3] Almost instantly, their successive governments became populist in nature because of many issues, including but not limited to: the confrontational nature of foreign policy towards the United States, unwavering support for other left-leaning regimes, and active state intervention within free markets.[4] Their support also increased after legalizing same-sex marriage – making Argentina the first Latin American country to do so – and bringing former military officers of the military *junta* to justice.

Undoubtedly, the miraculous economic recovery is what gave the Kirchners the popular support they used to consolidate power further. During Mr. Kirchner's presidency (2003-2007), the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew an average of 9% a year, which included a 52% increase in consumption.[5] This helped dramatically reduce poverty and unemployment; much of this growth was redistributed to the poorer echelons of society, which is the reason the Kirchners still enjoy the support of many within the lower class.[6] The economic boom, which occurred under Néstor's presidency, fueled the Kirchners' widespread popular support; it is part of the reason they were so successful in consolidating power and undermining institutional checks and balances.[7] During a period of spectacular economic performance, it was easy to turn a blind eye to institutional tampering and corruption.

Institutional Tampering

Luigi Manzetti argues that in government, "…[the] more institutional checks and balances [that] exist, the more confident citizens may be that their rulers will use caution in exercising their authority."[8] Certainly, Argentina has a history of weak checks and balances, but the Kirchners certainly have not improved the situation.

One major way the Kirchners meddled with institutions in Argentina, weakening checks and balances, was by implicitly suggesting that the judiciary branch's decisions could only be enforced if approved by the executive.[9] The best example of this is the Eduardo Sosa and Daniel Peralta polemic. In 1995, while Néstor Kirchner was governor of the Santa Cruz province, he unconstitutionally terminated Eduardo Sosa as attorney general of the province. Sosa fought to file charges against Mr. Kirchner to no avail, but he did manage to file legal charges in 2010 against then-Santa Cruz governor Daniel Peralta for not reinstating him as attorney general.[10] Not only did the court support Sosa's decision, they also suggested Peralta's removal. Cristina Kirchner spoke out against the court's decision and prevented Peralta's removal, demonstrating the power divide between the judicial and executive branches.

A more direct hand in judicial tampering was evident in April 2013 when Cristina Kirchner introduced a

reform of the Council of Magistrates to make it more "democratic."[11] The Council was comprised of members who had been elected internally. The new proposals by Cristina Kirchner and her party,[12] which controlled Congress, called for an increase of members to the Council. More importantly, the Council's candidates would have been proposed by political parties and then voted upon by the public in general elections.[13] Cristina Kirchner claimed that these laws would make Argentina more democratic since the judicial branch was the only branch that did not "reflect and represent the people".[14] She further argued that "neither judges nor lawyers have the preordained right to be elected amongst themselves" because this would imply a freedom from public accountability.[15]

Cristina's critics argued that reforming the Council of Magistrates was an easier way for the executive branch to exert tighter control over the one governmental mechanism that was buffering her policy: the judiciary.[16] Considering that the Frente para la Victoria (FpV) and the general Peronist coalition had a majority in Congress, it would have been easier for them to propose candidates friendly to the government and ultimately stack the court. Argentina already ranked 133rd out of 144 countries for judicial independence. According to Transparency International, these reforms would further damage Argentina's porous rule of law "by concentrating too much power in the executive,"

thus making the judicial branch hesitant to hold the government accountable – "an essential element of any strong system to fight against corruption".[17] Gabriel Knaul of the United Nations (UN) echoes this sentiment and adds that this reform "seriously compromises the principles of separation of powers and independence of the judiciary, which are fundamental elements of any democracy and any rule of law."[18]

Although the Supreme Court deemed the reforms unconstitutional, the damage was already inflicted. The populist nature of these reforms, along with Cristina Kirchner's fiery and combative insistence that they get passed, widened the immense societal gap. In fact, after this fiasco, Cristina's ratings plummeted to an all-time low of 30%.[19] In addition, this added to the many instances wherein she was viewed in a very negative light internationally, which embarrassed Argentinians. The cold tension between Kirchner and the Supreme Court continued until she left office.

CORRUPTION

The presence of corruption in government is extremely detrimental to a country because it shatters the trust that its citizens hold in their government. Furthermore, it can "discourage investments and set in motion a pernicious cycle of political alienation and distrust."[20] It is very difficult for citizens to express vertical accountability in a democratic way without proper tools within the judicial system

to hold government officials accountable. When vertical accountability cannot be expressed in a democratic manner, the public cannot trust the proper governmental mechanisms to hold elected officials accountable for their actions. Democracy can deteriorate and violence can ensue—a concept not so foreign in Latin America, with Argentina failing to be an exception. In 2013, Argentina ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in a region already notorious for corruption, and 107th in the world.[21] There is no significant difference in the corruption ratings between the Kirchner governments and the presidents before them; nevertheless, corruption has been blatant and unchecked under the Kirchner governments.

One of the biggest concerns of corruption under the Kirchner mandate deals with their accumulation of wealth from 2003 until present. Specifically, their wealth increased 1172%, from $7 million Argentinian Pesos (ARS) in 2003 to ARS$82 million in 2014.[22] Considering the annual presidential salary in Argentina is officially slightly more than USD$100,000,[23] it seems evident that this wealth was likely accumulated through illegitimate means, such as embezzlement or corruption. Cristina Kirchner alleges that their fortune was made through "real estate" but neither Argentinians nor the international community believe that. Even if the Kirchners did make their money through real estate, it probably was not done conventionally. Banks in Liechtenstein, Switzer-

land, and Luxembourg have raised red flags regarding the Kirchners' bank account transactions.[24] One piece of evidence of note was when the Kirchners got a suspiciously profitable deal on a piece of land to be used as a resort in their home province of Santa Cruz. Less than two years later,[25] the Kirchners sold "part" of this property for US$2 million, forty times the price of the original purchase for the entire property.[26]

Many more corruption scandals have been uncovered involving the Kirchners' business partners, including the discovery of actual suitcases of money, and bribes for campaign contributions in 2007. The main theme of almost all of the corruption allegations during the Kirchner era is that almost nobody has been convicted. The only person of note not only to be convicted but even to go to trial was Felicia Miceli, who has no personal ties to the Kirchners, a fact that she has adamantly pointed out.[27] In other words, Miceli finds it suspicious that she was the only person to go to trial when none of Kirchners' cronies were indicted, despite evidence against them.

People who have tried to make formal complaints against the Kirchners in court have been silenced, disregarded, or, in the case of Alberto Nisman, have wound up dead. This trend first became apparent in 2004 when Manuel Garrido – the head of the National Investigative Prosecutor Office of the Public Administration (FNIA) – filed six formal complaints to Attorney

General Esteban Righi, regarding the Kirchner government's corruption.[28] These allegations involved the aforementioned wealth accumulation, the illegal manipulation of key economic statistics, and the suspicious contracts regarding the management of Argentinian airports, among others.[29] Righi, a personal friend of Néstor Kirchner, dismissed the case. Garrido and the FNIA did not relent, however; from 2005 until 2009, the "FNIA filed over one hundred cases of administrative irregularities involving senior administration officials."[30] In the end, Righi claimed that the Attorney General's prosecutors "were investigating the same matters" and Garrido was forced to resign. Ultimately, the FNIA became a "lame duck investigator", unable to enforce political accountability.[31]

The recurring lack of horizontal accountability regarding corruption claims was also noted abroad. For example, a United States embassy cable pointed out that "Argentina's corruption scandals frequently make a big splash at the outset, only to dissipate into oblivion due to the languid pace of the 'investigations' and the endless juridical ping-pong to which they are submitted." The cable further pointed out that it takes an average of fourteen years to solve a corruption case in Argentina, "with only fifteen out of the 750 resulting in convictions."[32] The presence of constant impunity in Argentina made conditions ripe for the Kirchners and other political actors to continue corrupt and clientelistic practices without fears of prosecution.

The impunity of the Kirchners' corruption has widened *la grieta* in Argentina more than the corrupt acts themselves. Argentinians are accustomed to corruption, but the Kirchners actively impeded the institutions in place to hold the government accountable, from the judicial system itself, to investigative agencies such as the FNIA, to the people who are denouncing the government on their own. The Argentinians that support the Kirchners argue "innocent until proven guilty," or adopt the saying used ubiquitously in Latin America, "*rouba mas faz*" (Portuguese for: they rob, but they get things done). Conversely, the more educated segment of the Argentinian population is fed up with the fact that Cristina Kirchner has appeared almost invincible in the face of the law.

Economy

Tampering with the judicial system and corruption are both two major reasons why *la grieta* has widened in Argentina under Cristina Kirchner, but economic failures and mismanagement in the last few years are the biggest reason why Argentinians are desperately looking for change. Argentina experienced negative GDP growth in 2014, fiscal accounts remain "in the red," and unemployment continues to rise.[33] These economic factors are easy to identify. However, on a deeper level, Cristina Kirchner has tampered with official economic statistics, creating uncertainty as to

whether inflation statistics are even remotely accurate.[34] Furthermore, her nationalistic economic agenda, which features high import taxes and which originally benefited soya producers, now benefits virtually no one. For example, small and large businesses struggle to afford imported capital against the high taxes and their lame duck currency. Meanwhile, the soya farmers who originally benefited from the commodity boom were alienated when Cristina Kirchner imposed a soybean export tax in 2008.[35]

The Argentinian economy recovered during Néstor Kirchner's presidency in large part due to the commodity boom (2000-2008), and one cannot blame the Kirchners for the fact that this cycle reversed. However, the two can be blamed for the current state of the economy because of their severe mismanagement, which has effectively restrained growth opportunity. Argentina is now a country with limited economic maneuverability. Heritage Fund's Economic Freedom Index has ranked Argentina 169th in the world in terms of economic freedom; Cuba and Venezuela are the only cases ranked lower in the region.[36]

The Heritage Foundation's Economic Index measures ten quantitative and qualitative factors from four pillars: rule of law, limited government, regulatory efficiency, and open markets. The ten factors are graded on a scale of one to ten.[37] The 2015 index rating for Argentina is the worst in its history, and has fallen from 52 (out of 100) to 44.1 since the 2011 election. This poor rating is due to state interference, falsified statistics, an inaccurate value of the peso, and price controls "on almost all goods and services."[38] The Heritage Foundation underscores the fact that underreporting official inflation statistics encourages enterprises to fix prices and wages at the inflation rate they believe is accurate, which is unknown to all except for those in the inner circle of the government. The Argentinian state regulates everything, from business, to labor, to money and with this increased regulation, "efficiency and productivity growth is sabotaged."[39] These many interferences and regulations make Argentina one of the least business-friendly countries in the world, in turn creating a very anti-Kirchner sentiment for those who are trying to expand their business. Juan Addesi, a small business owner, confirmed this in a *New York Times* interview when he argued that he would be "ten times better off" without the restrictions and further, that Cristina Kirchner leaving office is "the best thing that could happen to us."[40]

Damián Díaz, the owner of an advertising firm in Buenos Aires, also shared this sentiment; he argued that the Kirchners' restrictive policies even limited the entrepreneurial creative capacities of Argentinians. According to Díaz, the macroeconomic environment that existed between 2003 and 2007 offered a brief window when people could start businesses with greater ease.[41] However, business obstacles are so strong now that in

2015, Argentina fell to number four in innovation among Latin American countries.[42] In 2012, Argentina was ranked number two in Latin America, according to the Instituto para el Desarrollo Social Argentino (IDESA)'s innovation index. IDESA argues that Argentina's "lack of innovation" is not because of individuals' lack of creative capacities but rather the "obstacles to open and close a business, to trade with foreign countries, job insecurity, tax pressures . . . high inflation … and the destruction of the capital goods market."[43] In other words, the Kirchners' poor macroeconomic policies have trickled down to restrict the innovative potential of their own stock of human capital. This situation could cause a new issue in Argentina: the brain drain of their most talented people.

The Heritage Foundation's Freedom Index describes that "in an economically free society, individuals are free to work, produce, consume, and invest in any way they please."[44] All of these things have been compromised, particularly during the second term of Cristina Kirchner's presidency. This lack of economic freedoms has encouraged people to turn to the underground economy to make ends meet. It is because of this negative welfare effect that one of Cristina Kirchner's harshest critics, the journalist Juan José Llach, argues that beyond the countable fiscal debt that she leaves behind, Argentina has also been endowed with an uncountable "social debt."[45] Since economic prospects are

so limited and because only a third of youth between the ages of 18 and 25 have a formal salary-paying job, it has become more tempting for young people to engage in narcotrafficking – the seemingly only opportunity where real wages are increasing.[46] Llach writes that "canceling this social debt is a colossal task but it's also feasible in time." Argentinians hope that Mauricio Macri can "pay back" the fiscal and social debts and help close the societal and economic fissure that Cristina Kirchner created through her policies.[47]

CONCLUSION

On December 10th, 2015, Cristina Kirchner left behind one of the most polarized legacies in the recent history of Latin America. Many in the lower class, who see her as a resurrection of Eva Perón, continue to give her unwavering support. Cristina and Néstor helped the economy's recovery only one year after the humiliating economic crisis of 2001-2002. While half of the population sees her as a savior, the other half sees her as a corrupt, populist politician whose short-sighted economic policies and poor management of the country left it on the tipping point of another crisis. The Kirchners' controlling, consolidating politics almost seemed to have a negative correlation on cohesion in society – the more they pushed on consolidating power with their populist rhetoric, the wider the polarity in society. Why is this the case? Why did Néstor and Cristina Kirchner leave behind a divided society rather than

a consolidated one, which seemed to always be the aim of *kirchnerismo*?

This paper has argued that Argentina's *grieta* has grown because of institutional tampering in the judiciary, corruption and the presence of impunity, and the debilitated state of the economy combined with the Kirchners' mismanagement of it. The Kirchners continuously attempted to undermine checks and balances by sabotaging the independence of the judicial branch, an essential component in horizontal accountability. They successfully hindered or silenced the institutions that held the power to hold them accountable for corruption, effectively committing a direct assault on the rule of law. Finally, when the economy began slowing down after the commodity market bust, Cristina Kirchner managed the economy in a way that not only exacerbated the economic downturn, but also limited growth opportunity, leaving behind an economy that – without careful, proper management reform – was on the cusp of another crisis.

The importance of *la grieta* was best epitomized during the 2015 elections. Voters who chose Mauricio Macri of the Republican Proposal party (PRO), selected a complete separation from kirchnerismo politics, while those who chose Daniel Scioli of the FpV, endorsed its continuation. The results of the run-off served as empirical evidence for Argentina's polarized society: Mauricio Macri won 51.4% of the votes compared to Daniel Scioli's 48.6%.[48]

In one of Mauricio Macri's most famous political advertisements, he characterized present-day Argentina as "*La Argentina de 'O'*" (The Argentina of "Or") – rich or poor, Kirchneristas or anti-Kirchneristas, proclaiming that "they say everything is going well, or they say everything is going bad." This is the type of Argentina that further separates Argentinians and the one that holds back progress. He proposed "*La Argentina de 'Y'*" (The Argentina of "And") as the one needed "to be able to live better and to be united."[49] The Kirchners left behind a societal rift, or *grieta*, that will be difficult to close. Perhaps Macri's promise of an "*Argentina de Y*" will help close it.

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NOTES

1 Literally means "gap" or "rift" in Spanish.

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4 Luigi Manzetti, "Accountability and Corruption in Argentina During the Kirchners' Era," *Latin America Research Review* 49, no. 2 (2014): 174.

5 Steven Levitsky and María Vicoria Murrillo, "Argentina: From Kirchner to Kirchner," *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 2 (2008), 16.

6 Luigi Manzetti, "Accountability and Corruption in Argentina During the Kirchners' Era," *Latin America Research Review* 49, no. 2 (2014): 174.

7 *Ibid.*, 177.

8 *Ibid.*, 175.

9 Manzetti, "Accountability and Corruption in Argentina During the Kirchners' Era," (2014), 181.

10 *Ibid.*

11 The Council of Magistrates is one arm of the Judicial Branch of Argentina, which, since the amendments of 1994, has the ability to appoint judges across the judicial system as well as to punish them. Before the proposed reforms in 2013, the Council was comprised of thirteen members: six legislators elected by congress, a representative from the executive, three judges selected from their colleagues, two lawyers voted by their colleagues, and a professor chosen by university deans; Sabrina Hummel, "Argentina's Judicial Reforms: A Growing Divide," *The Argentina Independent,* April 3, 2013, http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/argentinas-judicial-reforms-a-growing-divide/.

12 The Kirchners' party is called *Frente para la Victoria* (Victory Front, FpV)

13 More specifically, the Council of Magistrates would be increased from thirteen members to nineteen, with the addition of more academics and lawyers; Alejandro Rebossio, "¿De Qué Se Trate la Reforma Judicial de Argentina?", *El País*, April 25, 2013, http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/04/17/actualidad/1366226590_024943.html

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23 About ARS900,000 using the official exchange rate.

24 Manzetti, "Accountability and Corruption in Argentina During the Kichners' Era," (2014), 191.

25 The exact date of this transaction is not completely certain, but sources close to the Kirchners confirmed this transaction did occur via the Lázaro Báez-Kirchner connection.

26 Manzetti, "Accountability and Corruption in Argentina During the Kirchners' Era," (2014), 187.

27 *Ibid.*, 192.

28 Gabriel Sued, "El Fiscal Anticorrupción Dijo que lo Limitaron y Renunció", *La Nación*, March 13, 2009.

29 *Ibid.*

30 Manzetti, "Accountability and Corruption in Argentina During the Kirchners' Era," (2014), 183.

31 *Ibid.*, 184.

32 Michael Warren, "Argentina Awash in Drug $", *Washington Times,* December 2, 2010 in Manzetti, "Accountability and Corruption in Argentina During the Kirchners' Era," 183

33 Victoria M. Murrillo, "Curtains for Argentina's Kirchner Era", (2015), 58.

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35 *Ibid.*

36 Heritage Foundation: 2015 Economic Index of Freedom, "Argentina",

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Succeeding with Security Sector Reform:

How Important is Local Ownership?

Karina Asbjørnsen

Externally supported Security Sector Reform (SSR) has developed into a key component of international peacebuilding agendas, but the outcomes have been mixed so far. This article examines the importance of local ownership in determining SSR results. Looking at the cases of Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it argues that executive commitment to reform is the minimum requirement to accomplish satisfactory technical results. To achieve the political goals of SSR, a more comprehensive involvement of local actors is necessary. External actors should therefore carefully consider whether the political situation is ripe before committing resources to SSR processes.

INTRODUCTION

Ensuring sustained peace and development in fragile or failed states emerging from violent conflict is a difficult task. Yet, it is one of the main challenges facing the international community today. Because the security institutions in conflict-ridden countries are often contributing to conflict rather than preventing it, Security

Sector Reform (SSR) has developed into a key component of international peacebuilding agendas.[1] In general, the aim of SSR is to increase states' ability to meet the security needs of their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and principles of governance, transparency, and the rule of law. [2]

However, the results of externally supported SSR processes have been varied. A key reason why successful SSR has been difficult to accomplish is that security reforms touch upon the very existence of a state and its monopoly of violence, and thus concern the most sensitive area of public policy. [3] As such, external interference is especially delicate and may create tensions between foreign powers and local governments if their objectives differ. If the external support is perceived to undermine local authority and priorities, this may have consequences for both the implementation of SSR, the probability of success, and the reform's sustainability.

In this article, I will examine the importance of local ownership in SSR by comparing the approaches to reform and the results achieved in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Inspired by the approach taken by Kühne and Pietz and Carlowitz in their work on local ownership in peacebuilding, I will evaluate the local ownership attained in each of the three cases by looking at the timing, degree and type of involvement.[4] The goal is to shed light on how varying levels of ownership affect reform outcomes, and how comprehensive the involvement of local actors needs to be for reforms to succeed.

This article finds that while comprehensive ownership was secured in Sierra Leone, only executive commitment was attained in Liberia. In the DRC, the external actors have not succeeded in ensuring local ownership at all. I argue that the executive commitment in Liberia portrays the minimum level of local ownership necessary to achieve satisfactory technical results, although a more comprehensive involvement of local actors may be necessary to accomplish the political goals of SSR. Because SSR requires significant changes in political culture and power relations, I sustain that it is a waste of money to embark on reform if the national government is not committed to supporting it. Several other factors affect the outcome of SSR processes, but top government officials acting as spoilers are a deal breaker for reform, as seen in the DRC. This conclusion implies that external partners should get SSR programs up and running as quickly as possible if the political situation is ripe, but spend their dollars elsewhere if not.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: A TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL PROCESS

SSR was introduced in the 1990s as a holistic approach to reforming security governance, enabled by the lifting of political constraints on security-related assistance after the

Cold War. Western donors used this opening to go beyond classical military aid and expand their involvement from training armies to establishing systems for democratic governance, oversight, and accountability in the security sector. The security sector is here understood to encompass "all the organizations that have the authority to use, or order the use of, force in order to protect communities, individuals, and the state."[5] Though SSR is relevant in other contexts, it is usually initiated as part of post-conflict reconstruction and/or transition to democracy.[6]

The concept of SSR is grounded in a broad understanding of security, encompassing not only territorial integrity and state security but also security for individuals and communities. It can be described as a human rights approach to security issues, emphasizing the right of every citizen to a safe environment. The United Nations Security Council has affirmed that SSR should aim at consolidating peace and stability, promoting poverty reduction, rule of law and good governance, extending legitimate state authority, and preventing countries from relapsing into conflict.[7] In other words, SSR aims to achieve both technical and political goals.

Herbert Wulf divides SSR objectives into four broad areas: the political dimension of ensuring democratic and civilian oversight, the economic dimension concerning the allocation of resources for security purposes, the social dimension of guaranteeing the security of all citizens, and the institutional dimension of establishing functioning institutions that can fulfill their duties. This complexity explains why SSR has proven so difficult – it is not only a technical matter of restructuring and training security forces but also a process of altering cultures, attitudes, and behaviors. It is an inherently political undertaking that involves changing power structures and thus creating winners and losers among the stakeholders.[8] This realization has led many actors to stress the necessity of local control over the reform process. Reflecting this notion, the OECD countries have agreed on making the development of local ownership a main objective of SSR, and stated that reforms should be "people-centered and locally-owned."[9]

There are both normative and practical reasons why the timing, degree, and type of local ownership in SSR are important. First of all, the UN Charter and other international legal documents stipulate the legal right to self-determination and the principle of national sovereignty. Even under a Chapter VII intervention, unless there is an executive mandate, self-determination and sovereignty continue to be important guidelines for all international action. Furthermore, peacebuilding efforts often fail because planning and implementation occurs without sufficient local knowledge and respect for local structures.[10] And finally, local ownership and capacity is crucial for the sustainability of reforms, as locals must be commit-

ted to their continuation when external actors leave.[11] Through the case studies, I will further illustrate how the level of involvement of local actors can affect SSR results.

DIFFERENCES IN APPROACHES AND RESULTS: SIERRA LEONE, LIBERIA, AND THE DRC

Sierra Leone's civil war started in 1991 and lasted for more than 10 years. When the war finally ended in 2002, the country embarked on a comprehensive SSR process with assistance from the United Kingdom and the UN. The state's infrastructure was dysfunctional after the conflict, its control over the territory was incomplete and trust in the security forces was low. Although SSR started as a top-to-bottom process led mainly by UK officials, Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson find that local ownership was extended significantly over time as the international mission handed over more responsibility to national government officials. Technical experts managed to transition from being implementers to advisers, and from 2006 onwards, civil society involvement increased in a comprehensive manner. Moreover, members of civil society gained important oversight roles on Local Policing Partnership Boards and District Security Committees.[12]

Today, surveys show that the armed forces and police in Sierra Leone are no longer considered a security threat and enjoy higher levels of trust in the population.[13] Although crime levels are worrying and corruption remains a problem, the SSR process is perceived to have been relatively successful. Albrecht and Jackson contribute the success largely to the leadership by a core of Sierra Leonean government officials, who provided a powerful consensus for reform and sustained the SSR effort over an extended period. Although other strategic and technical decisions are likely to have influenced the outcome, the case shows how local ownership can be important for SSR even when the government is very weak.

The approach taken in Liberia differs significantly from that taken in Sierra Leone. After two civil wars lasting for a total of 14 years, the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2003. While the Lomé Accord gave the Sierra Leonean government the formal responsibility for the SSR process, the CPA granted the Unites States a lead role in military reform. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was responsible for reform of the police and justice sectors. The US government decided to outsource the task of reconstructing the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) to the private military companies DynCorp International and Pacific Architects and Engineers Inc.[14] This approach proved to be problematic in several ways.

To commence, allowing the US to take the lead in such a key area of SSR meant that a foreign government was making important decisions about another state's future security capabilities. For example, the US and Dy-

nCorp decided that the AFL was to be created from scratch and limited to 2000 soldiers, neither of which was the Liberian government's initial plan.[15] Moreover, the extensive involvement of private military contractors had serious consequences for accountability and transparency. For instance, Dyn-Corp refused to report to the Liberian parliament, citing its contractual obligations to the US State department. The dominance of external actors led both Liberian government officials and civil society groups to criticize the reform process for lack of local ownership.[16]

Interestingly, even though the Liberian approach was less comprehensive in its degree, timing, and type of local ownership than that of Sierra Leone, the results are quite similar. Surveys in Liberia find equal improvements in the public perception of the security forces, and the new AFL is now declared fully operational.[17] A key reason behind the similar results may be the common denominator: executive commitment. The reforms in Liberia gained speed after the inauguration of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in January 2006. Sirleaf invested the country in the US led reconstruction efforts from the beginning.[18] Similarly, the strong ownership by key public officials has been cited as a key reason for success in Sierra Leone.[19]

The level of executive commitment to SSR in Liberia and Sierra Leone stands in stark contrast to the experience in the DRC. After the Second Congo War officially ended in 2003, international donors have invested large resources in attempts on SSR. However, the national authorities have resisted these efforts and provided no overall leadership.[20] Judging by the situation today, it seems that this lack of executive commitment may have been crucial for the reform outcome. Progress has been limited at best; Congolese security forces continue to pose a considerable threat to the civilian population and the state rests unable to control its territory.[21] President Kabila's government continues to be unwilling to change the power structures in the country. Thus, reform remains donor-driven and piecemeal with loosely connected activities, not resulting in the necessary structural or behavioral change.[22] Further complicating reform, the external actors have been uncoordinated and incoherent, making them less effective in putting pressure on Kabila's government.

SSR AND LOCAL OWNERSHIP: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE CASES?

The cases of Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the DRC highlight several issues concerning SSR and local ownership that are worth discussing further. It is necessary to realize that local actors do not constitute a homogeneous group, and it is clear from the cases that there is no coherent donor approach regarding which actors to include in the process. Therefore, which type of involvement is necessary for SSR to succeed?

When considering this question,

it may be useful to look separately at the achievement of the technical and political goals of SSR. The case of Liberia shows that it is possible to create functioning security forces with only executive commitment to reform, but the political objectives of SSR may have been sacrificed along the way. In fact, Desiré Nilsson and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs find that Liberia still lacks effective democratic oversight mechanisms in the security sector today. This is logical, as one would not expect a parliament that was excluded from the reform process to suddenly fulfill its duties. If one is subscribing to the OECD definition of SSR stated in the introduction to this article, solely achieving technical goals is not enough for reforms to be considered successful. Involving a broader spectrum of relevant political and civil society actors is necessary to make progress on democratic accountability and transparency.

In the DRC, where no local ownership has been attained, reform has failed to achieve neither technical nor political goals. The case shows clearly how it is futile to embark on SSR without a minimum of executive commitment. Every peacebuilding mission will need to deal with spoilers in an effective manner. But when the spoilers include top government officials, the international mission risks not only to be undermined but also to secure more power for actors who will not contribute to sustainable peace.[23] In this case, donors may experience a transition dilemma, having to choose between operating without local ownership or involving the very power structures that caused the conflict in the first place. One can argue that it is always better to do something than nothing, but in the case of the DRC, the scarce resources available may have been better spent on other causes.

First of all, the DRC experience shows how important it is to engage in SSR when the political situation is ripe, meaning that at least executive commitment to reform is present. Commitment may come from a sincere interest on behalf of the government or from a desperate need for tapping into donor money. In both Sierra Leone and Liberia, the post-war governments had little choice but to work with their Western partners. The fact that several administrative functions had ceased to exist also meant that there was less frictional resistance within the bureaucracy. In the DRC the situation is different, with no clear military victory ending the war and a government that is able to play donors off against each other due to the presence of actors such as China and South Africa.[24] When the political situation is ripe, donors need to push for reform quickly to succeed. However, without executive commitment, it may be wiser to wait for a window of opportunity.

Secondly, not only the timing of reforms but also the timing of local involvement must be right. Like other peacebuilding measures, SSR is a dynamic process in which factors change over time. The correct degree

and type of local responsibility at one point in the process may not be beneficial at another time. For example, in the case of Sierra Leone, UK officials found themselves having to take the lead on reforms immediately after the war, simply because the national government was not functioning.[25] As described above, however, the international mission could hand over responsibility progressively. This was not the case in Liberia, where much criticism originated from the US controlling the process for too long.[26]

Thirdly, the successful transfer of responsibility is closely linked to the issue of sustainability. Lack of sustainability in peacebuilding efforts is one of the key problems resulting from lack of local ownership.[27] Adedeji Ebo argues that the process must be driven by local actors to ensure the new security structures' legitimacy in the future. Donors may experience an intrusiveness dilemma, as overly intrusive decision-making by external actors tends to alienate local stakeholders, while less intrusive measures may not suffice to improve the situation.[28] The case of Liberia illustrates the tendency to posit a tension between efficient implementation and local ownership, and it will be interesting to see how sustainable reforms are in the long run. Either way, hurrying too much to achieve short-term goals may damage the long-term success of SSR.

Lastly, one may ask if it is possible to achieve improved democratic accountability in a security sector without a process characterized by democratic accountability. If SSR is supposed to be a new and holistic approach to reforming security governance, donors must be willing to operate differently than they did in the era of classical military aid. This does not mean that international concerns and priorities are not relevant, but these will not be realized if SSR is unsustainable. If donors operate without legitimacy, any results achieved may be short lived. As such, external actors must manage to set a good example by adhering to the values for which they themselves advocate.

Conclusions

In sum, local ownership in SSR processes is not simple, but it is important. The case analysis in this article has shown how executive commitment is the minimum amount of local ownership necessary to achieve the technical goal of creating functioning security forces. If dominant political elites are set on obstructing reforms, resources spent on SSR are likely to be wasted. Furthermore, I argue that a more comprehensive involvement of local actors, such as parliamentary bodies and relevant civil society representatives, is necessary to realize the political goals of SSR – democratic governance, oversight, and accountability in the security sector. It may not always be possible to attain comprehensive ownership immediately, but both normative and legal reasons should motivate external actors to hand over responsibility gradually as soon as the situation allows for it. Otherwise, both the reform outcome

and sustainability may be at risk if the process is perceived as illegitimate.

This article is not arguing that local ownership is the only factor determining the success of SSR. Other variables, including the strategy chosen for reconstruction and training of the armed forces and police, the resources available, and the initial security situation clearly play important roles. Nevertheless, this article has shed light on how and why the presence or lack of local ownership creates a tipping point determining whether or not reforms will succeed. As the relationship between local and external actors remains one of the most difficult aspects of SSR, it is essential to improve policy and practice to ensure stability in the world's conflict-ridden states and avoid wasting scarce resources on unsuccessful and unsustainable reforms.

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Political Leadership in Lebanon and the Jumblatt Phenomenon:

Tipping the Scales of Lebanese Politics

Sebastian Gerlach

For observers and scholars of contemporary Lebanese politics, an understanding of Lebanon's complex political dynamics is hardly possible without a thorough analysis of the role of Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the country's Druze community. Notwithstanding his sect's marginal size, Jumblatt has for almost four decades greatly determined the course of domestic developments. Particularly between 2000 and 2013, the Druze leader developed into a local kingmaker through his repeated switch in affiliations between Lebanon's pro- and anti-Syrian coalitions. This study argues that Jumblatt's political behavior during this important period in recent Lebanese history was driven by his determination to ensure the political survival of his Druze minority community. Moreover, it highlights that Jumblatt's ongoing command over the community, which appears to be impressive given his frequent political realignments, stems from his position as the dominating, traditional Druze za'im and because the minority community recognized his political maneuvering as the best mean to provide the Druze with relevance in Lebanon's political arena.

INTRODUCTION

For observers and scholars of contemporary Lebanese politics, a thorough understanding of the country's complex political dynamics is hardly possible without analyzing the role of Walid Jumblatt, the leader of Lebanon's Druze community. Indeed, Jumblatt has, despite the marginal size of his sect, for almost four decades played a pivotal role in the political arena of Lebanon. Widely considered the kingmaker in Lebanese politics,[1] Jumblatt particularly influenced the course of domestic politics between 2000 and 2013 by repeatedly switching affiliations between the opposing pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian coalitions in Lebanon. More precisely, Jumblatt went from a being a close ally of the Syrian regime during the 1990s to the figurehead of the anti-Syrian March-14 movement following the assassination of late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005. Thereafter, in 2009, he unexpectedly reconciled with Damascus and enabled the formation of a pro-Syrian government in 2011. In 2013, he changed camps yet again and ever since has been a vocal critic of the Assad regime and its allies in Lebanon.

Considering the pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian camps' fundamental differences in outlook regarding the future of Lebanon, it stands out that the Druze sect, Jumblatt's sole power base, obediently followed his political U-turns. This may seem surprising, because Lebanon's history abounds with political and communal leaders who failed to preserve their followership after altering their political orientation.[2] In this respect, it is even more puzzling that Jumblatt was able to maintain the support of his Druze community, known for its negative attitudes towards the prominent Shi'ite- March-8 member Hezbollah, when reconciling with the pro-Syrian forces in 2009 and enabling the establishment of a pro-Syrian government in 2011.

Yet academia has so far paid little attention to the Druze *za'im* (leader) and his maneuvering in Lebanese politics. While some scholars have published narrative accounts of Jumblatt's personal background and environment,[3] analytical work on his political actions is rare and perspectives on his leadership patterns are practically non-existent.[4] This paper offers a contribution to both the studies of Walid Jumblatt and broader contemporary Lebanese politics. Examining the greater period from 2000 until 2013, and particularly Jumblatt's reconciliation with the pro-Syrian camp in 2009, it seeks to understand why Jumblatt repeatedly switched affiliations between the opposing pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian coalitions. Moreover, it aims to identify how the Druze chieftain was able to maintain political legitimacy among his Druze followers while doing so.

The argument of this analysis is twofold. First, it is contended that Walid Jumblatt's decisions to change political camps were informed by his determination to ensure the political

survival of his Druze minority community. Second, the Druze followed Jumblatt both due to his command over the community as the dominating, traditional Druze *za'im* and because they recognized his political maneuvering as the best mean to provide the minority community with relevance in Lebanon's political arena.

This analysis has two central implications that are important for the studies of Lebanese politics. As a contribution to understanding Walid Jumblatt and his leadership, it helps to comprehend the unparalleled role the Druze *za'im* has played in Lebanon's political arena for almost four decades. Accordingly, the analysis of this paper may also help predict future developments in Lebanese politics, with particular reference to the Druze community. Moreover, following up on the observation of Marvan Rowayheb, that "there are few good analytical studies on individual political leaders in Lebanon,"[5] this analysis is a contribution to understanding leadership in Lebanese politics in general. Hence, it adds to the comprehension of the political culture of a country whose politics are largely shaped by individual political figures.

This paper proceeds in four main parts. It will begin by briefly sketching defining characteristics of Lebanon's history and politics. Next, it will conduct a synopsis on the Druze sect in Lebanon until the Lebanese civil war and provide an overview on Walid Jumblatt's early years as Druze *za'im*. Then, the paper will analyze Jumblatt's leadership style during the period of 2000 until 2013. Lastly, it will conclude with a prognosis concerning Jumblatt's possible future political maneuvering, particularly in terms of adapting to changing conditions in neighboring Syria.

A DIVIDED NATION: LEBANON'S CONTEMPORARY HISTORY AND POLITICS

Modern Lebanon and its controversial sectarian political system stem from the reorganization of the Middle East after World War I. As part of the French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon, the Lebanese nation came into being as an artificial political entity carved out of the Levantine region. Eager to apply divide-and-rule politics in order to facilitate control over its dominion,[6] the French mandate conceived Lebanon as a multi-sectarian nation and implemented a confessional political and bureaucratic system designed to give each of Lebanon's sects a proportional share of influence in the new state.[7] However, in a bid to favor its longtime regional protégés, France ensured disproportionate Christian control over the state at the expense of all other confessions. In so doing, French policies not only institutionalized segregation between Lebanon's sects and established a political structure that was inherently divisive, but also created a highly uneven power balance which marginalized major communities within the nascent state.[8]

The flawed sectarian system induced critical tensions among the

Lebanese and eventually plunged the country into a vicious civil war in the 1970s and 1980s. After gaining independence in 1943, the Lebanese political establishment agreed on maintaining the French-imposed sectarian state.[9] However, domestic and regional developments of the 1950s and 1960s, including a growing Muslim population and the influx of Palestinians into Lebanon, put an increasing strain on the confessional system and weakened the Lebanese state. As a result, mounting sectarian tensions escalated and led to the outbreak of a 15 year-long civil war in 1975. While this conflict was, from a domestic perspective, predominantly characterized by Christian-Muslim competition over control of the state, it was also marked by Lebanon's emergence as a primary décor for regional power politics. In particular, the country's rival neighboring states of Israel and Syria faced off against each other in the Lebanese arena and supporting opposing Lebanese factions intervened heavily in the conflict. Over the course of the war, the Israel-supported Christian warring parties were increasingly put on the defensive whilst Syria and its local allies, first and foremost the Lebanese Shi'ites, gradually gained the upper hand and finally took hold of Lebanon in 1990.[10]

Lebanon thus came under Syrian tutelage during the 1990s. While the resolution of the civil war saw the implementation of an adjusted sectarian power-sharing formula aimed at creating a more balanced political system,[11] the Lebanese were not able to truly determine their own fate following the war. Rather, Syrian occupation turned the country into a de-facto protectorate. Masterminding Lebanon's domestic politics, Damascus began to brutally suppress any opposition to its rule but also allowed handpicked allies, most importantly the Shi'ite parties Amal and Hezbollah, Sunni leader Rafik Hariri, and Druze Walid Jumblatt, to extend their power bases and profit from the reconstruction of Lebanon.[12]

However, in 2005, Syria was forced to withdraw from Lebanon. In the early 2000s, domestic resistance to Syrian influence gained momentum as the new Syrian ruler, Bashar al-Assad, began to alienate Rafik Hariri and Walid Jumblatt. At the same time, mostly due to U.S. foreign policy changes, international pressure on Damascus to terminate control over Lebanese politics intensified. In February 2005, tensions escalated when then-Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in a bombing allegedly orchestrated by the Syrian regime. Consequentially, following massive popular demonstrations, Syria was pressured to withdraw from Lebanon.[13]

Despite this development, Lebanon was not yet able to escape the clout of its powerful neighbor. Against the backdrop of the Syrian question, Lebanese society and politics split into two opposing camps: the pro-Syrian, Shi'a-controlled March-8 coalition and the anti-Syrian March-14 alli-

ance, led by the Sunni Future Movement and Walid Jumblatt.[14] As tensions between the two blocs increased, the domestic power balance tipped in favor of the pro-Syrian elements in the late 2000s. Though the March-14 movement won the national elections of 2005 and dominated the government, it proved incapable of implementing the political changes necessary to distance Lebanon from Syrian interference. Especially Hezbollah, with its strong military wing, continued to act as a state-within-a-state. Attempts to diminish the influence of the Shi'ite party eventually resulted in a 'mini civil war' in May 2008, when Hezbollah occupied Beirut and induced the collapse of the March-14 government.[15]

Following the 2008 Beirut clashes, the March-14 project collapsed. Since shifts in the international political landscape had removed pressure on Syria to stop interfering in Lebanese affairs, the anti-Syrian forces were marginalized. This setback became evident with the formation of a national unity government in July 2008. In fact, the construction of this government accorded official veto power over Lebanese politics to the March-8 camp. Moreover, in July 2009, Walid Jumblatt's surprise defection from the March-14 alliance dealt a critical blow to the anti-Syrian movement. The defeat of March-14 was made final when the Druze chieftain enabled the formation of a March-8 government in 2011.[16]

Since then, the Syrian civil war and regional competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran have continued to re-shuffle the cards in Lebanon. In 2013, the March-8 government collapsed and was replaced by another national unity government that stayed in power until December 2016. Today, Lebanon suffers first and foremost from sectarian strife between Sunnis and Shi'ites whereby the impacts of the latest political developments remain to be seen.[17]

THE DRUZE OF LEBANON AND KAMAL JUMBLATT

The Lebanese Druze faced a difficult integration into the newly created Lebanon after World War I. In general, the Druze are an ethnoreligious minority in the Middle East which primarily lives in contemporary Israel, Syria, and Lebanon.[18] Residents of Mount Lebanon since the Middle Ages, the Druze community of modern Lebanon had traditionally been the dominant force in the poorly accessible mountainous region. However, in the 19th century, increasing clan rivalries among the Druze and a mounting conflict with Mount Lebanon's growing Maronite community led to a decline in Druze power. Most importantly, the French-backed Christian victory in the Maronite-Druze civil war of 1860 resulted in the collapse of the formerly dominant Druze feudal system and paved the way for Christian domination over Mount Lebanon.[19] As a result, after the creation of modern Lebanon in 1920, the Druze were politically marginalized, and the newly implemented sectarian system

allowed the former lords of Mount Lebanon only minimal political influence.[20]

Nevertheless, during the first decades following Lebanon's independence, the Druze were able to regain political prestige under the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt. An Arab nationalist and stout supporter of the Palestinian cause, Kamal Jumblatt criticized the overwhelmingly pro-Western outlook of the Maronite-Christian elites and disdained the flawed sectarian system. Thus, as the founder of the officially secular – yet mostly Druze – Progressive Socialist Party (PSP),[21] he gradually emerged as the most significant Lebanese opposition leader to the ruling Maronite establishment.[22]

The beginning of the Lebanese civil war marked both the heyday and end of Kamal Jumblatt's power. By the 1970s, Jumblatt had not only become the dominating figure of the Lebanese Druze, marginalizing other clans,[23] but he had also built an impressive power base that comprised leftist-Christian, Lebanese-Muslim, and Palestinian elements. After the outbreak of civil strife in 1975, which initially pitted Jumblatt's leftist, pan-Arab coalition against the Maronite-Christian front, the chieftain quickly gained the upper hand. Yet, while Damascus had previously supported Jumblatt to counterbalance the pro-Western Maronites, his growing dominance posed a threat to Syria's own political agenda. Hence, in 1976, Syria intervened in Lebanon on behalf of the Christian establishment

and soon contained Jumblatt. Facing military defeat and both international and domestic isolation, Kamal was eventually assassinated in March 1977 and the Druze revival abruptly stopped.[24]

THE LEBANESE CIVIL WAR, THE ASCENT OF WALID JUMBLATT, AND THE DRUZE-SYRIAN ALLIANCE

Born in 1949 as Kamal Jumblatt's only son, Walid Jumblatt belongs to a prominent Druze dynasty. Originally hailing from the Aleppo region in northern Syria, the Jumblatt-clan emigrated to Mount Lebanon in the 17th century and began to play an active role in communal politics only shortly thereafter. During the inner-Druze conflict for supremacy of the 18th and early 19th century, the Jumblatts emerged together with the rival Yazbaki-clan at the forefront of Druze political life and became an influential force in Mount Lebanon. Although the general decline of the Druze community after 1860 also diminished the Jumblatt's importance in modern Lebanon, Kamal Jumblatt helped keep the dynasty at the forefront of domestic politics. Interestingly, during his youth in the 1960s and 1970s, Walid was not interested in participating in his father's activism. Educated at the American University of Beirut (AUB), Walid refrained from any political involvement. Rather, he worked as a journalist at the famous Lebanon leftist daily An-Nahar and was known for being a playboy who frequently broke with Druze tradition, for example by marrying a

non-Druze woman.[25]

Nevertheless, following his father's assassination in 1977, Walid Jumblatt became the primary chieftain of the Lebanese Druze community and was forced to navigate the Lebanese Druze through the turmoil of the civil war. The prominence of the Jumblatt-clan and Kamal Jumblatt's standing among the Druze provided Walid with initial legitimacy in the community.[26] However, his position became more complicated as the young *za'im* faced increasing sectarian conflict during the 1980s. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, allied Christian-Maronite militias moved into traditionally Druze-held territories south of Beirut and intended to expel the Druze from their ancestral homeland. In response to this threat to the Druze community's very existence, Jumblatt launched an all-out campaign against the Christian militias following Israel's sudden withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983. During this conflict, the so-called Mountain War, lasting from 1983 until 1984, Jumblatt's forces drove the Christians out of the Druze heartland and the young chieftain gained a decisive victory.[27]

The outcome of the Mountain War not only preserved the Druze but also contributed crucially to Jumblatt's communal standing, making him the uncontested leader of the Druze minority. Firstly, Jumblatt's authority went unquestioned as the credibility of the rival Arslan-clan, which had become the dominating family of the Yazbaki, was undermined given their long-term collusion with Maronite elites.[28] Moreover, the Mountain War had elevated Jumblatt's PSP as the main defender of the Druze and enshrined the party as the primary political voice of the community.[29] In this respect, due to the de-facto disappearance of Lebanese state authority over the Druze regions during the civil war, Jumblatt began to use the PSP to oversee the fiefdom's administration and established a sophisticated, feudal patronage network which, from then on, would serve as the foundation of his communal power.[30]

Jumblatt further secured his political role in the Lebanese arena and the well-being of his Druze community by forging a strategic alliance with the Syrian regime. Already in 1977, shortly after the assassination of his father, Jumblatt decided to reconcile with the Syrian regime. Although Syrian President Hafez al-Assad was alleged to have ordered the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt, Walid visited Damascus and mended fences with the autocrat. Acknowledging that the survival of the Druze was only possible by acquiring a powerful foreign sponsor, Jumblatt allied himself with the Syrian regime. Over the course of the Lebanese civil war, this relationship between Jumblatt and the Syrian regime deepened. Most importantly, Damascus provided significant logistic support to the Druze chieftain, enabling him to further establish his fiefdom in the Chouf and Aley.[31]

The importance of this alliance continued even after 1990. Syria's

control over the Lebanese political system enabled Jumblatt to fortify his control of the Druze community. Benefiting from gerrymandering of electoral districts and receiving access to state resources in the form of important cabinet positions,[32] Jumblatt strengthened his patronage network. In turn, his network helped him keep the community united under his leadership. For instance, to prevent the Arslan-clan from regaining influence, Jumblatt co-opted a numerous Yazbaki activists and offered them positions in his various organizations.[33] Among these individuals were Marwan Hamadeh and Gaza Aridi who, on behalf of the PSP, held important government posts throughout the last 25 years and remain some of Jumblatt's closest advisors.[34] Having carved out an important place for both himself and his community, Jumblatt thus emerged from the civil war as the Druze's uncontested communal leader.

WALID JUMBLATT LEAVES THE SYRIAN SPHERE OF INFLUENCE

Walid Jumblatt's honeymoon with Syria cooled down considerably during the late 1990s. Following its total occupation of Lebanon in 1990, Damascus had organically pursued a policy of mutual coexistence with its Lebanese allies, granting them considerable leeway with regards to domestic politics. This approach had given Jumblatt and the Druze community significant political influence, despite the confirmation of the Druze's marginal status in the adjusted sectarian power-sharing formula implemented in 1989. However, power shifts in Syria during the mid-1990s changed this modus operandi. Eager to systematically eliminate opposition to his succession, Bashar al-Assad, son and heir apparent to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, started out on a process of purging the upper echelons of the Syrian regime from possible threats. In addition, Bashar tightened control over Lebanon out of fear that the close ties between Lebanon's pro-Syrian clients, in particular Rafik Hariri and Walid Jumblatt, and major figures of the old Syrian elite would pose a danger to him. Finally, in 1998, he arranged the election of his protégé Emile Lahoud as president of Lebanon and sidelined Hariri and Jumblatt politically, excluding them from the newly formed government.[35]

Jumblatt responded to these drastic changes by turning against Syria in a strategic manner. Alarmed by his waning influence and afraid that the Assad regime would orchestrate his defeat in the parliamentary elections of 2000, Jumblatt began to position himself as an outspoken critic of Syria's interference in Lebanon. He formed alliances with the mostly Christian opposition to Syria in a bid for votes from Christian voters in Aley and the Chouf.[36] In August 2000, this shift paid off when the Druze leader and his new allies won a landslide victory alongside Rafik Hariri in the parliamentary elections. Thereafter, with Hariri being reinstated as prime minister, Jumblatt was allotted an important role in the new government.[37]

Following this success, Jumblatt remained a critic of Syria and was rewarded for his stances with great domestic popularity. Unlike Hariri, who pursued reconciliation with the new Syrian leadership, Jumblatt further distanced himself from his former patron and called for fundamental political change in Lebanon. As a result, Jumblatt's standing in Damascus declined drastically. The Syrian regime pursued a strategy designed to undermine Jumblatt's standing, declaring him a persona non grata and courting Druze rivals of Jumblatt.[38] However, these attempts proved unsuccessful. Instead of turning against him, both Jumblatt's Druze and his newly gained Christian followers expressed massive support for him. In late 2000, thousands of Druze, as well as many Christians, held a massive rally at the Jumblatts' ancestral home despite warnings from Syria.[39] Moreover, prominent Druze religious figures expressed their support for Jumblatt, declaring that the "sheikhs and members of the Druze community are very upset and angry about what Jumblatt has been subjected to."[40]

Considering Syria's grip on Lebanon, it appears impressive that Jumblatt maintained his domestic standing after having renounced ties with his former patron. Indeed, the Assad regime's inability to sideline the Druze *za'im* can be attributed to Jumblatt's well-established feudal power base in the Druze community and to the Druze's trust in the political capacities of their leader.

More precisely, Jumblatt maintained authority primarily because he was able to rely on the above-described patronage system that he had crafted during and after the civil war. For instance, in 2000, Jumblatt's main rival, Syria-supportive Talal Arslan, only got elected into parliament "thanks to Jumblatt's not placing a Druze challenger in his path."[41] Likewise, knowing that a strong Lebanese state would have come at the expense of his dominance over the Druze, Jumblatt had even after 1990 opposed government authority in the Chouf and Aley.[42] Therefore, having had successfully marginalized opposition within his community and monopolized administrative authority over the Druze throughout the 1990s, Jumblatt could alter his political stances towards Syria without fearing substantial repercussions arising within the Druze community.

Moreover, it can be inferred that Jumblatt's previous successful protection of the Druze created a strong sense of followership which was immune to outside interference. Indeed, Jumblatt's decision to establish himself as a critic of the Syrian role in Lebanon reflected his previous efforts to safeguard the Druze community. Against the backdrop of Lebanon's highly sectarian state, Jumblatt's decision to join sides with the Christian opposition coincided with the Druze political reality in Lebanon. As Michael Young notes, "after 1992 Jumblatt revived a time-honored belief that his community's future was inex-

orably tied to that of the Maronites."[43] In an increasingly Sunni-Shi'a dominated Lebanon, Jumblatt knew that the small Druze population could only remain a political factor if it renewed its relations with the sidelined Christians and thus entered their struggle against Syrian domination.[44] Hence, acknowledging Jumblatt's previous strategic successes, the Druze were given a strong incentive to stand behind their leader despite his break with Damascus.

WALID JUMBLATT AT THE FOREFRONT OF THE CEDAR REVOLUTION

Reaffirmed in his position, Jumblatt continued to step up his criticism of Syria's inference in Lebanon in the mid-2000s. He started to openly condemn the political role of Syria's proxy Hezbollah. Moreover, Jumblatt continuously denounced the Syria-backed policies of President Émile Lahoud and his political entourage. When the Assad regime forced the Lebanese parliament to extend Lahoud's presidential term for another three years in 2004, Jumblatt and Hariri undertook more tangible steps against Syria. Encouraged by wide-ranging international support,[45] they formed a broad anti-Syrian coalition and openly called for the total withdrawal of Syria's military and intelligence units.[46]

Following the assassination of Rafik Hariri in February 2005, Jumblatt emerged as the primary leader of the anti-Syrian opposition. Emboldened by the international support for the anti-Syrian project and the electoral victory of the newly formed March-14 coalition in the 2005 parliamentary election,[47] Jumblatt attempted to position himself as a true national leader and engineer sustainable change in Lebanon. In particular, he began to drastically lash out at Hezbollah, accusing the organization of aiding Syrian interference and trying to take Lebanon hostage:

> *"Hezbollah's ideology is the biggest threat to Lebanon's future and peaceful coexistence and democracy… Hezbollah has a plan and this plan is to bring the country under its control. It had built strong institutions, a military arsenal, and a network of communications [that are] much better than the ones of the Lebanese state."[48]*

He further declared:

> *"Hezbollah is a tool in the hands of Iran and Syria… Its weapons are a big threat to Lebanon's internal stability and should be brought under the control of the Lebanese state."[49]*

In fact, Jumblatt understood that a new Lebanon marked by true national coexistence and ensuring the safety of the Druze minority could only be achieved by removing Syria's influence on the country and undermining the superior position of Syria's allies, first and foremost Hezbollah. Ever since the creation of the Shi'a militia, Jumblatt had feared its staunchly Islamist agenda, which posed a real threat to the Druze community. The relationship between the Druze and

Hezbollah had thereby been "characterized by total political dissonance, an absolute conflict of interests between those who aim at preserving the status quo of a pluralistic society [the Druze] and those seeking, from the point of view of the former, its ultimate dissolution [Hezbollah]."[50]

While Jumblatt was the head of the March-14 movement in 2006 and 2007, the situation had become even more precarious for the Druze. Leaked US cables reveal that Jumblatt was not only concerned that Hezbollah intended to become a permanent state-within-a-state. He also increasingly feared Shi'ite population growth and Hezbollah's massive efforts to purchase land in traditionally Druze and Christians areas in the mountain regions southeast of Beirut (primarily the Chouf).[51] More precisely, he was afraid that Hezbollah intended "to cut the traditional Druze territory in half and install a Shia population loyal to Hezbollah."[52] Hence, the Druze chieftain was determined to reduce Hezbollah's power, and, in 2008, tensions between Jumblatt and the Shi'a militia escalated. As Hezbollah and its March-8 allies had brought the March-14-dominated government to a standstill and disputes between both camps over the successor of Emile Lahoud further paralyzed the country, Jumblatt publicly revealed clandestine information on Hezbollah's communication networks and urged the Lebanese government to dismantle these activities. In response, Hezbollah invaded both Beirut, defeating private security forces aligned with Saad Harri's Sunni Future Movement, and the Chouf and Aley District, battling Druze fighters belonging to Jumblatt.[53]

Jumblatt's authority among the Druze appeared to have been ambivalent during his time as spearhead of the anti-Syrian coalition. On the one hand, Jumblatt scored considerable victories in the municipal elections of 2004 and the parliamentary election of 2005 while the results of his Druze rivals were rather mediocre.[54] This can be interpreted as a clear sign of support for Jumblatt's political shift, as the Druze, as aforementioned, considered his new approach beneficial for the community's long-term well-being. On the other hand, Jumblatt was eager to receive continued financial support from the international Arab sponsors of the March-14 movement, most importantly Saudi Arabia, in order to maintain his feudal patronage network and outspend his Druze rivals. For instance, US cables reveal Jumblatt's criticism of Saad Hariri for not supplying him with the same amounts Rafik Hariri had used to,[55] and state that Jumblatt almost ran out of cash in mid-2006.[56] Thus, it seems that Jumblatt's patronage network was challenged during this period and that his feudal authority was at least to some extent under pressure.

Nevertheless, given Hezbollah's expansionist agenda, it can be argued that Jumblatt's fierce anti-Hezbollah stances generally matched Druze public opinion and that the Druze thus

firmly supported their *za'im*. When the Shi'a militia entered Aley and the Chouf in May 2008, the Druze rallied behind Jumblatt and fervently battled the intruders. Even fighters belonging to Talal Arslan, who had joined the Hezbollah-led March-8 camp and continued to be an ally to Syria, joined the combat on behalf of Jumblatt and fought against Hezbollah.[57] Likewise, the emergence of the radical Druze group Dai Ammar, which received attention during the 2008 clashes due to its grim resistance towards Hezbollah, highlights the Druze disdain of Hezbollah. Vowing to protect the Druze people and homeland at any cost, the group's standpoints were far more radical than Jumblatt's policy.[58] Therefore, it can be concluded that the Druze were ready to follow their communal chieftain and remained loyal throughout the mid-2000s, even as conflict shook the community.

WALID JUMBLATT TIPPING THE SCALES

However, in the aftermath of the 2008 conflict, Jumblatt recognized that the weakness of the March-14 project could seriously endanger the Druze community. The 'mini civil war' of 2008 had not only revealed the inability of the anti-Syrian movement to bring about real change in Lebanon, but had also demonstrated the continuous strength of the pro-Syrian camp. Recognizing the defeat of March-14 and particularly the Druze's powerlessness, Jumblatt, in discussions with U.S. diplomats, accused Hezbollah of trying to remove the Druze from the Chouf, yet acknowledged that the

Hezbollah-led March-8 camp had won.[59] Commenting on his decision to prevent his militiamen from going after defeated Hezbollah fighters, he remarked:

> *"I am avoiding war… because I don't want the Druze to be 'cleansed' from the Chouf. I don't care if I lose my personal prestige in the process… I'm a politician. Setbacks happen. We must accept it and move on. They [Hezbollah and its March-8 allies] have humiliated us, but what can we do now?"* [60]

The March-14 defeat was indeed serious. The Doha agreement of May 2008, a meeting involving all major Lebanese factions aimed at dispersing tensions and creating a new political modus vivendi, underlined the defeat of the anti-Syrian project and implied that "a new political geography had been created in Lebanon in which the Shiite community controls access to political power in Lebanon and no government can rule without Shiite approval."[61] Moreover, the departure of the hawkish Bush administration and the coming to power of Barack Obama, who promoted a rapprochement with Damascus, combined with attempts by Saudi Arabia to improve ties with Bashar al-Assad showed Jumblatt that international support for his endeavors was crumbling.[62]

Therefore, in a strategic attempt to protect the Druze, Jumblatt decided to abandon his staunch anti-Syrian orientation. Aware of the collapse of international support for the March-14 project and of an imminent

rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Syria, which would have forced Saad Hariri to alter his stances towards Damascus, Jumblatt wanted to avoid Druze isolation at any cost.[63] He knew that the Druze could not bear a lasting conflict with the Shi'ites and their Syrian patron.

Rather, Jumblatt reconciled with the pro-Syrian forces in Lebanon. After he had realized that it was impossible to break Hezbollah's grip on Lebanon, he decided that it was better for the sake of Druze survival to side with the winning party.[64] Having officially remained committed to the movement until June 2009, in order to manipulate the alliance to secure victory in the parliamentary elections of the same year,[65] Jumblatt finally declared his departure from the anti-Syrian collation in August 2009. Entirely shifting his rhetoric, he remarked, that "protecting the Druze will be realized by means of the broad Arab horizon… Their protection lies in Arabism and in Syria – without which they will be trampled."[66]

Accordingly, throughout 2009 and 2010, Jumblatt worked relentlessly on reconciliation with the pro-Syrian forces in Lebanon, first and foremost Hezbollah, and the Syrian regime.[67] In 2011, Jumblatt finally formed a tactical alliance with the pro-Syrian camp. Contributing to the breakdown of Saad Hariri's national unity government in January, he enabled the formation of a March-8 government in June of the same year.[68]

The Druze followed Jumblatt un-enthusiastically this time. In a closed-door meeting with several important Druze sheikhs in June 2008, Jumblatt struggled to win the religious authorities for his policy of reconciliation.[69] In addition, Jumblatt's support for the formation of a March-8-led government "left his community at a loss for words and many of its members torn between conflicting sentiments" whereby "Druze in the Chouf Mountains were up in arms [over Jumblatt's stances].[70] Considering the community's general suspicion against Hezbollah's practices and the clashes of May 2008, these attitudes are not surprising.

Yet Jumblatt had to face neither serious criticism nor Druze opposition to his approach towards Syria and March-8. Rather, the community stood behind their za'im and "many of Jumblatt's followers said they understand his tactic."[71]

Clearly, Jumblatt's well-established feudal standing made it impossible for anyone to seriously challenge his authority. Since 1983, Jumblatt had been the uncontested communal leader of the Druze and, over the decades, his authority had essentially marginalized any other voices in the community.[72] Besides, the only real existing opposition to Jumblatt, the Arslan-clan, was already a Hezbollah ally and in fact coordinated Jumblatt's reconciliation with the pro-Syrian camp.[73] Thus, he enjoyed substantial room for maneuvering with regards to Druze communal politics and made use of this freedom when switch-

ing sides after 2009. Nevertheless, it would be too simple to just ascribe the support to Jumblatt's feudal sway.

Rather, the Druze leader's overall success at safeguarding the community and providing it with political relevance constituted the main reason behind his status. In the sectarian power-sharing system of modern Lebanon, the numerically inferior Druze have been allotted only minimal powers. Being given eight parliamentary seats and no guaranteed prominent position in the state or the bureaucracy, the community is formally deprived of any political clout. However, Jumblatt's acumen had constantly placed the Druze at the center of Lebanese politics, allowing the community to play a role that greatly exceeded their formal powers. Considering that Jumblatt tipped the scales between the March-14 movement and the March-8 camp after his defection from the anti-Syrian camp, his reconciliation with the pro-Syrian forces implied that the Druze once again exerted disproportional political influence.

Thus, Jumblatt has succeeded at deeply enshrining his role among the Druze, who depend on his skills in order to compensate for their formal political insignificance. Indeed, as Abbas Halabi notes, "only the presence of Walid Jumblatt is compensating for this general weakness through the political and social mobilization that he generates."[74] Jumblatt himself recognizes this pattern and replied once when asked about his political moti-

vation: "I have these 200,000 Druse I have to look out for."[75] The apparent 'weather vane,' Jumblatt essentially never changed his fundamental political principle of protecting the Druze at all costs, a behavior rewarded by his people with absolute followership.

The latest episode of Jumblatt's performance was detectable after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, when Jumblatt turned anew against Syria. Once again, he criticized the Assad regime and condemned Hezbollah for intervening in the conflict against Lebanese interests and committing war crimes.[76] In 2014, Jumblatt and Saudi Arabia engineered the formation of Tamman Salam's national unity government. In doing so, Jumblatt once again occupied a political role that was larger than the Druze's formal role in Lebanese politics.[77] As of today, Jumblatt is still a critic of Damascus, but he has been keen to grant himself considerable political flexibly within Lebanon's domestic political arena.[78]

Conclusion and Outlook

In 1977, Walid Jumblatt succeeded his late father, Kamal Jumblatt, as the primary *za'im* of the Lebanese Druze. Today, almost 40 years later, Walid continues to be the uncontested leader of his community. Over the last four decades, he has established a firm position within in the Druze community through his feudal patronage network. Moreover, during this time, Jumblatt has continuously won over his Druze followers and

has created an approach to domestic leadership which, despite its seemingly unpredictable flip-flopping, has always been guided by a steady will to safeguard his community.

Based on the results of this analysis, it can be predicted that Jumblatt's determination to protect his people will continue to determine his policies in the future. Thus, considering the current course of the Syrian civil war, it is very likely that the Jumblatt *za'im* would shift his outlook again if the Assad regime was to reemerge as the dominant political player in the Levant. This time, however, the path to reconciliation would be cleared by Walid Jumblatt's first son, Taymour, who will run for parliament in the general elections of 2017 instead of his father.[79] After forty years at the forefront of Lebanese politics, Walid seems ready to gradually retire and let his offspring continue his legacy.[80] Hence, the prospects for future Druze politics appear to be set, and Taymour's marriage with the daughter of a prominent Shi'ite family[81] can be interpreted as a sign to which political side the Jumblatts' will mostly likely lean in the near future.

This study has also exemplified the importance of leadership in Lebanon and has therefore highlighted the importance of studying Lebanese political leaders for understanding the country's politics. Thus, considering that studies on Lebanese political leadership are rare, it calls on academia to conduct further research on the topic. Moreover, having shed light on a *za'im* who stands out among Lebanon's leaders, this analysis has also underlined the impacts of individual political acumen.

Therefore, this paper concludes with an appeal to Lebanon's political class to create a more capable Lebanese state. Considering the country's manifold challenges and its recurring political stalemates, Lebanon is in dire need of stronger institutional structures that move political power away from sectarian chieftains and enable political practices which truly serve the public interest.

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NOTES

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3 See for example Gary C. Gambill and Daniel Nassif, "Walid Jumblatt," *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin* 3, no. 5 (2001), accessed December 9, 2016, https://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0105_ld1.htm; Sami Moubayed, "Syria Loses its Former Ally in Lebanon, Druze Leader Walid Jumblatt," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* 20, no. 1 (2001): 35-36, accessed December 9, 2016, http://www.wrmea.org/2001-january-february/2001-january-february-table-of-contents.html.

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5 Rowayheb, "Walid Jumblat and Political Alliances," 49.

6 Ayse Tekdal Fildis, "The Troubles in Syria: Spawned by French Divide and Rule," *Middle East Policy* 18, no. 4 (2011): 132-133.

7 Lebanon has 18 recognized sects, including various Christian and Muslim denominations. The census of 1932, the only official census ever conducted in Lebanon, showed a slight Christian majority of 51% (mostly Maronites and Greek Orthodox) over a Muslim minority of 49% (mostly Sunnis and Shi'ites). Today, unofficial figures estimate the Christian share of the population to be around 40% while Muslims account for the remaining 60%. Lebanon's Druze, who are considered Muslim by law, have ever since the creation of the Lebanese nation been a minority, accounting for no more than 5 to 6% of the country's total resident citizens. See CIA, The World Factbook Lebanon, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, continually updated, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html.

8 William Harris, Lebanon: A History 600-2011 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 186-190; Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, 2nd ed. (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 88-90.

9 In 1943, Lebanon's political elite adopted the so-called National Pact, an unwritten agreement that clearly defined independent Lebanon as a multi-confessional state. The general framework of the National Pact, determining that the Lebanese President must always be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister always a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament always a Shia Muslim constitutes the foundation of Lebanese politics still today. See Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, 110-112.

10 Samir Makdisi and Richard Sadaka, The Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990 (Beirut: American University of Beirut Institute of Financial Economics, 2003), 7-40.

11 In 1989, the Lebanese elites agreed on so-called Taef-Agreement, which modified the confessional distribution of powers and gave

the Lebanese Muslim communities political weight, but yet reaffirmed the inherent sectarian nature of the Lebanese state. The Taef-Agreement shifted powers away from the Christian presidency and strengthened the Sunni Prime Minister as well as the Shi'a Speaker of Parliament. Furthermore, Taef introduced a 5-5 ratio of parliament members between Christians and Muslims, abandoning the 6:5 in favor of Christians stipulated by the National Pact. See Makdisi and Sadaka, The Lebanese Civil War, 35-40.

12 Harris, Lebanon: A History 600-2011, 258-269.

13 Nicholas Blanford, Killing Mr Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and its Impact on the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 40-70.

14 After 2005, Lebanon also emerged as a pronounced area of regional competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, with the former backing particularly the Lebanese Sunnis led by Saad Hariri's Future Movement and the later backing the Lebanese Shi'ites led by Hezbollah. See Harris, Lebanon: A History 600-2011, 269-276.

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17 As of today, Lebanon is marked by yet another reshuffling of domestic alliances that has brought an end to the post-2005 bipolarity. While sectarian tensions, inner division, and infighting remain, the clear division of the political scene into March-8 and March-14 has ceased to exist. Nevertheless, the election of Hezbollah ally Michel Aoun as president in October 2016 seems to indicate that the Iran-backed Shi'ites have strengthened their position. See Nazih Osserian, "Presidential election will shuffle political deck," The Daily Star, October 31, 2016, accessed December 9,

2016, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2016/Oct-31/378876-presidential-election-will-shuffle-political-deck.ashx.

18 Emerging in Egypt around the year 1000, the Druze doctrine arouse out of Shia Islam as well as pre-Islamic religious and philosophical trends. From the outset, the believers of the Druze religion became victims of discrimination. Hence, to flee persecution, the Druze settled in the following centuries primarily in the mountainous regions of the Levant, forming homogenous communities that ever since have been characterized by a strong seclusiveness. Moreover, the Druze have since early days rested their survival on the internal cohesion of the community and utmost solidary among its members. See Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 2nd ed. (Jefferson NC: McFarland, 2002), 94-100.

19 Harris, Lebanon: A History 600-2011, 69-103; Abbas Halabi, The Druze: A New Cultural and Historical Appreciation (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2015), Kindle Edition, 1000-1114, 3598-3713.

20 Up until the mid-19th century, the Druze had constituted the majority of inhabitants in Mount Lebanon, and even after the Christians superseded them, the Druze continued to be the dominant minority in their homeland. However, following the creation of Greater Lebanon and the incorporation of mostly Muslim areas into the new entity, the Druze segment of Lebanon's populations dwindled significantly and fell behind the Maronite, Sunni, Greek-Orthodox, and Shia share. See Rania Maktabi, "The Lebanese census of 1932 revisited. Who are the Lebanese?," British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 26, no. 2 (1999): 219-241.

21 The PSP was founded as a secular, socialist party and attracted considerable followership among leftist Christians and Shi'a Muslims. Nevertheless, Kamal Jumblatt also conceived it to create a political basis for the Druze and cunningly used the party as a tool for dominating his community. Accordingly, it is important to note that Kamal Jumblatt's control over the PSP was tantamount to having control over most of the Lebanese Druze. See Yusri Hazran, The Druze Community and the Lebanese State: Between Confrontation and Reconcilia-

tion (London: Routledge, 2014), 57-58.

22 Gambill and Nassif, "Walid Jumblatt"; Hazran, The Druze Community, 160-207.

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26 Following feudal customs, Walid Jumblatt succeeded Kamal Jumblatt as za'im and party leader of the PSP because he was the latter's first and only son. See Nazih Richani, Dilemmas of Democracy and Poltical Parties in Sectarian Societies: The Case of the PSP in Lebanon (London: MacMillan Press, 1998), 63.

27 Gambill and Nassif, "Walid Jumblatt"; Halabi, The Druze, 3260-3275.

28 After Lebanese independence, the Arslan-clan had aligned itself with the Maronite political establishment. See Zaarour, "Jumblatt, Walid," 395.

29 For instance, during the mid-1980s the 250,000-people strong Lebanese Druze community had around 30,000 militiamen most of which were members of the PSP and thus followers of Walid Jumblatt. See Richani, Dilemmas of Democracy, 92-95.

30 See Judith P. Harik, "Change and Continuity among the Lebanese Druze Community: The Civil Administration of the Mountains, 1983-90," *Middle Eastern Studies* 29, no. 3 (1993): 377-398.

31 Gambill and Nassif, "Walid Jumblatt."; Zaarour, "Jumblatt, Walid," 396.

32 Most notably, Jumblatt was granted control over the well-endowed Ministry of the Displaced, which oversaw the reconstruction of the regions of Aley and Chouf. Jumblatt used the ministry's fund to maintain his patronage-system. See Abbas Assi, Democracy in Lebanon: Political Parties and the Struggle for Power Since Syrian Withdrawal (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016), 90-91.

33 Judith P. Harik, ""Shaykh al-'Aql" and the Druze of Mount Lebanon: Conflict and Accommodation," *Middle Eastern Studies* 30, no. 3 (1994): 477.

34 Harik, ""Shaykh al-'Aql" and the Druze of Mount Lebanon," 478; Roula Ibrahim, "Walid Jumblatt and His Two Right Hands," *Al-Akhbar,* September 23, 2012, accessed December 9, 2016, http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/12542.

35 Gambill and Nassif, "Walid Jumblatt;" Moubayed, "Syria Loses its Former Ally in Lebanon," 35.; Bashar al-Assad sought to control Lebanon through Emile Lahoud and the Lebanese security and intelligence services, which were granted extensive political influence after Lahoud's election. See Gambill and Nassif, "Walid Jumblatt."

36 Jumblatt allied with influential Maronite politicians, including Dory Chamoun and Amin Gemayel. See Moubayed, "Syria Loses its Former Ally in Lebanon," 35.

37 Halabi, The Druze, 3382-3400.

38 Gambill and Nassif, "Walid Jumblatt."

39 Sabine Darrous and Hisham Ghait, "Thousands flock to Chouf to offer Jumblatt support," *The Daily Star*, November 13, 2000, accessed December 9, 2016, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2000/Nov-13/30010-thousands-flock-to-chouf-to-offer-jumblatt-support.ashx.

40 *Ibid.*

41 Michael Young, "Walid Jumblatt: Lebanon's anachronism," *The Daily Star*, October 28, 2000, accessed December 9, 2016, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2000/Oct-28/98151-walid-jumblatt-lebanons-anachronism.ashx.

42 *Ibid.*

43 *Ibid.*

44 As aforementioned, Jumblatt depended on the Christian votes in the Aley District and the Chouf; particularly in the latter district, the Christian proportion of the voting population (roughly 30%) is considerable. However, more importantly, Jumblatt realized that the Druze minority could only continue to play a role in Lebanese politics if the Christians continued to be counterweight to Muslim predominance. See for example Al-Majalla, "Profile:

Walid Jumblatt," Al-Majalla, May 5, 2009, accessed January 7, 2017, http://eng.majalla.com/2009/05/article554201/walid-jumblatt.

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48 Walid Jumblatt, Weekly Statement to Al Anba', July 25, 2007, quoted in Marwan G. Rowayheb, "Walid Jumblat and Political Alliances: The Politics of Adaptation," Middle East Critique 20, no. 1 (2011): 60.

49 Walid Jumblatt, Weekly Statement to Al Anba', October 16, 2007, quoted in Marwan G. Rowayheb, "Walid Jumblat and Political Alliances: The Politics of Adaptation," Middle East Critique 20, no. 1 (2011): 60.

50 Hazran, The Druze Community and the Lebanese State, 281.

51 U.S. Embassy Beirut, "MGLE01: Jumblatt Believes Hizballah Intends Permanent State-Within-A-State," May 19, 2006, WikiLeaks, WikiLeaks Cable: 06BEIRUT1575_a, accessed December 9, 2016, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06BEIRUT1575_a.html.

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54 Halabi, The Druze, 3502; iMonthly,

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57 Now Lebanon, "The Druze reckoning," Now Lebanon, October 30, 2008, accessed December 9, 2016, https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentary-analysis/the_druze_reckoning_.

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60 Ibid.

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62 Rowayheb, "Walid Jumblat and Political Alliances," 61-62.

63 Young, The Ghosts of Martyrs Square, 232-234.

64 Salem, "Defection Shakes Lebanon's March 14 Majority."

65 Assi, Democracy in Lebanon, 134.

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67 Rowayheb, "Walid Jumblat and Political Alliances," 62-64

68 *Ibid.*

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71 *Ibid.*

72 Interview with the director of the Beirut office of an international political think, Beirut, November 22, 2016. The interviewee, who works closely with the PSP and Jumblatt, confirmed that Jumblatt remains unchallenged in his community and continues to rely on a sophisticated patronage network and loyal vassals. Furthermore, he confirmed that the role of Jumblatt's rivals, first and foremost Talal Arslan, is rather marginal.

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79 Interview with the director of the Beirut office of an international political think, November 22, 2016.

80 The Daily Star, "Taymour Walid Jumblatt will succeed his father in the 2017 elections," *The Daily Star*, March 05, 2017, accessed April 9, 2017, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2017/Mar-05/396159-taymour-walid-jumblatt-will-succeed-his-father-in-the-2017-elections.ashx; The circumstance that the transition of power has proceeded very smoothly so far is thereby another indicator for the Jumblatts' strong authority over the Druze community. Information obtained from interview with the director of the Beirut office of an international political, November 22, 2016.

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
Negative Parliamentarian Governance and Radical Right-Wing Populism:

The Rise of the Danish People's Party

Madison Wilcox

Since its electoral breakthrough in 2001, the Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti) has been an influential force within Danish politics. With its anti-immigration, anti-Muslim, and socially conservative policies, the DPP promotes an ideology that represents a break from the socially liberal stereotype of Scandinavian countries. Yet, the DPP has steadily gained power in the Danish Parliament (Folketing), receiving the second highest percentage of votes in the 2015 elections. The purpose of this article is to posit an explanation for the DPP's disproportionate influence and for the concurrent rightward shift in Danish politics. While there are many possible causes for the meteoric rise of the far right in Denmark, this piece will be limited to exploring the shift as a reflection of wider European political trends as well as the structure of the Danish parliamentary system. The article will demonstrate that, while an upswing in extreme right-wing politics within the successful framework of xenophobia and anti-establishment politics gave rise to the DPP's increased power, the negative parliamentarian government structure in Denmark has additionally enabled the party to exert magnified influence on policy formation. These conclusions provide some explanation for Denmark's strict immigration policies.

INTRODUCTION

Denmark, along with its Scandinavian counterparts, is often categorized as an ultra-left political utopia by those in the United States and elsewhere. Known for socially liberal values and a highly-developed welfare state with over 30% of GDP spent on social expenditure, Denmark has been held up as a social-democratic framework worth emulating by influential progressives such as U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders. However, in 2015 and 2016, Denmark passed some of the most conservative policies in Europe, particularly in regards to immigration and assimilation. These measures included expanding the waiting period for family reunification and allowing the government to repossess the assets of asylum-seekers to help support their livelihoods.[1] Since 2001, the rise of the Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti or DPP), which operates on an anti-immigration, anti-Muslim, and nationalist platform, has led this dramatic shift.

While there are several possible explanations for the recent swing in the Danish political arena, this argument will be limited to exploring two of the reasons most widely prevalent in academic literature. Although many commentators would attribute the influence of the DPP to a broader right-wing populist trend in Europe, this piece will expand upon this theory to demonstrate how endogenous factors within Denmark have contributed to some of the harshest immigration policies on the continent.

To contextualize the argument, this paper will begin by providing a brief background on the structure of the Danish parliamentary system, recent election results, and the ideological platform of the DPP. Next, it will demonstrate the link between the growth of the DPP and the expansion of populist right-wing parties in Europe around a "fundamental core of ethno-nationalist xenophobia and anti-political establishment populism."[2] Finally, it will posit that Denmark's negative parliamentarian system, which facilitates governance by minority coalitions, has enabled the DPP's larger-than-expected effect on domestic policy.

BACKGROUND: THE DANISH PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM AND RECENT ELECTION RESULTS

Denmark's constitution outlines a system of negative parliamentarism, which does not require the government to have a majority in parliament, but necessitates its resignation if there is a majority in opposition. Put another way, the parliament's power is derived from its capacity to unseat an incumbent government. This power is concentrated around the Folketing (the parliament) and the prime minister, who leads the governing coalition in parliament. Thus, Danish governments have, since 1909, consistently been composed of minority coalitions. These parties compete for seats and create alliances to form a majority to control parliament. In most cases, the ruling parties do not manage to achieve an absolute majority, but

are often able to secure the votes of enough supporting parties to ensure that there is not a majority against them. Therefore, governing parties must be willing to negotiate with smaller parties and make concessions across the political spectrum to garner enough support to pass legislation and remain in power, which leads to politics of consensus.[3]

This system is in direct contrast to positive parliamentarianism, in which a new government is created only by winning a majority vote. Positive parliamentary systems are found in many major European countries including Germany, Hungary, and Poland. For these countries, although coalitions are often still necessary to form a government, minority governments are less likely to be formed because they require explicit majority support.[4] As such, the necessity of a majority for investiture as well as removal of a government is relatively demanding and may require more centrist governing coalitions compared to forms of negative parliamentarianism found in countries like Austria, Norway, and Denmark.[5]

Historically, the four most influential parties have been the Conservative People's Party, the Social-Democrats, the Liberal Party (Venstre), and the Danish Social Liberal Party. The Liberal Party and the Conservatives are both right-wing groups that have typically supported tight fiscal and protectionist trade policies. The Social-Democrats have been the leading party in Denmark for many years,

carrying the most seats in parliament from 1924 to 2001, and can be credited with support for the working class and the creation of a highly-developed welfare state.[6] In the past, the Social-Democrats have most frequently formed minority coalitions with fellow left-wing parties, but in recent times this traditional balance has been challenged by the presence of the DPP.

Over the past 15 years, establishment right-wing groups have aligned with the DPP during elections in an attempt to control Parliament. In 2001, the Liberals managed to break the grip of the Social-Democrats and form a minority coalition government with the Conservatives. Although the DPP was given no cabinet representation, the Liberal-Conservative coalition's ability to govern hinged on their support.[7] While DPP came in third in the general election, garnering only 12% of the popular vote, their twenty-two seats in Parliament were vital to the Liberal-Conservative coalition's voting majority. As such, the DPP exerted exaggerated authority, despite having a small fraction of overall national support. Over the next ten years, the party continued to expand its base and provide parliamentary support, consistently receiving up to 14% of the popular vote by the end of the decade.[8]

This steady growth stalled slightly in the 2011 elections, when the Social-Democrats pieced together a minority coalition following an economic dip brought about by the glob-

al recession of 2008. However, in the summer of 2015, following the largest refugee crisis since World War II, the DPP stormed back on the political scene, winning 21% of the total votes. Despite coming in behind the Social Democrats and the DPP, the Liberals, led by current Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen, created a minority coalition cabinet consisting solely of Liberal ministers (a very rare occurrence in the history of the cabinet), thanks to the parliamentary support of the DPP. Since then, the Liberal party has formed a ruling Conservative coalition with other center-right wing parties.

Despite being asked to join the ruling coalition by Prime Minister Rasmussen in 2016, the DPP refused and continues to have no cabinet representation.[9] The choice to remain outside the leadership has served a strategic, long-term goal because inclusion in the cabinet would counteract the anti-political establishment platform which is central to the party's image. Even since gaining electoral influence in 2001, DPP politicians consistently refer to other members of parliament as "they" instead of "we."[10] This gives the DPP the best of both worlds: a continued outsider status and a deciding vote in policy. This latest result, in addition to the election of Pia Kjærsgaard, founder and leader of the DPP from 1995 to 2012, as Speaker of the Parliament, has cemented the party's influence in mainstream Danish politics.

Rise of the DPP

Not in their wildest imagination would anyone have imagined, that large parts of Copenhagen and other Danish Towns would be populated by people who are at a lower stage of civilisation, with their own primitive and cruel customs […] This is exactly what is happening now. Thousands upon thousands of persons, who apparently – civilisationally, culturally, and spiritually – lives [sic] in the year 1005 instead of 2005, that come to a country [Denmark] that left the dark ages hundreds of years ago.[11]

These are the words of Pia Kjærsgaard, founder of the Danish People's Party and Speaker of Parliament since 2015, who has also claimed that the Quran teaches Muslims to "lie and deceive, cheat and swindle."[12] However, Muslims make up just one target of the DPP's wrath, which extends to all immigrants. The party espouses the belief that an influx of immigrants will overwhelm the population, bringing with them violence and allegiance to foreign laws, which disrupt an otherwise peaceful country. As stated in the 2007 DPP Work Program, "to make Denmark multiethnic would mean that reactionary cultures, hostile to evolution, would break down our so-far stable, homogenous society […] Nowhere on the globe has a peaceful integration of Muslims into another culture been feasible."[13] Still, the DPP differs from other far-right parties in its support of the welfare state, education, and protection of the environment. In fact, while its stance on

immigration would qualify the DPP as far-right, most of the party's economic agenda is center-left in nature. However, it is the most championed and radical propositions, such as the repossession of immigrant property to pay for their living and barring Muslims from entering the country, that have given the party its notoriety and add to its appeal.[14]

After the 2001 election, the DPP succeeded in implementing its more extreme policies on a national scale. Legislation spearheaded by the DPP strictly curtailed benefits for newly admitted immigrants. Furthermore, the new provisions encumbered their naturalization process. The party also had a key role in drafting an immigration law passed in May 2002, which includes provisions making marriage to non-nationals more difficult through the addition of minimum age and financial independence requirements. This legislation has also introduced a rigorous points system which makes active civic participation in Danish society a prerequisite for citizenship. These policies, seemingly aimed at poorer, non-native communities, have been the most evident examples of the far-right's influence on the Danish agenda.[15]

The DPP's ability to affect policy depends on engaging enough of the population to get a crucial percentage of votes in parliament. The DPP garnered support by appealing to the working-class voters who had previously favored the Social-Democratic party. Many of these workers who had supported the Social-Democrats because of their commitment to the welfare state were attracted by the DPP's similar commitment to welfare, with the caveat of a more ethno-centric focus. From 1998 to 2001, when the DPP first gained influence in the government, working class voters for DPP rose from 49% to 56% coupled with a 50% to 43% drop in support for the Social-Democrats.[16] Additionally, much like similar populist leaders in Europe and the United States, increased influence in government and their headline-grabbing anti-immigrant rhetoric has brought the movement vast media attention, further extending their reach.

In an attempt to curtail the loss of votes to the DPP and co-opt the core of its message, the Social-Democrats have recently taken an atypically hard line against immigration, promoting some additional limitations to welfare that is afforded to immigrants.[17] Conversely, this has given the DPP an even larger role in agenda-setting as, for example, the media coverage leading up to the 2001 elections moved away from the Social-Democrats' previously popular welfare policies to focus on their less-developed stance on immigration.[18] This benefitted the DPP since, in addition to direct parliamentary pressure, it has managed to shift the policy conversation to one in which they have a stronger voice and more aggressive, coherent solutions. As a result, the legitimacy of the DPP increased not only via direct parliamentary support from the Conserva-

tives but also through indirect policy acquiescence from the Social Democrats.

Radical Right-Wing Populism in Europe

The rise of the Danish People's Party is part of a wider growth of radical right-wing populism in Europe. Past literature on the subject suggests that the rise of the DPP is in part following a general trend that has taken place across Europe in the last decade, and which intensified after the economic recession of 2009. Many scholars have pointed to a distinctive group of populist right-wing parties that have been gaining traction in many other countries across Europe, including the French National Front under Marine Le Pen, the Austria Freedom Party under former federal Chancellor Jorg Haider, and the UK Independence Party formerly led by Nigel Farage.[19] Though varying in their descriptive terminology, most refer to a convergence of views deriving from ethno-pluralism and anti-establishment politics.[20] The DPP's slogan "Denmark for the Danes" reflects the belief that Denmark has created an ideal and homogenous society that is worth protecting from outside influences. Party politicians often claim that Islam is linked to violence and that Sharia law, if allowed to take root, would damage the rights of Danish women.[21] The opposition to traditional government powers and the EU also creates the aura of political protest that can garner the support of those disaffected by economic downturns.[22]

The concept of ethno-pluralism, which promotes the separation of different groups of people to preserve a unique (and purportedly endangered) culture, is fundamental to the radical right. Additionally, populist right-wing parties campaign against the political establishment, seeking to hand power back to the "people" (a population limited strictly to citizens who are native-born or representative of the nation's largest ethnic group). Although populism and xenophobia have always had a place in the radical right's agenda (witness Jean-Marie Le Pen's inflammatory rhetoric throughout the '80s and '90s, or the 26.9% share of the vote earned by the Austrian Freedom party in the 1999 election), the consolidation of these factors into primary policy goals by the contemporary far-right has been unique, contributing to its recent success across the continent.

This agenda is crucial in understanding the objectives of these groups. Its reduction of policy aims along xenophobic and populist lines corresponds to a policy template that can be used to describe a family of far-right European political parties. This policy template provides a simple solution to the wide variety of political and social realities of European countries. Jens Rydgren contends that these principles first took shape in the late 1970s in France and have spread due to their success. The National Front used both "othering" of minorities and criticism of the polit-

ical establishment to gain the support of a working class buffeted by globalization and the decline of traditional industry, culminating in Marine Le Pen's likely first-round victory in the 2017 French Presidential election.

Delivering nativism within anti-establishment nationalism has "enabled parties of the extreme right to (1) mobilise xenophobic and/or anti-immigration attitudes without being stigmatised as racists, and (2) to pose a serious critique on contemporary democratic systems, and thereby foment political protest, without being stigmatised as antidemocrats."[23] These cleavages help to legitimize xenophobic and anti-state attitudes without going so far as to cause their overall condemnation. In fact, the DPP has been careful to condemn groups and individuals seen as propagating ideas that are too extreme. For instance, the party's expulsion of 19 members, including one member with high ranking, in 1999 served to separate the DPP's public image from groups displaying more overt racist ideologies.[24]

Jungar and Jupskås identify growing support for similar views across the Nordic region. Using expert surveys, interviews with key party officials, archive data, and party manifestos, they conclude that, even though the True Finns, Swedish Democrats, and the DPP have had distinct political trajectories, they are now converging behind a radical right framework similar to the one spreading throughout Central and Southern Europe.[25]

The same assimilationist, anti-immigration, and anti-Islam rhetoric has been demonstrated by all parties, as has an increased degree of transnational linkages. Though cooperation was limited in the early 2000s, the DPP, Swedish Democrats, and True Finns maintain transnational linkages through formalized partnerships in international organizations as well as informal communication with party leaders in the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), and the Lega Nord in Italy.[26]

The DPP's political position is thus intertwined with those of other movements in France, Britain, Sweden, and Austria. For example, in addition to both supporting limits on immigrants, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the DPP have almost identical policies on the forcible assimilation of immigrants through national language tests and the relinquishment of allegiance to Islamic law.[27] Similarly, UKIP and the DPP both also support a five-year waiting period before immigrants are entitled to receive benefits, a ban on unskilled workers, and a points system for skilled workers to attain citizenship. Moreover, the radical right groups in these countries campaign on a platform of being outside the political establishment and against EU integration.[28] After winning positions at the EU level, these groups often cooperate and use their European Parliament votes to influence decisions about immigration in the Union.[29]

The Folketing Effect

Building off what has been identified as a wider trend of radical right-wing parties in Europe, this section will analyze the role the negative parliamentary structure of the Folketing plays in enhancing the influence of the DPP. The first element to explore is the relatively small percentage of parliamentary votes that the DPP controls in relation to the weight given to its policy proposals, especially after the 2001 election. Though the DPP has been the second largest party in Parliament since 2015, it does not follow that a party that had such little prior support—having won only 7% of the popular vote in 1998 and 12% in 2001—should have been able to shift the policy discourse on immigration and social issues to the extent that the DPP did. Months after their electoral victory in 2011, the Social-Democratic government created a Ministry of Refugee, Immigration, and Integration Affairs with the support of the the DPP, and implemented a set of more stringent policies which led to a dramatic drop in asylum applications to Denmark from 53% in 2001 to 28% in 2002.[30] This increased political power, as a result of the negative parliamentarian structure, effectively legitimized and increased the political power of the DPP, and allowed them to promote their platform to a wider audience.

The 2001 elections were a watershed moment for the DPP and a great surprise to many, in terms of both the results and the dominant topics of conversation. A large proportion of Danish academics believed that taxation would be the highlighted issue, as many workers opposed a tax policy recently introduced by the Social Democrat-led government.[31] However, in 2001, 20% of voters named immigration as the most important issue affecting their vote, compared to 4% a decade earlier.[32] The DPP strategically promoted this topic as their primary policy focus.

The Social-Democrats saw their support drop among working class voters, and so respositioned themselves to take a harder line against immigration. In doing so, they allowed the rhetoric of the extreme-right to gain attention and validity. The Social-Democratic party further appeared weak and scattered as leading members, like former Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen called the DPP "dishonorable," while other members, like Mogens Camre, echoed DPP calls to limit immigration.[33] Driven by the threat of a shift in the political balance of power should the DPP win more seats in the Parliament, the Social-Democrats moved their pary position to the right. This move ultimately legitimized the DPP and its proposed policies, without them needing to secure an electoral victory.

This course of events would have been less likely under a different government system. Under a simple two party system, the Social-Democrats could have trusted that working-class voters would not switch their vote to a right-wing party that

sought to limit the welfare state, and thus would have been secure enough to maintain its liberal stance on immigration. Meanwhile, under a positive parliamentarian system, the DPP would have been required to officially join a majority government with the Conservatives—a requirement that would have undermined their strategy of maintaining their outsider's appeal by not directly participating in the inner government despite their electoral success.

However, in Denmark's minority coalition system, a small fraction of the traditional Social-Democrat-supporting, working-class voters pushed the entire national government towards a center-right coalition by shifting their support to the DPP and their anti-immigration policies. Support for the DPP from the working-class increased by only 7% between 1998 and 2001 (from 49% to 56%). However, this was a large enough change to cause the Social-Democrats to fear a political swing. To maintain their control of the national government, the Social-Democrats thus sought to appeal to this small group of voters that held conservative opinions on immigration, and voluntarily moved their party platform to the right. Although intended to stymie a rightward political shift of the entire government, this shift was disloyal to the socially liberal Social-Democrat base, and gave preferences to the concerns of a small group of single-issue swing voters. Due to this shift on the part of the Social-Democrats, the 2001 elec-

tion marked a tipping point in Danish national politics, after which the DPP exerted enough control to transform the national discourse on key policy issues.

In addition to pushing the DPP's political opponents to change their policy positions, the minority coalition government system allowed DPP to exert undue influence on lawmaking. The center-right minority coalition that formed in 2001 was dependent on the DPP, its main supporting party. The coalition was therefore heavily influenced by the DPP's demands for harsher regulations on immigration since the DPP could threaten to leave the coalition at any time, and thus cause it to lose power. Within months of the election, the Conservative government passed new laws based directly on the DPP's election rhetoric. This included laws to restrict rights of entry, cut welfare benefits for non-citizens, and to limit the rights of Danish citizens to sponsor and be reunified with spouses to those over the age of 24.[34] DPP brinksmanship forced the Liberals to concede policy ground to a greater extent than they, and indeed the majority of the Danish population, would have prefered. In fact, the opposition termed the government "blokpolitik" because almost all agreements and negotiations in the Social-Democrat coalition were made exclusively with the DPP. Using this strategy, the DPP have been directly credited with influencing a host of policies including the age barrier and points system for citizenship by

marriage, drastic cuts in benefits for new arrivals, military involvement in Afghanistan, and stricter border control.[35]

Sweden, another country using a system of negative parliamentarism, has seen the similar rise of their own far-right party, the Swedish Democrats. Though several years behind the DPP in development and electoral success, the party has managed to become the third largest in Sweden following the 2014 elections. The Swedish Democrats arose out of a more openly-right-wing extremist and less populist movement than the DPP. As such, the term "extremist," which is almost never used in the Danish media when referring to the DPP, is commonplace in Sweden in reference to the Swedish Democrats.[36]

Unlike in Denmark, Sweden's left-leaning Social-Democrats have had enough support to create a coalition to control government. Furthermore, the Swedish mainstream parties have managed to ice out the Swedish Democrats through both political action and rhetoric. Still, there have been modifications to immigration policy mirroring those made in Denmark. For example, Sweden now supports reducing the minimum number of immigrants admitted to the EU, which is a sharp reversal from their previous open-door policy.[37] This points to a self-imposed shift rightwards due to similar fears of losing votes, and therefore the helm of the government, to the populist far right.

It must be noted there are numerous other arguments that could account for the DPP's rise to power. One such argument is purely economic: data analysis has shown that there has been a higher transfer of government resources to immigrant populations in Denmark than other segments of society as compared to other countries in Europe. This possibly makes the DPP agenda more economically advantageous for native-born Danish citizens.[38] Secondly, analysis suggests that, in coalition government systems, the political right gains influence when inflation rates rise, as it did in Denmark in 2001.[39] However, despite this increase before the elections, it came after several years of positive economic performance, and so should not have been of significant concern to voters.[40] Third, the economic crisis of 2009 has been largely credited for the shift in power back to the opposition, Social-Democrats in 2011.[41] Ultimately, these suggest that the economic cycle of boom and bust plays a part in the success of opposition parties in elections, but does not fully explain the gradual and sustained growth of far-right parties in Denmark.

There has also been considerable attention paid to a historical explanation, especially in Nordic countries. According to these theories, Denmark, a small and homogenous nation with a history of foreign domination, might feel more threatened by a large influx of immigrants than other countries might.[42] While this argument may explain some of the extremity of re-

cent Danish anti-immigration policy, it fails to explain the growing trend of xenophobia and support for far-right parties in Europe as a whole. Furthermore, this argument would not hold for Norway, a similarly-sized country with a record of foreign domination that surpasses that of Denmark, whose only significant far-right party, the Progress Party, champions less extreme immigration policies than its Scandinavian counterparts—Swedish Democrats, DPP, and the True Finns—and has been weakening over the past decade. They currently carry less than 10% of the popular vote and have little influence in government.[43]

Conclusions

The strengthening influence of the Danish People's Party is a phenomenon that has transformed the laws and political discourse in what was thought to be one of the most tolerant societies in the world. The rise of the radical right in Denmark built on a wider European trend using a framework of ethno-pluralism and anti-establishment politics. While the DPP looks to limit immigration and EU integration, it maintains a position outside the governing coalition in order to secure the political protest vote. The similarities between the policies of the DPP and those of populist far-right parties in Austria, Sweden, Finland, Britain, France, and others point to the growth of a family of political parties in which the DPP neatly fits.

The negative parliamentarian structure of the Danish government allowed the DPP to exert greater influence on policy due to its position as a Conservative coalition member. The coalition's dependence on the DPP contributed to the enactment of some of the strictest immigration laws in Europe. Nevertheless, while the DPP's voice in legislation has grown, and as its policy stances have steadily gained legitimacy, the party has stayed out of the minority coalition so as to influence policy without compromising its anti-establishment reputation.

Understanding the rise of the DPP is important given the wider implications of its growing influence. First, their success confirms the prediction of literature on the power of the ethno-pluralist, anti-establishment framework of contemporary radical-right wing parties. Second, if the DPP and other political parties using this framework should continue to grow in popularity, they could create new problems within the EU. As their political influence increases, isolationism could increase, economic linkages could become less efficient, and cooperation could decline. Already, Brexit, promoted in large part by UKIP, has caused deep tension between the United Kingdom and the EU. This split might culminate in a more restricted freedom of movement, and could cause the fragmentation of the UK should Scotland decide to sek its own independence. These same tensions have carried over to the French 2017 presidential election as Marine Le Pen and the National Front look poised to win the first round of the election. Furthermore, the analysis of

the DPP provides insight in terms of the subtleties of influence in a negative parliamentarian system controlled by minority coalitions. Voters, politicians, and the media can benefit from being more cognizant of the unique power dynamics within this system of government as they discuss policy and vote. Finally, as Presidential candidates in the United States and scholars across the world point to Denmark as the ideal system to try and imitate, it is important to fully understand what they desire to emulate.

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