



# REDEFINING EUROPE

ON INTERDEPENDENCE

KENNETH WALTZ

CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON EU ENLARGEMENT

DOROTHEE HEISENBERG

CAN MULTI-COMMUNAL DEMOCRACIES WORK?

IANNIS CARRAS

JÖRG HAIDER: A DISCUSSION ON RHETORIC


RICHARD WIMMER

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## *Dear Readers,*

It gives me great pleasure to welcome you to the third edition of the Journal of International Affairs. Like the European Union, though on a smaller scale, the Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs endured self-critique, expansion and fundamental alterations this year. It is not unexpected, then, that this year's Journal theme, "Redefining Europe," reflects its own process of redefinition.

The third year of any endeavor is the most critical, as Dr. Heisenberg points out in her article, "Critical Reflections on European Union Expansion." In presenting you with the third edition of the Journal, I invite you to consider as thoroughly and reflectively about the dynamic process of European evolution as the authors herewithin have. Consider the collection of different approaches to the challenges of enlarging and transforming such a beast as Europe, weigh this year's events in Austria and Spain, ask yourself how the United States fits into the picture, and you will find yourself in the shoes of scholars of International Affairs at SAIS.

You will also find more questions than answers within the pages of the third edition, as the table of contents bears testament. Indeed, how can Europe, still unsure of the extent of its borders and responsibilities, inspire more confidence than caution in its leaders? As the Journal seeks to render the economic, political, and social transformation of Europe in the twenty-first century into literature, it, like Europe, also seeks to survive. May the two complement each other in years to come.

Rachel Schneller  
Editor-in-Chief



*In October, 1999, the Bologna Center and the International Relations Program of the University of Bologna, Forli, organized a special lecture series on "Realist Theory and International Relations," which was delivered by Professor Kenneth Waltz. What follows is an edited transcript of his second lecture, "On Interdependence." While this was his first visit to the Bologna Center, Professor Waltz is no stranger to SAIS; as a young Oberlin College student, he spent time at the School when it was still in its Florida Avenue location. Professor Waltz, presently adjunct professor at Columbia University, is one of the most distinguished theorists of international relations theory and author of the classic book, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis.*

- Dr. Thomas Row, SAIS, Bologna Center

## ON INTERDEPENDENCE

BY KENNETH WALTZ

The spread of democracy is not enough to create a state of peace in the world; nor is interdependence, the propulsive power of the profit motive, or optimism in the future. Norman Angell exemplified the sense of interdependence before World War I in his book, The Great Illusion<sup>1</sup>, in which he showed war would not occur where it would not pay. And, of course, not long afterward, World War I occurred.

The theory of complex interdependence, a further tightening of the economic screw, is strengthened by the globalization of the 1990's. Successive increases in interdependence suggest that the more countries lock themselves together economically, the costlier it will be to fight a war, and the less we expect wars to occur. This is plausible; if states see wars as costly, they are less likely to fight them. The question is not whether or not interdependence tends in this direction, but rather, how strong the effect of interdependence actually is.

First, I want to raise the question of what the effects of interdependence are. They are ambiguous. There are some good effects. The wider the area across which trade is conducted and the higher the volume of trade, the more people benefit from the division of labor and experience increased economic well

being. However, there are also negative effects. In War Before Civilization<sup>2</sup>, Lawrence Keeley concludes that as tribes began to trade goods with each other, incidents of war began to occur more frequently. Ever since Plato, utopias have been set in isolation from other peoples. Island civilizations allowed people to develop unique qualities, uncontaminated by others. The lack of interaction with others prevented conflict and violence.

Interaction may lead to complete integration and penetration, transforming anarchy into hierarchy. In this case, integration also rules out international war. It is the gray area between isolation and integration where world interdependence plays a role, where people from different states have contact with one another but are not integrated and are not united under a reliable authority.

Second, we must address the effects of the inequalities of nations on interdependence. There is the tendency to talk about interdependence across the globe as though we are all of one piece. This obscures the fact that states with differing capabilities and levels of resources fare differently in the world. Interdependence is a euphemism used to disguise dependence. I recall one of my students asking me, "Why do American officials and professors always talk about interdependence? We Frenchmen know that you do not depend on us, we depend on you." Why indeed? In a 1970 article, "The Myth of National Interdependence<sup>3</sup>," I described interdependence as an American ideology that disguises the fact that there are high degrees of dependence on the part of some countries. It is politically convenient for the least dependent or the most independent country to describe everything as "interdependence."

The climax of the issue of interdependence is the concept of asymmetrical interdependence, the fact that some states are strong and some are weak. This difference is well illustrated in Susan Strange's book, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy<sup>4</sup>. She points out that, internationally, the authority of governments tends to be transferred to the market. However, she also points out that the authority of governments tends to overrule the caution of the markets. It may be that the authority of governments tends to slip away into the hands of financiers and traders, but when states notice the market usurping the authority of their governments, the politically and economically strong states try to recapture it.

Third, interdependence is a weak force, not a strong force. Two illustra-

tions are the most conclusive. First, the various parts of the Soviet Union were not interdependent; they were integrated. All viable countries are fairly closely integrated, and the Soviet Union was especially integrated due to the state planning that created the union. The costliness of breaking apart is supposed to make for a kind of cohesive peacefulness, and yet the Soviet Union split apart, even at a great cost. Extensive economic integration created with the goal of Communism in mind could not hold the country together.

Another example is Yugoslavia. The disintegration of Yugoslavia was done at great cost to the well being of the people in that area. Interdependence and integration proved to be weak forces in the face of religious commitment and ethnic differences; even security interests were sacrificed. Under some circumstances, integration and interdependence cannot hold an entity together.

### **On International Institutions and Interdependence**

I take NATO as my example of an institution that brings the meaning, the force, the effect, and the usefulness of the concept of international institutions into question. NATO has not only survived, but has flourished and expanded. It has done so in spite of realists saying at the end of the Cold War that the years of NATO were numbered. I expected, as any realist would expect, that upon winning the victory, the alliance would fall apart. It is a cliché of history, a theoretical warrant, that winning kills alliances.

The balance of power theory says that if there is a dominant state or group of states, other states begin to counterbalance them by forming a coalition. This happened twice during the Napoleonic era. In World War I and II, the coalitions that won the wars fell apart on the morrow of the victory. So it was not strange to predict that after the Cold War, NATO would dwindle and disappear.

Although the nearly three thousand bureaucrats of NATO would like the organization to continue, this is not an explanation for the continuation of NATO. NATO is a treaty entered into by states, and it is states that have to agree and decide to keep the institutions, not the bureaucrats. Yet NATO not only survives, it expands. On the surface, it would seem to call a realist perspective into question, but I do not think it does. States establish and sustain institutions because they think those institutions will serve their purposes. NATO was established because one state, and a set of states associated with that state, thought that it

would serve their purposes.

So why did NATO expand in spite of a lack of enthusiasm on the part of European states? NATO is expanding for one reason and one reason only- because the United States wants it to expand. The institution does not form the interest; one state, or a small group of states, decides what happens to the institution. These states decide whether or not institutions will be established, whether or not they will continue, whether or not they will be changed, and whether or not they expand. NATO expanded because the United States thought, perhaps mistakenly, that the expansion of NATO would serve American interests.

The United States wants NATO to survive and flourish because it is not otherwise directly involved in European economic institutions. America's only way of continuing its influence and control in Europe is through military means. The flourishing of NATO is America's intended way of maintaining its grip on European foreign and military policies. Think of another institution now forty years old, the Western European Union. The Western European Union has been looking for a role for the last forty years and has not found one. When it seemed to be moving toward developing a role for itself after the Cold War, the Bush administration made it clear it did not want a separate distinct decision-making entity within Europe.

My fourth point concerns the balance of power. It doesn't look as though a balance of power is in process. Instead of developing autonomy in relation to the United States, Europe is simply complying with it, much as it did through those many years of the Cold War. Why? Balance of power theory would lead one to expect a move by Europe to establish a greater degree of autonomy. Brent Scowcroft in "Geopolitical Vertigo and the U.S. Rule<sup>5</sup>" has said that the balance of power applies only to certain special periods of history. We are now out of one of those special periods of history, and the balance of power is obsolete.

State leaders have discovered they don't have to play the balance of power politics game. They have known for hundreds of years that it is a costly game to play, but only recently have they learned that there is no obligation to play it. If enough leaders of enough important states refusing to play, then that kind of politics becomes obsolete. The end of the Cold War, supposedly, has transformed international politics.

Michael Mastanduno in *International Security*<sup>6</sup> wrote that we can go on and on for a great many years with the United States as the dominant world power without other states reacting, an anomaly in international politics indeed. It is problematic how long United States hegemony would have to go on before realists would cave in and say they were wrong. Mastanduno, however, does conclude that eventually power will balance power.

I would like to look at the question from another angle. Balances of power do not form quickly. For example, a balance of power against Hitler did not form until 1941-1942; years after the war had begun, and after the United States had entered the war on the side of the Allies. States only balance when they must. Balances are difficult to form and costly. States are often tempted to jump on the bandwagon and appease instead of fighting a war. Going against a country that looks like it may be the winner will cost a lot of arms, effort, and lives.

Secondly, earlier great wars left enough major powers standing to provide the materials for forming a new balance of power. In a bipolar world, if one of the countries representing one of the poles disappears, by definition there is only one great power left. If that one great power is going to be balanced, it requires some other country lifting itself to the level of that one great power. It is extremely difficult for two or more countries to come together to balance a great power in a nuclear world because, as Charles de Gaulle said, nuclear weapons don't add up. A nuclear power that allies itself with another nuclear power at the strategic level does not become strategically stronger.

## **On The European Union**

The European Union has no intention or capability of balancing the United States because it does not have the capability to make foreign and military policy. Some think it is moving in that direction, but no one thinks it has arrived. Balancing is not inevitable. The outstanding present day case is the Western Hemisphere. North America has dominated South America for seemingly forever, illustrating the point that balances do not always form.

There has to be a recognizable European military and foreign policy for it to emerge as a great power, which does not now exist. Statements from the European Union by a variety of people have indicated over and over again that European foreign policy is a policy made by consensus. If a foreign policy is made

by consensus, it is a lowest common denominator policy. There is not much one can do with a foreign policy unless it is backed with military capabilities. Unless European forces develop there can be no European military policy and no European foreign policy.

If Europe does achieve a political unity that comprehends foreign and defense policy as well as economic, legal, and social policy, it will then be capable of acting. If this does occur, Europe would emerge very quickly as one of the great powers of the world along with the United States. Europe has everything it needs to be a great power in the world except effective political unity. That's all it lacks. But that's a big lack.

### **On The Balance of Power**

But a balance of power *is* forming; it is forming in East Asia right before our eyes. It is a balance of power being built up and created by the actions of two obvious countries: the People's Republic of China and Japan, and it is forming just the way balance of power theory would lead one to expect. The preponderant power scares the other power. China could not now engage in warfare with Japan and expect to win. Chinese policy now is a very steady, very purposeful pouring of resources into the military. Since the 1950's it has been deemed constitutional for the Japanese to have defense forces. It was also deemed constitutional for the Japanese to have nuclear weapons as defensive forces. Japan is one of the countries capable of deciding when it will have nuclear weapons, as some of its leaders have said.

The United States cannot stop the formation of a counter to its own power. However, the United States can make it happen more quickly or more slowly. If the United States behaves in a way that bears out its 1992 Defense Department planning document, in which it is said that the policy of the United States will be to prevent other industrial countries from challenging it in any way, then others will react against the United States and form a balance against it.

At this point, the United States has virtually no vital interest that can be militarily threatened in the foreseeable future by any other state or combination of states. This means that the United States does not have to react when something happens in the world. We did not have to respond to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or to the situation in the Balkans. The United States in its foreign policy acts on its own whim; it is not required to get involved. This is not a comfortable situation for

other countries that wonder if the United States will continue to protect them.

According to Charles Kegley, former president of the International Studies Association, if the world once again becomes a multi-polar world, realists will have been proved correct. The world is slowly becoming multi-polar. It is occurring slowly because balances of power generally form slowly, and because there is a gap between the United States and the next possible competitor. The United States has a tremendous capability, built up over time. It has a large gross domestic product and is able to maintain a tremendous military force while spending a relatively small percentage of its gross domestic product on defense. This means that the process of developing a counterbalance to the United States will be difficult and very long. In the end the balance may be restored by Western Europe, China, or by Japan.

### **On The International Political Structure**

After World War II, the United States wanted to bring its troops home and did so very quickly, a clear indication that the United States intended to maintain foreign involvement only for as long as necessary. Having withdrawn American forces, America sent them back to Europe in response to the threat of the Soviet Union. Once the United States began intervening, it found it extremely difficult to stop. Now the United States is in a situation in which it wants to maintain its deep involvement but may find it increasingly difficult to do so. The question is: will other states want American involvement or will they want to begin to develop and maintain a greater autonomy? Whereas before America wanted to get out and had to stay in, now it wants to stay in. Yet the time may come when it will have to get out, to do less for other countries and let them do more for themselves.

#### **Notes:**

1 A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantage, London: Heinemann, 1910.

2 New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

3 In Charles P. Kindleberger (Ed.), The International Corporation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970, 205-223.

4 New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

5 ("America Can't Afford to Turn Inward,") *New Perspectives Quarterly: NPQ*, Vol. 9, No. 3(Summer 1992).

6 "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 21 No. 4 (Spring 1997), 49-88.



# SAME BED, SAME DREAMS? EUROPE'S SEARCH FOR AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

BY ALFRED VAN STADEN

In the early 1980's, André Fontaine wrote a book entitled *Un seul lit pour deux rêves*<sup>1</sup>. In this book, the former director of *Le Monde* argued that both East and West had embraced the quest for détente as the primary objective in their policies towards each other but, at the same time, held quite different views on the content of their mutual relationship. Why am I recalling this? Because the question arises whether the countries of Western Europe are experiencing the same dreams when they sleep in the common room of the European Union, with their thoughts lingering on Europe's identity, security and defense. Most observers would agree that, until very recently, the answer was bound to be negative. Indeed, EU member states were inclined to perceive European interests quite differently, their preoccupations with security priorities turned out to be very much circumscribed by geographical proximity, and their political aspirations were not identical. Thus, for instance, France tried to enhance the geopolitical dimension of the European Union to serve the wider goal of creating a multipolar world with less influence by the United States (repeatedly described by the French foreign minister Hubert Védrine as the *hyperpuissance américaine*) in Europe. Furthermore, Britain was anxious to preserve the transatlantic linkage and to protect the cohesion of NATO while Germany, caught in conflicting bureaucratic views, took a position in between those countries. Finally, the four neutral and non-allied EU members plus Denmark, favoring a civilian Europe, wanted to keep the security profile of the EU relatively low by opposing the inclusion of security guarantees, as specified by Article 5 of the modified Brussels Treaty. Not surprisingly, few official attempts, if any, have been made to define European identity in clear political terms. Consequently, the notion of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) was often described very loosely as just a more visible European presence in NATO.

However, this rather pessimistic picture has been overtaken of late by new developments, resulting in a convergence of national views as well as fresh initiatives taken to achieve closer security and defense cooperation among EU member states. In this regard, the Kosovo war of 1999 acted as a catalyst, creating a sense of urgency in Europe. Indeed, Europeans were pressed to take

some formal decisions to translate their economic weight into military clout. During the war, they found themselves embarrassed by the level of their military dependence on the United States. The US had to fly the lion's share of the risky missions in NATO's air campaign and to foot by far the biggest bill. This caused a "never-again" mood, not only among leading American politicians, but also in political circles on the European side of the Atlantic. European countries recognized the need for building a military capacity of their own to deal with those international crises that touch upon European interests but not necessarily on American ones.

In this article, I will further discuss the underlying reasons for the European countries to seek closer cooperation on security and defense. Then I will briefly analyze why, to date, little progress has been made in achieving this goal. Next, recent developments at the official level giving cause for cautious optimism are addressed. And, finally, some ideas will be put forward about practical steps that must be taken.

### **Forces underlying security and defense cooperation**

In explaining the drive towards closer European security and defense cooperation, it is useful to distinguish between "push" and "pull" factors. The first derive from the dynamics of the integration process as a whole. According to functionalist logic, successful cooperation in one policy field generates forces that move towards cooperation in adjacent policy fields. It has been an article of faith, however, that beneficial spillover effects and virtuous circles of one step leading to another only take place in the field of low politics with highly interdependent social and economic sectors. High politics (foreign policy and defense) was supposed to be separated by a wide gulf from welfare politics<sup>2</sup>. However, the successful establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union increased pressures to build a full-fledged political union. In view of the many cross-linkages between economic and security problems it was increasingly difficult to maintain that the European Union could remain a halfway house. The argument was leveled that there is no point in developing a common currency if Europe is incapable of guaranteeing peace, security and freedom for its citizens. The occurrence of severe international crises (such as in the Middle East) might damage the economic interests of Europe and consequently undermine the confidence in the Euro in financial markets. Europe's failure to effectively respond to these crises was believed to weaken its political credibility and diplomatic authority. It was beyond comprehension that

the largest trading block in the world, with a total income slightly more than the US, remained a military basket case. Therefore, it was concluded, Europe must be able to provide effective military intervention should the need arise.

The “pull” factors are related to changes in the external environment. German unification, being the immediate blessing of the end of the Cold War, triggered the “deepening” of European integration as a means of anchoring a more powerful Germany to the European institutions. This entailed replacing the former European Political Cooperation with a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as set out in the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty stated that the CFSP “shall include all questions related to the security of the European Union, including the eventual framing of a common security policy, which might in time lead to a common defense<sup>3</sup>.” The Western European Union (WEU) was defined as “an integral part of the development of the European Union,” and it was stipulated that this organization, upon the request of the European Union, will elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union “which will have defense implications<sup>4</sup>.” A second relevant development was the decision of the US to withdraw many of its troops from Western Europe and the growing American reluctance to commit ground forces to operations in Europe, accompanied by numerous calls on Europeans to shoulder a bigger part of the common defense burden. Washington refused to accept a division of labour in the Alliance according to which Europe was to take responsibility for “soft power” issues like foreign aid and humanitarian assistance, while only the US was in the business of “hard power” with the use of force. It became increasingly clear that Europe could not remain allied to the US because of its weakness and addiction to American protection, to borrow the well-known phrase from Stanley Hoffmann<sup>5</sup>. If it was to carry military weight in the new strategic environment, Europe had no other choice but to diminish its military dependence on the United States.

A Europe which proves to be unable and unwilling to take care of its own security interests is more damaging to the transatlantic relationship in the long run than a broad-shouldered Europe demanding to be taken seriously in American calculations. American isolationism feeds on continuous complaints about Europe’s failure to put its own house in order. In a country with strong NATO credentials like the Netherlands, a clear recognition of the fact that there need not be a contradiction between being a good European and a good Atlanticist has grown.

## Europe's Failures in the 1990

Why has Europe's record on international crisis management been that poor in spite of high expectations raised by the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty? There are three familiar explanations<sup>6</sup>. There are those who put the blame on the institutional shortcomings of the CFSP enterprise, i.e., the rule of unanimity in the Council's decisions, the weak position of the Commission, and the rotating presidency of the EU councils. But I doubt whether a better-equipped foreign policy machinery, however important, would have made a substantial difference in EU's capacity to solve problems in, for instance, the Balkans, the Gulf and Central Africa.

Other observers attribute Europe's impotence to the lack of military capabilities (such as command and control systems, strategic intelligence and surveillance, and strategic lift capabilities) that are required to project military power on troublespots at Europe's rim. This point, of course, is well taken. On the other hand, it is begging the question of why the nations of Europe, while together spending almost two thirds of what the US does on defense, are, for instance, hardly able to deliver 10% of the transportable defense capability for prompt long range action. Nor does the total size of European defense expenditure give any justification for the aforementioned fact that the US share in the air strikes against Yugoslavia during the Kosovo campaign was reportedly about 80%. There is a terrible mismatch between defense inputs and defense outputs in European countries. The reasons are not difficult to identify: obsolete Cold War planning with strong emphasis on territorial defense towards major thrusts in Central Europe and national duplications of costly military infrastructure.

The third explanation is even more familiar than the other two, namely the lack of political will. I believe that this apparently self-evident concept is blatantly superficial and not very helpful in finding the right answer. It is true that governments are sometimes reluctant to take action because they consider the risks of military intervention too high relative to their interests. But there are also occasions in which governments are ready to take action but cannot agree on a common approach because their perceptions of the interests at stake differ significantly. This has repeatedly been the case in the European context. In addition, the larger European countries, particularly France and Britain, find it difficult to pool sovereignty on defense since they still believe they have military options of their own. There is also the relevance of the theoretical argument wielded by neo-

realists (like Joseph Grieco<sup>7</sup>) about considerations of national power as a major impediment to international cooperation. Also in settings where all countries concerned have something to win by joining their forces, they may feel inhibited to do so because other countries could gain even more through cooperation. Given the strictly intergovernmental nature of any conceivable form of European defense, participating countries have reason to ask about the distribution of relative gains. Which countries will be brought into positions of leadership and enjoy 'extra prestige'? Which countries, by contrast, have to accept a place in the backseat?

It is interesting to look at the reasons for the quite different results in monetary integration on the one hand and defense cooperation on the other. Why did the EMU turn out to be successful and the CFSP not? Is it because international security and defense strike at the heart of national sovereignty or, to put it in another way, because it is touching on national identity? Perhaps. But giving up one's national currency is not a small matter in terms of sovereignty and identity either. There may be other reasons to be taken into account. Influential, transnational interest groups have lobbied for the EMU; there is only a weak constituency in European societies making the case for defense cooperation. This situation might change if the ongoing mergers between national defense industries lead to one big European player. Another consideration to be taken into account lies in the win-win situation that the EMU represented. Indeed, there was something to win for all interested countries. Germany's partners were able to gain access to German monetary policies (which, for a long time, *de facto* dictated the policies of most Western European countries), whereas Germany could reward itself by making its enhanced political weight acceptable to its partners.

## **Recent developments**

Now what have been the official events, as referred to, giving cause for cautious optimism? Three developments are worth being singled out. The first concerns the evolution of NATO and the adoption by the Alliance of the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). At NATO's summit in Berlin in 1996, the US agreed, when it chose not to become involved in an operation to be conducted in Europe, to approve of NATO's support for European operations under the political authority of WEU by making NATO assets available to European allies<sup>8</sup>. One should bear in mind that there are two different interpretations of the phrase "NATO assets," namely, a restricted and a more extensive one. Strictly speaking, the expression refers to the 13,000 personnel serving in NATO military

headquarters, in specialized units like the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment System (NADGE) and in the Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS) aircrafts assigned to SACEUR. But, more extensively, “NATO assets” are also commonly taken to cover particular US military capabilities like strategic intelligence, strategic lift, theatre reconnaissance, and communications that the US could provide to European operations in the event of its deciding not to take part in these operations. NATO’s new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Alliance 50th anniversary summit at Washington (April 1999), reaffirmed the Berlin decision. The document airs the view that “the Alliance fully supports the development of the European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance by making available assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations<sup>9</sup>.” It was understood that assistance to European allies would take place on a case by case base and by consensus.

The second development arises from the entering into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (May 1999). The treaty contains some new provisions on security and defense. The Union’s common defense policy was given substance by including the so-called Petersberg tasks into the treaty text. These tasks, which had been agreed upon by the members of the WEU in June 1992, consisted of “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.” I note that “peacemaking” was actually meant to be “peace enforcement<sup>10</sup>.” Also, the treaty clarified the Union’s relationship with the latter organisation. The WEU was considered “an integral part of the development of the Union, providing the Union with access to an operational capability.” Accordingly, the Union was obliged to “foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union<sup>11</sup>.” The wording embodied a compromise between the French and British positions. France wanted to place the WEU in the position of military arm of the EU, whilst the UK looked at the WEU from the perspective of developing a European pillar inside NATO.

The most important new development, however, occurred in October 1998, with the reversal of long-standing British reluctance to support defense cooperation in the framework of the European Union. The December 1998 joint declaration of the British Prime Minister Blair and the French President Jacques Chirac (in *cohabitation* with Prime Minister Lionel Jospin) in St.Malo was particularly significant. The two sides agreed that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces”<sup>12</sup>. What made this

declaration really important was that it left open the possibility of European military action taken outside the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, that is to say without use of NATO assets. Probably, the reappraisal of the British position was the result of the British government being very anxious to move to the center of European politics and assume a leading role in the EU. Because of its self-exclusion from both “Euroland” and “Schengenland,” international security and defense was the obvious choice for Britain to enhance its European profile.

The Cologne European Council of June 1999 endorsed the idea of creating “a capacity for autonomous action” as stated in the British-French declaration. Furthermore, the Council decided to develop more effective military capabilities and to establish new political and military structures. It also called for a transfer of functions from the Western European Union to the EU, paving the way for a merger between the two organizations<sup>13</sup>. It was believed that the European countries had crossed the rubicon by explicitly mentioning the possibility of EU-led operations *with* recourse to NATO assets and capabilities and *without* their use. The latter option meant military operations without involvement of the United States. Also the subsequent Helsinki Summit, 11-12 December 1999, was described as a “historic breakthrough.” In the Finnish capital, European leaders decided to benchmark their ambitions on common security and defense in concrete military targets. They agreed that memberstates, cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons (full corps level with 15 brigades) capable of executing the full range of Petersberg tasks<sup>14</sup>. However ambitious this goal, in contrast with the public impression that was created, the Helsinki agreement did not entail the establishment of a fully integrated, permanent army. European countries interested in participating in EU-led military operations were called on to earmark national units that could serve as *modules* or building blocks for *ad hoc* military formations. The creation of a standing military force is still a long shot.

EU member states recognized the need to develop military capabilities (especially mobile headquarters) that are suited to crisis management operations. In this respect, apart from financial considerations, the European countries are facing a very difficult task: how can they solve the dilemma of achieving real autonomy on the one hand and avoid *unnecessary duplication* with NATO capabilities on the other? And how can the goal of European autonomy be reconciled with the preservation of political cohesion in the Alliance? All European countries,

France included, have subscribed to the view that the development of an autonomous European defense capability should not collide with NATO interests. But many Americans are concerned about permitting an EU caucus to emerge within NATO. They fear that the process of developing a consensus will shift from NATO to the EU, and that the Europeans will then present the US (and for that matter Canada, Norway, Iceland and Turkey) with a common position that is not open to negotiation. This is the fear of *gattisation* of NATO, rooted in America's bad memories of Europe's behavior in the predecessor of WTO.

In a major speech in London (September 1999), Strobe Talbott (the U.S. deputy Secretary of State) recalled the image of long-standing US ambivalence to Europe's military ambitions. To be sure, he reiterated American support for the further development of the ESDI. However, he made it clear that the Americans do not want to see an ESDI "that comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates NATO but that could eventually compete with NATO<sup>15</sup>." Obviously, if the EU states adopted such a "take it or leave it" posture, their relations with other NATO allies would rapidly deteriorate. Such a development is not inevitable, though. It is, as I see it, within the power of the EU members to ensure that NATO meetings remain venues for building consensus and common purpose. After all, it is in the long-term interest of European countries not to antagonize the Americans. So I agree with François Heisburg's conclusion: "A shifting of the burden together with a greater European role can probably be managed without destabilising the European-American relationship<sup>16</sup>."

Several suggestions have been made to accelerate the process of European security and defense co-operation<sup>17</sup>. One of these is to set Maastricht-like convergence criteria for reforming the armies and defense industries of EU countries to improve their military capabilities. Thus, for example, the French President, in his annual address to France's ambassadors in August 1999, spoke of "*de véritables critères de convergences auxquels devront obéir ceux qui entendent partager ces responsabilités en matière de sécurité et de politique étrangère communes*<sup>18</sup>." Important yardsticks would be the restructuring of military budgets in order to allocate more money for training and investments, and a clear commitment to building considerably more professional and readily deployable military forces. However tempting the application of EMU-like criteria of convergence to the field of military affairs, one should be aware of important differences between the two domains. First, it is difficult to set purely quantitative

criteria for all relevant dimensions of military strength. Thus, for example, qualitative technological and organizational factors may prevail over large quantities of outdated weapons<sup>19</sup>. Second, it is rather easy to exclude free riders from the fruits of monetary integration (transaction costs etc.) but it is much more difficult to deprive them of the benefits of military cooperation, i.e., the creation of security and stability mainly in Europe's periphery. This consideration raises the question of what might be the incentives for particular countries to try to meet the criteria of convergence in the first place.

Another suggestion would be the creation of a European defense industry and to take a Europe-first approach to military procurement. The ambition of pursuing an independent EU military role logically implies a determination to maintain an independent European defense industry. But is Europe able, one might ask, to keep up with the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)? It is widely held that the US is so far advanced in the military application of information technology that everyone else is out of the game. On the other hand, one could argue that the RMA proved less revolutionary in Kosovo than many had assumed as far as its impact in destroying Serbian capabilities. What's more, Europe's high-tech record with military aircraft, Airbus and the Ariane, gives no cause for deep pessimism. Nonetheless, European countries are trailing far behind the US in terms of programs for advanced military research related to high technology. To prevent any widening of the gap in this respect, the creation of a special European fund for military research and development deserves serious consideration.

Above all, European militaries must enhance their capacity for projecting and sustaining power. Indeed, it is essential to get more deployable troops per Euro, not by duplicating the command structures and headquarters of NATO but by removing the wasteful duplications among the armed forces of European countries. Building "common force elements," based on the idea of pooling national resources, could add to Europe's military strength. Obvious candidates for such schemes are strategic air and sea lift capabilities, refueling aircraft, communication facilities and IT systems for logistical support.

## **Conclusion**

Will the European Union, in the new millennium, be ready to conduct Kosovo-like military operations without the active involvement of the United States? Are the European countries now about to share not only the same bed but also the

same dreams, to use the metaphor from the beginning of this essay? Or, by contrast, will more demonstrations of European impotence, however agonising and exasperating, be required to bring about a real breakthrough? After all, the learning curve of European integration has proven very long as far as security and defense are concerned. Some sceptics believe the ambition of developing a common European security and defense policy to be fundamentally incompatible with the very idea of Great Power politics. Thus, for example, the British scholar Barry Buzan has argued that European citizens today do not put much trust in their governments and are no longer prepared to die for their countries. Individualism and a consumer ethic are supposed to have transformed Western European citizens into lethargic free-riders, looking mostly in vain to an illusory “international community<sup>20</sup>.” But, as far as this argument holds water, it is striking to note that a similar observation has also been made about public attitudes in the United States<sup>21</sup>.

I am inclined to take an agnostic view. As the saying goes, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. In other words: the will of the European countries to pull their military forces together must be tested in the next international crisis. For Europe to pass this test, at least two prior conditions have to be met. First, European governments must succeed in transforming their traditional defense forces into modern, rapidly deployable intervention units, the importance of which has already been emphasized. One of the main tasks the governments are likely to face is to recruit enough youth willing to volunteer for military missions outside their home territories. Of the European countries that already maintain professional armies, the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium are currently struggling with manpower problems. Should European governments fail to find a satisfactory solution for these problems, the goal set by the Helsinki Summit to field, if necessary, the equivalent of an army corps that is able to respond rapidly to trouble spots on Europe’s flanks or farther away, will most certainly not be attained.

Second, the question of political leadership has to be dealt with. This question has been neglected in discussions to date. Unlike NATO, the European Union lacks among its ranks a member state that is powerful enough to perform critical leadership tasks in crisis situations or other serious contingencies. It may be argued that over the years the Franco-German coalition (“axis”) has served as a substitute for leadership. But in the realm of security and defense Germany remains a relatively weak player as it is still reluctant about projecting military power beyond its borders, whereas the military contribution of Great Britain is essential to any European scheme for defense cooperation. Besides, the Franco-

German coalition has lost, for various reasons, much of its appeal and political vitality. One might think of the possibility of entrusting the larger European nations with primary responsibility for the political guidance of military operations. However, the creation of a so-called *directoire* of these nations (UK, France, Germany and perhaps Italy) is most likely to arouse resentment and feelings of marginalization on the part of the smaller European nations. The exclusion of the smaller member states from the making of important political and military decisions would enhance the likelihood of their becoming free riders.

How to strike a balance between the need for military effectiveness on the one hand and the legitimacy of political decisions guiding military actions on the other? This problem can only be managed in close consultation among *all* countries (large and small) that are willing to make substantial contributions to any particular military operation and to accept a fair share in the risks involved. After all, as recent experience has shown, some of the smaller member states did supply more troops and military capabilities for peace operations in the Balkans than member states that like to be considered "large." The guiding principle should be "no taxation without representation" but as much, "no representation without taxation."

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## Notes

1 Full title: Un seul lit pour deux rêves. Histoire de la détente 1962-1981. Paris: Fayard, 1981.

2 See Alfred van Staden, "After Maastricht: Explaining the Movement towards a Common European Defense Policy," Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith (eds), European Foreign Policy. The EC and Changing Perspective in Europe. London: Sage Publications, 1994. 142-148.

3 *Treaty on the European Union*, Title V, Article J4(1).

4 *Treaty on the European Union*, Title V, Article J4(2).

5 Stanley Hoffmann, "Europe's Identity Crisis Revisited," *Daedalus* Vol. 123, No. 2 (1994), 9-10.

6 Jan Zielonka offers as many as five different explanations. See his book Explaining Euro-Paralysis. Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.

7 See his book Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America and the Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990.

8 The Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin, June 3, 1996, (paragraph 7) states that NATO support to WEU operations will include "identification, within the Alliance, of the types of separable but not separate capabilities, assets and support assets, as well as, in order to prepare for WEU-led operations, separable but not separate HQ's, HQ elements and command positions, that would be required to command and conduct WEU-led operations and which could be made available, subject to decision by the NAC." The commitment of US assets to facilitate European-led operations was reportedly confirmed by several US and NATO participants in the Berlin ministerial. See for the latter Kori Schake, Amaya Bloch-Lainé and Charles Grant, "Building a European Defense Capability," *Survival*, Vol. 41, No.1 (Spring 1999), 39 (note 14).

9 *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*. Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C., April 23-24, 1999, paragraph 18.

10 See on this Willem van Eekelen, *Debating European Security*. The Hague: Sdu Publishers/Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 1998. 127.

11 See Alfred van Staden "Mission Impossible? Europe's role in diplomacy and international security," Willem J.M. van Genugten a.o. (eds), *Realism and Moralism in International Relations. Essays in Honor of Frans A.M. Alting von Geusau*. The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999. 65-66.

12 *Declaration on European Defense, UK-French Summit*, Saint-Malo, December 3-4, 1998, paragraph 2.

13 *Declaration of the European Council on the Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defense*, Cologne, 3-4 June 1999, paragraphs 1 and 5.

14 *Conclusions of the European Council held in Helsinki on December 11-12, 1999*, Annex IV. The Council also decided to establish new permanent political and military bodies: (1) a standing Political and Security Committee which will be composed of national representatives of senior/ambassadorial level, (2) the Military Committee composed of the national Chiefs of Defense, represented by their military delegates and (3) the Military Staff which, within the Council structures, is due to provide military expertise and support to the Common European Security and Defense Policy, including the conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations.

15 Strobe Talbott, "Transatlantic Ties," *Newsweek* (October 18, 1999), 34.

16 François Heisburg, "American Hegemony? Perceptions of the US Abroad," *Survival*, Vol. 41, No.4 (Winter 1999-2000), 14.

17 See for instance the chapters written by Antonio Missiroli and Stephan De Spiegeleire in Mathias Jopp & Hanna Ojanen (eds.), *European Security Integration: Implications for Non-Alignment and Alliance*. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs/ Bonn: Institut für Europäische Politik/ WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1999.

18 For an elaboration of this idea see Fran Vois Heisburg, "L'Europe de la Défense dans l'Alliance Atlantique," *Politique Etrangère*, 2/99 (été 1999), 219-232.

19 See for this argument Gianni Bonvicini, "European Defense: Beyond Functional Convergence. Procedures and Institutions," *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 3 (September 1999), 27.

20 Quoted by Peter van Ham and Przemyslaw Grudzinski, "Affluence and Influence. The Conceptual Basis of Europe's New Politics," *The National Interest* (Winter 1999/2000), 84.

21 See, for instance, Michael Mandelbaum, "Learning to be Warless," *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Summer 1999), 151.



# CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON EU ENLARGEMENT<sup>1</sup>

BY DOROTHEE HEISENBERG

## Introduction

In Copenhagen on June 22, 1993 the European Union (EU)<sup>2</sup> made a momentous decision, the importance of which seems to have been unappreciated at the time. By formally committing themselves to allowing up to thirteen new Central and East European countries (CEEC's) to become members of the union eventually, the EU had taken a dramatic step in irreversibly changing the institutional structures and character of the EU itself. Surprisingly, this monumental change of policy was hardly discussed in the two-day European Council meeting, was not highlighted by the media covering the summit, and did not even merit the first item on the communiqué of the summit. Instead, buried near the bottom of the communiqué was the paragraph that:

The European Council today agreed that the associated countries in central and eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union. Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required.<sup>3</sup>

Although the acceptance was conditional on political and economic factors, the fact remains that after the Copenhagen Summit in 1993, the discussion of enlargement became a question of how and when, and not if.

Since the Copenhagen Summit, the EU developed an organizing framework detailing the order in which to admit the countries (Agenda 2000, the Luxembourg Summit declarations in December 1997, and the Helsinki Summit declarations in December 1999), the framework to rationalize the financial structure of the EU's programs (Agenda 2000 and the Essen and Cologne Summits in March and June 1999) and an intergovernmental conference (IGC) and treaty revision to change the EU's institutional structures (Amsterdam Treaty and the current IGC). However, despite these many attempts to facilitate admission, little substantive progress has been made to achieve that promise to date.

There is little doubt that a significant portion of the lack of progress on the EU's part may be attributed to changes in Member States' preferences regarding the ultimate desirability of this enlargement. Although the Member States justify the lack of progress in arguments about the inadequate preparation of the CEEC's at this time, there is primarily a reluctance to change the institutions of the EU in such a radical way as would be necessitated by the addition of 13 or more new states. The current state of the enlargement question is that three elements need to be achieved before the actual enlargement is completed: 1) the CEEC's must reform their domestic institutions and economies to conform to the *acquis communautaire*, 2) the EU must reform its institutions, and 3) the EU must rationalize the financing of the EU and its major aid programs. Most of the EU's focus has been on the insufficient progress made on the first element by the CEEC's; however, the Member States have a record of failing to reach an agreement on the second and third points, and in the long run, these may be the more important elements of discussion.

This article addresses that question of the EU's institutional reform and structural integrity. Specifically, it reflects critically on the commitment to admit an indeterminate number of new members at Copenhagen. At issue is the risk that enlargement, no matter how morally justified, will undermine the forty-five year old structural stability of the EU. Should the Member States renege on their promise of membership for the CEEC's in order to preserve the EU?

The EU is a unique set of institutions cobbled together without a plan for future development or coherent institutional design. The path of institutional development has been incremental evolution rather than conscious design, and the conflicts between existing EU Member States often reflect this development. Changing the structures in a fundamental way, and adding thirteen new members (irrespective of their economic level of development) poses the risk of a complete breakdown of the whole institutional framework. This essay addresses some of the risks for the EU.

## **A Brief History of Enlargement**

The Treaty of Rome incorporated an open door policy towards other countries at the signing of the European Union documents in 1957. The primary motivation at the time was to give Britain a chance to change its mind and join the EU later. There was limited discussion of which countries would or would not be

in the union, and the inclusive stance taken by the Member States reflects an international context of other states (most importantly Britain) declining entry rather than clamoring for entry. Moreover, the limits of what was “Europe” were well established within the Cold War context, and there were thus a limited number of potential candidates.

The first enlargement (Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway in 1973) reinforced this perception of the EU: Norway negotiated accession but failed to join after the required referendum failed, and Britain essentially renegotiated entry after it had been accepted in 1973. This enlargement showed that economic motivations to join the EU predominated political ones. The EU had been more successful than EFTA, and the exclusion from a successful regime was difficult. By 1973, the EU had already acquired a critical mass that made it *economically* attractive.

The second enlargement (Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986) demonstrated that the EU had become a stamp of approval for post-dictatorship regimes. EU accession stood for political motivation to modernize, to eschew market protectionism, to remain democratic and to join European, indeed international, society. From the EU’s perspective, the admission of these countries represented a lowering of the admissions standards set by the existing Member States. Political reasons to join trumped economic fitness, setting the precedent for the current accession talks. Moreover, the Mediterranean enlargement changed the character of the EU voting, to make bloc voting (core-periphery, rich-poor, and northern-southern) more prevalent on various issues.

The third enlargement (Sweden, Finland, Austria and Norway in 1995) was a recognition of two trends: the end of the Cold War, which permitted previously neutral states to join the decidedly political EU, and the economic non-viability of EFTA in its remnant configuration. Again, Norway’s accession failed in the referendum phase, but the other states joined after conforming their legislation to the extensive EU framework.

Two points regarding these accessions are notable: first, the populations of the existing Member States in the early enlargements were not asked to ratify the increase in the union membership; all of the decision-making on enlarging the EU was done by the government elites. Although indirect democracy is legitimate practice and the preferred decision-making method in Europe, it has also served

as a lightning rod for criticisms of the EU bureaucracy's democratic deficit. The increasing divisions between mass public and elite opinion on the issue of enlargement would indicate that perhaps these types of sensitive issues should be handled in a more democratically participatory fashion. As the EU has become more and more federal and interdependent over time, it may be appropriate to have Member State citizens make the decision of which other states should have the rights and responsibilities of EU membership.

Second, there is an *ad hoc* quality to the decision-making process regarding which states should join the union that increasingly is out of synch with the stature of the EU internationally. Specifically, there has not been an organized effort to define "Europe" and its boundaries<sup>4</sup>. Without knowing what "not Europe<sup>5</sup>" is, it is difficult to define "Europe" and "European values." This is evident in the identity search now being conducted by the existing Member States<sup>6</sup>. As the EU became an irresistible attraction in Europe, there was more demand for accession; however, the EU continued to behave institutionally as though it were a small customs union, indifferent to the size of the union.

### **The Proposed Enlargement**

The proposed enlargement to include the CEEC's reflects the history of admitting any countries that want to join. A chronology (see Table 1) of the milestone EU decisions concerning the CEEC's shows that there was never a serious discussion of whether these countries should be offered admission. Instead, the EU Members acted on the basis of assumptions that were deemed obvious or politically correct. The desirability of the CEEC's ultimately joining the EU was considered self-evident, and the EU bureaucracy operated on the basis of that assumption. Moreover, during the critical first three years (November 1989-June 1993), the EU Members were distracted by the negotiation and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the beginnings of the Yugoslav wars, and the EMS crises, and thus enlargement did not receive the attention it required<sup>7</sup>.

## Table One: MILESTONES ON THE WAY TO ENLARGEMENT

December 1989	EU creates the PHARE program of aid for economic restructuring for Poland and Hungary, later expanded to 12 countries.
April 1990	Dublin European Council requests a negotiating mandate to create Association Agreements with the CEEC's
December 1991	First Association Agreements signed with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.
June 1992	Commission presents its Report "The Challenge of Enlargement" to the Lisbon European Council.
<b>June 1993</b>	<b>Copenhagen European Council formally commits the EU to enlargement.</b>
December 1995	Madrid European Council states that negotiations would begin after 1996 IGC.
June 1997	Amsterdam Treaty signed without sufficient EU institutional reform to make accession without another IGC possible.
July 1997	Commission publishes Agenda 2000, detailing the issues the EU will negotiate with applicant countries.
December 1997	Luxembourg European Council announces an "accession process" would be launched in March 1998, and divides the applicants into three groups.
June 1999	Cologne European Council fails to significantly reform EU financial arrangements.
December 1999	Helsinki European Council announces that the 13 applicant states are participating in the accession process on an equal footing, thereby eliminating the three groupings created at Luxembourg.
February 2000	A new IGC on reform of EU institutions is opened.

Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the EU acted to approve financial aid to Poland and Hungary (PHARE) which was later expanded to twelve other CEEC's. Two years later, in December 1991, the first Association (Europe) Agreements were signed with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. The Association Agreements are trade agreements that state that the associated CEEC will,

over a ten year period following the signing of the Association Agreement, liberalize trade with the EU. Essentially, the Europe Agreements were to lay the foundation for a free trade zone between the CEEC's and the EU. In this period, the associated CEEC would forego giving state aids and liberalize competition in its market. In return, the EU would grant access to the European market.

There were three significant exceptions to the free trade area that was being created, all advantaging the EU: textiles, steel and agricultural goods. Thus, three sectors in which the CEEC's had a comparative advantage were deliberately excluded from the agreements. It isn't hard to understand why they continued to lobby for full membership.

Six months later, the Commission presented its report, "The Challenge of Enlargement," to the Lisbon European Council, in which it strongly recommended that the CEEC's be admitted into the EU.

What is striking about the various accounts of this period is the extent to which the Member States acted as though enlargement were a foregone conclusion that could not be debated. The uncertainty of the post-Cold War transition period forced the EU to act uncharacteristically quickly on such a question of monumental importance to the EU itself. Moreover, the lack of Treaty guidance as to what countries could legitimately be excluded, combined with the guilt of Western Europeans for seeming, in the words of Lech Walesa<sup>8</sup>, to put a "silver curtain" in place of the "iron curtain," made a frank debate over enlargement impossible. The critical June 1993 decision at the Copenhagen European Council to formally offer accession seems to have been made without any real discussion of the long-term implications for the EU:

The most important proposal was ... that 'the European Council should confirm in a clear political message, its commitment to membership of the Union for Europe Agreement signatories when they are able to satisfy the conditions required.' This was the great achievement of Copenhagen. Interestingly, it was hardly discussed by the Member States and certainly not disputed in the many hours of discussion and negotiation leading up to the Summit. The explanation of this show of unanimity is difficult, given that probably a majority of countries were not totally in favor of accession, at least in the near term.<sup>9</sup>

Once the Copenhagen Summit had formally offered admission, the die was cast, and the terms of the debate about accession moved to the question of how best to incorporate the CEEC's into the union. It is unclear, however, if this response is still the most appropriate for the circumstances ten years after the end of the Cold War. The CEEC's are politically stabilized, and their economies are, to different degrees, stabilizing around a market-oriented system. The urgency to admit the CEEC's to shore up their democratic credentials is gone, and the toll on the EU's institutions of admitting so many states is becoming more apparent. Is it possible to change strategic direction at this date?

### **Objections to the Enlargement**

The most commonly heard objections to the impending enlargement of the EU are that the CEEC's are considerably poorer and more agrarian than even the poorest of the EU's current members, placing a significant strain on the existing aid programs of the EU. This critique implies that if the EU waits sufficiently long for these countries to achieve EU minimum standards, there will be few problems with the admissions process. Much of the formal EU debate has, in fact, revolved around the issue of timing the accessions to ensure the CEEC's meet the set conditions. Economic conditionality has become the most significant factor slowing the accession for the individual countries.

A less benign version of the same criterion arises at the mass public level. Right wing populist movements like the Freedom Party in Austria have capitalized on the fear that the impoverished nature of the CEEC's threatens the current EU population's living standards, and therefore should be opposed on those grounds. These "GDP per capita" concerns, although important, miss critical aspects of the debate about the EU polity. The decision to admit significantly more members may undermine the fundamental stability of the EU that the world has come to take for granted. Moreover, raising questions about the financial condition of the CEEC's that are to be allowed into the EU risks "personalizing" a debate about the EU that should go forward even if these countries had no interest in admission. Fundamental questions about the future path of the EU have been avoided because of their political divisiveness. Yet the enlargement process simply begs for a consensus on these questions. The EU historically has avoided these questions by "backing into" many decisions and then presenting its citizens with a de facto decision.

In order to strip away the arguments having to do with the economic

status of these countries, and to focus attention on the EU institutional debate, let us assume that the EU is considering admitting fifteen Norways into the Union, meaning small, rich, EU budget net-contributing countries that share a common conception of the welfare state and ecological policy. Would this pose a problem for the EU, or would it be as uncomplicated<sup>10</sup> as the last enlargement in 1995?

The sheer number of candidates ensures that any accession agreement must include EU Treaty reform that rationalizes the number of institutional voters on policy. Essentially, the exercise now before the current Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) involves reducing the number of veto points in the decision-making process in order to prevent gridlock in EU institutions. There are several ways<sup>11</sup> to do this but essentially this would be achieved through two means: either by enlarging the scope of qualified majority voting (QMV) to areas that are now covered by unanimity voting, or by reducing, and in some cases, eliminating, the number of votes that each country has in the various EU institutions. The EU Member States have wrestled with these alternatives for several years now and for perhaps obvious reasons, have not reached a consensus on the appropriate solution. The 1996 IGC had as its primary goal to make the institutions of the EU compatible with enlargement, a task it fell sadly short of, necessitating another IGC to accomplish. The new IGC<sup>12</sup> has as its mandate, “[to] examine the size and composition of the Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council and the possible extension of qualified majority voting in the Council...”<sup>13</sup>

There are democratic, structural and historical reasons why these solutions are problematic. The democratic objections to the proposals can be summarized by saying that they change the existing character of the EU without popular assent. Although there is considerable dispute about how to characterize the present EU institutional framework with its quirky anomalies, the most widely held conception is one of confederalism rather than centralized federalism. Thus, despite an increase in QMV over time and even issue areas, the Member States continue to hold a veto over almost all non-economic decisions made by the EU (primarily those in the second and third pillars of the Maastricht Treaty). It is this fundamental retention of sovereignty that the new institutional arrangements are likely to change, and with it, the character of the EU itself. Many Member States are hesitant to take such a dramatic step.

A further democratic critique of these solutions is that they fundamentally change the dynamic between large and small countries. One of the essential char-

acteristics of EU voting is that the smaller countries are over-represented in EU institutions on the measure of votes per capita (see Table 2). Moreover, the blocking minority of 26 out of 87 votes in the Council at present can be a coalition of 5 small states, comprising as little as 12% of the EU population. While this over-representation of small state voter power may seem unjust (and is thus the target of Commission reform proposals), it serves to mitigate a large state bias that exists *de facto* in the EU due to the inherent intergovernmental nature. Most of the EU initiatives are large-country sponsored, or at the very least approved by the large countries<sup>14</sup>, and the Council voting over-representation of the small countries may in fact be a useful antidote to the “tyranny of the majority” problem in Europe. By changing the composition of the EU from “5 large and 10 small” to “7 large and 21 small” and changing the voting structures to either represent accurately (or not represent at all) the voting populations in the small countries, the EU risks alienating the small country citizen that to date has been able to make his preferences heard. It is perhaps this historical compromise that has made the EU so politically stable.

The structural arguments against EU enlargement come from international relations research on empires of the past. At issue is the absolute size of the EU, and whether it is politically feasible to create a stable union of that size. Table 3 shows the existing population of the EU-15 in relation to the ten most populous countries of the world, as well as where the EU-28 population would fit in. A suitable analogy to EU expansion might be blowing up a balloon: it is a mathematical certainty that the balloon will burst if air is continually added, but no one knows exactly at what moment it will burst. The EU is attempting to create a political system for more than half a billion people; the only other two examples of this are China and India. Does this indicate that the EU can only enlarge by becoming less democratic and more centralized or by accepting political chaos and gridlock? Is it empirically possible for a democratic union of this size be stable?

**Table 2: EU Institutions<sup>1</sup> Vote Distribution**  
 Actual Votes compared to Votes Reweighted by Population

Country	% of EU Population	Votes in Council		Seats in Parliament		# of EU Commissioners	
		Now	Reweighted <sup>2</sup>	Now	Reweighted	Now	Reweighted
Germany	22,0	10	19	99	136	2	4
Britain	15,7	10	14	87	98	2	3
France	15,6	10	14	87	98	2	3
Italy	15,4	10	14	87	96	2	3
Spain	10,5	8	9	64	66	2	2
Netherlands	4,1	5	4	31	26	1	1
Greece	2,8	5	2	25	18	1	1
Belgium	2,7	5	2	25	17	1	1
Portugal	2,7	5	2	25	17	1	1
Sweden	2,4	4	2	22	15	1	1
Denmark	1,4	3	1	16	9	1	0
Finland	1,4	3	1	16	9	1	0
Ireland	1,0	3	1	15	6	1	0
Luxembourg	0,1	2	0	6	1	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>87<sup>3</sup></b>		<b>626</b>		<b>20</b>	

<sup>1</sup> Source: The Economist, February 1, 1997.

<sup>2</sup> Reweighted by population.

<sup>3</sup> 62 votes are needed for a qualified majority, making 26 votes a blocking minority.

**Table 3: Countries Ranked by Population: 1998 Rank<sup>15</sup>**

<u>Country</u>	<u>Population (in millions)</u>
China	1,236.915
India	984.004
<b>EU-28</b>	<b>544.979</b>
<b>EU-15</b>	<b>374.584</b>
United States	270.290
Indonesia	212.942
Brazil	169.807
Russia	146.861
Pakistan	135.135
Japan	125.932
Bangladesh	125.105
Nigeria	110.532

**Applicant countries and their population (in millions):**

Poland	38.607
Romania	22.485
Czech Republic	10.286
Hungary	10.116
Bulgaria	8.243
Slovakia	5.392
Lithuania	3.697
Latvia	2.441
Slovenia	1.986
Estonia	1.443
Cyprus	0.753
Malta	0.378
Turkey	64.568
Total EU applicants	170.395
<b>Total EU-28</b>	<b>544.979</b>

Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* presents the cycle of empire-building and empire-disintegration that hinges on the empire over-extending its reach, engendering both nationalist opposition and increasing economic costs that weaken the core. Is this an apt characterization of the EU? On the one hand, the pressure for extending the EU comes from the outside rather than from the EU itself, and thus one would expect less nationalist resistance. On the other hand, nationalist pressures can arise both from the elite-mass divergence in the accession countries, as well as from the disenfranchised populations within the EU that had to give up their veto rights in order to make accession possible. Thus a nationalist, in this case anti-EU, protest could be mobilized from the newly democratic and independent populations that do not want to relinquish their newly regained sovereignty. A divergence between political elites and mass opinion on the desirability of joining the EU has already formed in several of the CEEC's<sup>16</sup>.

Alternatively, there could be organized resistance from the EU population which objects to the changing structure of the EU. The primary legitimization of the EU's plans will be through the European Parliament's assent procedure and through parliamentary ratification by most of the Member States. Given a growing divergence between mass and elite opinions about enlargement in the EU, popular opposition to enlargement may not be reflected in the parliamentary process. At present there are no mainstream political parties that are taking an anti-enlargement position in any of the EU Member States<sup>17</sup>. However, this could change in the years before the accession preparations are finalized.

From an economic point of view, the enlargement requires the EU to fundamentally change several of the programs that have evolved as significant federalizing measures, like the Common Agricultural Policy and the Structural Funds. These programs have served as identity anchors for the EU since the 1960s (in the case of the CAP), and the EU faces the choice of dramatically cutting or eliminating them, or overextending itself financially to accommodate the CEEC's. Obviously, there are several Member States that would welcome these cuts, but it would be a mistake to underestimate the degree of support for these programs within the Member States.

A final point about structural stability concerns the European Central Bank and its monetary policy making. At present there are already concerns that the number of votes in the governing council (11) could outweigh those of the executive council (6) and therefore add a regional bias to the monetary policy of the

EU<sup>18</sup>. The addition of up to seventeen additional members of the Governing Council would exacerbate this tendency, and potentially destroy coherent monetary policymaking in the ECB. Structural changes to the ECB institutional framework are not even contemplated at this date, given that the EU accession must necessarily precede negotiations of EMU membership<sup>19</sup>. However, structural revisions would require unanimity voting on new treaty amendments, which would be extremely difficult with twenty-eight members. Financial market uncertainty about institutional changes at the ECB could lead to financial crises before the EU could act coherently.

The above discussion of the absolute size of the EU highlights the critical question that few EU bureaucrats seem to be asking: can an EU-28 be as politically stable as the EU-15 has been? It is imperative to keep the stability criterion as the most important one, overriding considerations of fairness, mutual economic gain, and political advantage. The current political climate in Brussels is that it is too late to exclude the CEEC's from full membership, and thus the only objective is to find the proper method for incorporating them. However, if the institutional reforms increase the instability of the EU, or cause the institutions to fail, it will be difficult if not impossible to salvage the existing benefits of European cooperation. Would it not be better to find alternative solutions?

### **Creative Alternatives to Membership?**

In the EU it has been difficult to think creatively about the future of the institutions because many ideas are immediately discarded as fragmenting the union, or disadvantaging new or existing members. Among the ideas that have periodically been floated by various groups are "two speed Europe," "hard-core Europe," "variable geometry" and "Europe a la carte." These discussions have been motivated not by the demands of enlarging the union, but to accommodate the differing preferences of the existing Member States toward further federalization. These proposals have in common a desire to differentiate Member States on the basis of their preferences toward further integration, evidence that even within the existing Member States there are those that would want more economic than political union.

A common criticism of these plans is that any movement toward these alternative conceptions of the EU (not all countries in every program) opens Pandora's box, making the EU ungovernable and fiscally infeasible. Aside from

the fact that this box has already been opened, with the EMU opt-outs for Britain and Denmark and the Schengen *acquis*, it is unclear that it would be more destabilizing (in light of the increasing membership) to have different "grades" of EU membership than to insist on incorporating the CEEC's into an institutional framework built for six members. Essentially, the EU would redefine the very concept of "membership."

Would prospective members consider joining a revised EU which does not contain the existing benefits for every member? This is exactly the scenario being negotiated at the moment. It is clear that from the CAP to the Structural Funds, the financial benefits of joining the EU will be significantly modified or eliminated before the CEEC's can join. Although the changes to the EU's finances were supposed to be completed at the Cologne Summit in June 1999, the lack of consensus on this contentious issue delayed the inevitable reforms. However, before the CEEC's join, it is certain that many of the financial arrangements that would have benefited them will be altered or eliminated.

There is virtual unanimity among observers that CEEC enthusiasm for EU membership is motivated by political and identity questions rather than economic cost/benefit calculations. This is partly due to the fact that some of the economic benefits of accession have already been obtained by virtue of the European Agreements. More importantly, however, is the fact that the economic calculus of the benefits of membership is indeterminate. There are significant costs as well as benefits, and it is virtually impossible to make a definitive judgement as to what the net cost or benefit will be for each country<sup>20</sup>. Moreover, as stated above, it is impossible to calculate the financial benefits of the CAP or Structural funds, since these programs are likely to be radically changed before accession.

Some of the economic benefits have already accrued to the CEEC's by virtue of the Accession Agreements. The CEEC's have been forced to conform their domestic institutions to be compatible with the EU's *acquis communautaire*, thereby increasing transparency, accountability and competition in these economies. It is a fact that the CEEC's have been disadvantaged economically by the exceptions the EU imposed on the free trade certain sectors, but the remedy for this cost is rather simple (if politically difficult for the EU). As an interim step, the protection of certain EU markets should be eliminated in order for the CEEC's to get a more accurate picture of the benefits and costs of membership.

Security concerns are also unlikely to be the chief motivation to join the EU. After more than ten years of political stability in most CEEC's, the security and political stability concerns which prompted the initial rush to admit them into the EU no longer seem as pressing as they did in 1993. Moreover, the ongoing NATO enlargement negotiations would seem to be a better forum to discuss security concerns than within the EU.

By default, therefore, the elite consensus that exists in the CEEC's that EU membership is desirable is based on political and identity factors. These factors are hardly insignificant motivators, but they do allow the opportunity to change the entire structure of the EU in ways that allow "membership" to be more broadly defined. If new members comprised the sole constituents in this new association, there would be a danger of class differences. Therefore, there should also be the opportunity for existing members of the EU to change their status as well. This would be highly complicated, and the entire process of institutional redesign and financing would necessarily need to be extremely transparent in order to avoid the suggestion that the EU was trying to cheat the CEEC's out of a previously made bargain. However, these types of difficult decisions need to be made sooner rather than later in order to preserve the stability of the EU as a whole.

Enlargement of the EU to the CEEC's is a project fraught with serious difficulties. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is the EU institutional issues that are more problematic than the economic issues that are often offered as proof that the enlargement process should slow down. EU institutional and financial issues have been discussed for more than seven years in various Commission and inter-governmental forums, but they remain extremely divisive. This apparent disagreement reflects fundamentally different conceptions of the EU's purpose and character among existing member states. These differences are unlikely to be papered over in the coming years despite the pressure of the impending enlargement. Thus there are two paths the EU could take: one is to renege on its commitment to membership for the CEEC's, or at least to stall as long as possible and hope that the internal political preferences of the individual CEEC's change to reject full membership. This appears to be the *de facto* strategy of the Member States at the moment. The second, and perhaps more honest, path would be to spend two years completely redesigning the EU to make it compatible with different federalist preferences and enlargement. It is perhaps a utopian view that agreement for such a radical change could be won from the Member States, the Commission

and the Parliament, but it is a debate that will be necessary at some point in the near future.

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## Notes

1 The author would like to thank Cesar Munoz for his able research assistance.

2 Throughout the essay, the name "European Union" will be used rather than "European Community", though this did not become the official appellation until November 1, 1993, when the Treaty on European Union entered into force.

3 *Financial Times*, June 23, 1993.

4 The Treaty of Rome was silent on the issue of enlargement. The 1972 Act of Accession spelled out the new states' acceptance of the original Treaties, the legislative acts and the declarations or resolutions of the Council, and any international agreements or conventions entered into at that time. Each subsequent enlargement had a similar Act of Accession passed by the Council. Article 49 (*ex Art. O*) of the Treaty on European Union codified and clarified the accession procedure. "Any *European State* [emphasis added] may apply to become a Member of the Union. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component members. The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded which such admission entails shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements."

5 The only country that European statesmen have ever classified as "not European" is Russia.

6 See European Commission, 1999.

7 Smith and Timmins, 1999.

8 *Ibid.*, 25.

9 Mayhew, 1998, 27.

10 Even in the 1995 enlargement, there was considerable conflict about how the votes would be reallocated, and Britain and Spain threatened to obstruct the accession if their proposals for a blocking minority were not accepted.

11 The Cologne Summit declaration enumerated several options to change the institutions, including changing the size and composition of the Commission; weighting of votes in the Council (re-weighting, introduction of a dual majority and threshold for qualified-majority decision-making), and the possible extension of qualified-majority voting in the Council.

12 At the time of this writing, the new IGC, which opened on February 14, 2000, has not made public its solutions to the institutional problems. Commission President Prodi, in opening the IGC, tried to prevent a reoccurrence of the lack of political will in reforming the institutions by saying, "we must not think - even for a moment -

that this is just the beginning of reform and that there will no doubt be other institutional reforms after this one. Look at the decisions on the enlargement process taken at Helsinki and look at the timetable before us. I see no room for a second IGC. We cannot countenance any leftovers from Nice [the December 2000 European Council meeting closing the IGC]” For a full text of the speech, see <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/speeches/index.htm>

13 Commission of the European Communities, “Conclusions of the Presidency, Helsinki European Council Meeting.” Bulletin EU 12-1999.

14 Moravcsik, 1999.

15 Source: World Bank and Eurostat, 1999.

16 See Grabbe and Hughes, 1999.

17 It is an open question as to whether it is possible to build a mainstream party platform on opposition to enlargement. The formal invitation given at the Copenhagen Summit may make it impossible to deny membership, and thus any scepticism of enlargement has been focused on the appropriate economic situation (the when, not if, question). If, however, a new EU “variable geometry” proposal could be found, it would be more likely to give mainstream parties a way to voice their objections in a manner that is not xenophobic or right-extremist.

18 See, for example, de Grauwe, Dewachter and Aksoy, 1999.

19 European Central Bank, 2000.

20 This has not stopped policymakers or academics from trying to quantify the costs and benefits. For a good overview, see Mayhew, 1998.

# DOES EUROPEAN “UNCOMMON” FOREIGN POLICY HAVE A FUTURE? <sup>1</sup>

BY ELISABETTA BRIGHI

More than ten years have passed since the end of the Cold War, and yet the structure and nature of the newly born international system remains far from defined. Or rather, its only stable feature appears to be that of instability. Since 1989, relations among states have been shaped by a high degree of fluidity, uncertainty and precariousness that few observers had foreseen.

In this new and less predictable international context, Europe has hitherto forfeited opportunities to redefine its role in the world arena. No longer the bone of contention between the two worlds of democracy and communism, Europe seemed well prepared to launch a decisive phase of integration in foreign and security policies at the beginning of the 1990's. However, it took only a few years to prove European federalists, who believed that the hour of the United States of Europe had finally come, wrong once again. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)<sup>2</sup> is a policy without a clear perspective, in spite of recent integrationist proposals.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the current stalemate in European foreign policy and identify relevant dimensions of European external security policy. Only if internal and external dynamics affecting the European continent are taken into consideration can reasonable expectations about the future of the CFSP be formulated. Referencing integration and international relations theory sheds light on the crucial causes of the current European stalemate and separates significant from marginal issues.

## **Europe and the World: Some Preliminary Considerations**

The characterization of the new international system as increasingly unstable will not surprise those familiar with the neorealist approach to international politics. As early as 1979, Kenneth Waltz argued that bipolar international systems are more stable than multipolar systems<sup>3</sup>. Since 1989, the eruption of local, limited, yet disruptive crises at the periphery of the Western world, the push to regionalize international politics, the precariousness and the ever-changing nature of relations among states, and the reemergence of domestic politics as a powerful source of influence on foreign policy<sup>4</sup> all point in the same direction.

The new international system appears to have lost the mechanical and automatic adjustment mechanism that bipolarism provided. Without its compelling imperatives, uncertainties arise every time a crisis erupts concerning responsibility for the costs of intervention. The United States no longer has a systemic compulsion to intervene in every European crisis in order to preserve its leadership and not lose ground against the Soviet Union. The Western world must face the consequences of selective US engagement and enhanced systemic unpredictability.

If we follow the reasoning of most alliance theorists<sup>5</sup>, this situation should result in a powerful incentive for Europe to finally integrate its member states' foreign policies. In fact, as the threat from the Soviet Union disappears, a decreasing level of cohesion in the Western camp was predicted to follow. This would certainly be the most powerful argument for the affirmation of Europe as an autonomous international power. Unfortunately, this argument is not borne out by reality. European foreign policy integration is deprived of momentum. Other powerful incentives are at work, running counter to integrationist tendencies. These forces, which come from both the internal European context and its external environment, will be considered in the next pages.

### **The Internal European Context**

In the proliferation of acronyms invented to define the American and European effort to create a common European foreign policy, the concept of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) was particularly relevant because it stated the purpose of European military cooperation and indirectly offered the best possible definition of what Europe *has not* yet acquired: a common European security and defense *identity*.

Why have all efforts in the last decade failed? To answer this question, it is useful to compare the two main theoretical approaches that have been used thus far to explain the dynamics of European integration and apply them to the study of cooperation in foreign and security affairs.

First, *neofunctionalism* has repeatedly stressed the concept of "spillover," the mechanism that transmits incentives for integration from one area to another and induces greater numbers of transnational actors to support the cause of integration. In this process, supranational institutions have a key role since they both

lead the efforts of transnational actors who want to integrate and visualize the future integrated community. Thus, if integration has success in one area, the process of learning will initiate further integration, producing a virtuous circle<sup>6</sup>.

Neofunctionalism seems ill-suited to explain European cooperation in the domain of foreign policy, since none of the assumptions of this theoretical approach seem to hold. No spillover effect has occurred in the last decade. Even now that the EMU has been launched, it is unlikely that a positive spillover will take place and increase the chances for cooperation in military issues, especially as long as the Euro experiences significant weakness. Moreover, if the launch of the Euro took approximately five decades, how long will ESDI take?

Current CFSP provisions do not allow much intervention by European institutions apart from the European Council and the Council of Ministers of the EC, the institutions that have traditionally represented the different national interests of European states. The European Commission, the European Parliament and *a fortiori* the European Court of Justice play a marginal role; these very institutions could provide a vision of European integration and are capable of creating a European *identity*. However, they remain at the periphery of institutional procedures, deprived of any real power.

Furthermore, the very nature of the policy seems to be a negative rather than a positive element for the successful application of the neofunctionalist paradigm. The areas of foreign and security policies are typically characterized by the absence of transnational actors and *élites*. Even the identification of common needs, another central starting point for a neofunctional integration, seems remote.

With those criticisms in mind, it is easy to see the points of strength in the second theoretical approach, that of *intergovernmentalism*<sup>7</sup>. The central assumption of this theory is that states, not transnational actors, are the subjects of the process of integration. States engage in bargaining processes in which they aim to maximize national interests defined through domestic politics, not through security or power. Any step forward or backward in the process of integration depends on the degree of convergence or divergence that national interests have at that particular stage of the process, and thus relies on the will of states to continue or halt cooperation.

This approach interprets European integration as a long series of celebrated intergovernmental bargains that have resulted in *lowest common denominator* agreements among states and allowed only as much integration as states have been willing to concede. Integration, then, has nothing to do with a vision of Europe, but is rather a pragmatic approach toward facing the issue of closer cooperation among neighboring states. Whereas neofunctionalism emphasizes the potential harmony of interests among states, intergovernmentalism stresses the conflict of interests<sup>8</sup>.

The recent unfolding of events favors the intergovernmentalism interpretation. Integration seems to proceed only when states allow it, and the institutions that are involved in the decision making process of CFSP are only those that keep an eye on states' interests.

For example, Great Britain has been traditionally the least enthusiastic state as far as the integration of European foreign policy is concerned. Until a few months ago, it strongly opposed any advance in this process, blocking the extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) from implementation measures to crucial political matters, denying any strengthening of the role of the European Commission or Parliament in the second pillar, that of the CFSP, and opposing the gradual merger of the WEU (Western European Union, the military arm of the European Union) into the EU. On a scale of different levels of propensity to integrate their foreign policy, Great Britain scored the lowest, whereas states such as Germany and Italy scored highest<sup>9</sup>.

Upon what did this particular stance depend? Historically, Britain invested little in the creation of EPC and CFSP, preferring NATO to a common European foreign and security policy. Drawing on its long tradition of independent foreign policy, Britain often acted as if it did not need European legitimization or "cover" for its foreign policy.

The situation in other states was quite different. Germany and Italy, though ever faithful to the Atlantic alliance, have never hidden their federalist aspirations and always supported any program, plan or declaration that enhanced European cooperation in foreign policy. Their commitment to this cause has been undisputed, and this can be understood by taking their international concerns into consideration. Fifty years on the front line of the conflict between the free world and communism, these two countries are currently also the most exposed to the new

threats from the periphery, bordering as they do on the “arc of instability” that stretches from the Balkans to North Africa<sup>10</sup>.

It is thus no surprise that the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam reflected a lack of convergence and opted for provisions able to satisfy all positions, ending up with a compromise of little practical or operational meaning. Every treaty has been put to a crucial test; Maastricht had former Yugoslavia and Amsterdam had Kosovo. In both cases Europe, as a distinctive and autonomous actor of foreign policy, failed.

Since the end of last year, however, the positions of European states have changed. Great Britain has demonstrated its willingness to advance in defense cooperation, with the objective of developing Europe’s autonomous military capabilities<sup>11</sup>. This reversal was codified in the Saint Malo meeting of December 1998, in the Cologne meeting of June 1999 and finally in the Helsinki meeting of December 1999, where all countries decided to move forward in the progressive merger of the WEU into the EU, agreed on the creation of several European military bodies<sup>12</sup> and sanctioned the appointment of the first High Representative of CFSP, Javier Solana.

With the reversal of the British position, new intergovernmental bargains were struck, and the results that followed were those already mentioned. Once again, European supranational institutions played no relevant role; rather, the states themselves decided to move forward in the process of integration. Only when national interests sufficiently converged did the states decide to proceed with further integration.

Why then has the British position changed? As emphasized by intergovernmentalist theory, domestic politics played a consistent role in redefining British “national interests.” In this regard, the election of Tony Blair in 1997 and the victory of the Labour Party contributed to altering the British position on many European issues. The international position of Great Britain may also have changed; NATO now appears less viable and cannot be trusted to solve “European” crises.

More importantly, are these new developments of a decisive nature and have they improved the framework of an effective European foreign policy? It could be argued that these developments are nothing but the European response to the emergency of Kosovo and that they will not last. Even if they do, a very

important puzzle remains to be solved. Starting from the end of the process and building up military capabilities does not preclude the logical beginning of the process of integration. These new military provisions do not clarify what the ultimate source of political authority for such a defense policy is, nor what the role of the CFSP should be. Military capabilities are valuable only so long as political capabilities are sufficiently strong. Whereas there seems to be some progress in the first area, the second area is approaching a new stalemate. Simply increasing military personnel or assets is unlikely *per se* to help build a European political *identity*.

Thus, the CFSP amounts to little until it incorporates the possibility of getting a state do what otherwise it would not have done. The key reform required is the extension of QMV to crucial strategic and political affairs, since this would mean the end of the possibility of states invoking a national veto every time they perceive a threat to national sovereignty. Unless this happens, the European Union will lose political credibility while gaining military capability.

Are national interests sufficiently convergent on reform? Not yet, as the newest bargains all demonstrate. Great Britain and France not only decided to move forward in endowing the EU with military capabilities but also emphasized their willingness to adhere to intergovernmental methods when making political decisions. Will there ever be sufficient convergence? The intergovernmentalist approach assumes not, because governments are not interested in combining their foreign and defense policies and creating a linkage with other areas. This pronounced and prolonged divergence among the national interests of European member states appears to be a very powerful determinant of the present failure of CFSP. The theoretical approach that best explains past European cooperation paints a dim picture of its future.

### **The External European Environment**

Internal divergences alone, however, are not the only determinants of the failure of CFSP; another important aspect concerns external relations and in particular, troubled transatlantic relations.

As mentioned earlier, the collapse of bipolarism reopened the question of the internal balance of the transatlantic alliance. Now that the leadership of the US is no longer questioned, and in the absence of a threat to the international security of the Western world, an increase in the divergence of allied interests is likely to

take place. Are Europe and the US drifting apart? In the past ten years both actors have succeeded brilliantly in making these divergences seem of little importance, and the new concept of ESDI was the cornerstone of the strategy of renewed cooperation.

The US attitude towards the creation of a European Defense and Security Identity has passed through several phases in this decade. At first the concept of “partnership in leadership” was invented to reassure Germany and the rest of Europe about their continued saliency in the transatlantic alliance, and the label of ESDI was coined to give support and legitimization to European attempts in the area of defense. Then, from the mid-1990’s until 1998, the US switched to a position of benign neglect, postponing the decision about responsibility and leadership in European security. In 1999, however, as the acceleration of the debate about European military capabilities gained momentum, the US finally publicized precise conditions for the present and future process. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s “3 D’s<sup>13</sup>” are quite straightforward: no duplication of US military assets, no decoupling of the US from Europe, and no discrimination against non-EU NATO members.

Ambivalence is likely to become the key feature of the US attitude towards the CFSP. On one hand, the United States wants a stronger Europe since a weak continent is of no strategic value, but on the other hand, the military and political leadership of the US should by no means be questioned. This policy of squaring the circle is not sustainable, especially as European assertiveness in the area of military affairs persists.

The Helsinki provisions of December 1999 may have sown the seeds of future confrontation. The creation of a Political and Security Committee, a Military Staff, a Military Committee and a Rapid Deployment Force seems close to the concept of “duplication,” not just of assets, but of bodies of command. If these tendencies are confirmed, the transatlantic link might be severely impaired. However, the gap between European and American military capabilities is still wide, and it would take European states decades of inconceivably high defense spending to fill it, if they ever decide to do so. For the time being, European assertiveness is a remote threat to US military primacy, but the political meaning of such developments should not be underestimated.

The US is faced with a strategic dilemma in Europe and simply “deciding not to decide” is no answer. Should the US preserve its influence in Europe or should it engage in a gradual political retrenchment, sparing the American economy huge costs and avoiding dangerous overextension and embarrassing “selective engagements?” Either way, the future of the transatlantic link depends on its decision.

The hegemonic stability theory explains the “capability-expectations gap<sup>14</sup>,” the apparent inconsistency between the current difficulty in building the ESDI as opposed to the high expectations for it at the beginning of the decade. Cooperation proved less easy than expected because the context in which it took place changed significantly. Bipolarism turned out not to be an obstacle to European cooperation; on the contrary, American hegemony over Europe during the Cold War facilitated and fostered prolonged intra-European cooperation<sup>15</sup>. As long as the US performed the basic functions of assuring a constant defense against the Soviet threat and permanently installing troops on European soil, European states cooperated with each other. Once the US no longer performed these functions, benign cooperation began to be replaced by much less dependable “normal” inter-state relations among European states, a context characterized as much by conflict as by cooperation.

The constant and unquestioned US presence in Europe solved the perennial problem of balance of power within the continent for decades. Now that the presence of the US in Europe becomes more and more uncertain, old rivalries inevitably reappear. Thus, cooperation under the new international context may actually be *less* likely than under bipolarism. This should not be taken to extremes<sup>16</sup>; the resort to war among European states is still unlikely to occur. However, European states will be less likely to accept measures that do not yield immediate relative gains in terms of power and influence, and they will be less willing to act on the basis of pure reciprocity.

This argument may be refuted by the mitigating factor of interdependence. After all, European states are closely linked by economic, cultural and social interdependence, and this has always diminished the chances of extreme conflict. However, the thesis that economic interdependence and cooperation can spill over to high politics areas is a functionalist tenet whose validity has been questioned even by neo-functionalists<sup>17</sup>. Secondly, economic interdependence might

not be a sufficiently “mitigating” factor when defense and military issues are inserted into the picture; interdependence cannot nullify a security competition.

Therefore, the predictions that follow from these considerations are not very promising about the chances of having a real ESDI created in the near future, if ever. This is the result of the neorealist approach. In fact, this approach has proved to be very useful in explaining the pattern of European cooperation in the Cold War era, and its general validity seems to hold even in the post Cold War world as well.

## **Conclusions**

The future of European foreign and defense policy looks very uncertain. Even with new developments, it is still to be seen whether these measures are a temporary acceleration due to the emergency in Kosovo or whether they are a true catalyst for change<sup>18</sup>.

European efforts to build its own ESDI have been hampered by two sets of obstacles, one coming from its internal dimension, the other coming from its external environment. First, a pronounced and prolonged divergence of major European member states to integrate foreign and security policies has been a source of disunity and stalemate. This factor, coupled with the reality of intergovernmentalism, has brought about the paralysis that has characterized CFSP since 1991, the year of its inauguration.

As for the second set of causes, the international position of the continent does not appear to favor the creation of a true ESDI in the near future. Even though Europe has a strong incentive to increase its profile in the transatlantic alliance now that bipolarism has collapsed, these incentives are powerfully countered by the change in the context of intra-European state relations.

The chances for a complete ESDI and CFSP in the near future are very low. This does not imply that the process of cooperation will stop or recede, but rather that it will remain fragmented and ineffective for years, or until the sudden rise of an external threat forces cooperation among European states. In the post Cold War international system, we can reasonably expect that threats to security will be less concentrated than before. Thus, even this beneficial scenario for a common European policy paradoxically renders it even less likely.

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## Notes

1 The labeling of CFSP as an "uncommon" European Foreign Policy is from Philip H. Gordon, "European Uncommon Foreign Policy," *International Security*, Vol.22 No 3 (1997/1998), 74-100.

2 Maastricht, 1991: "...the ultimate phase of European cooperation in the realm of foreign and security affairs."

3 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Reading, PA: Addison Wesley Press, 1979.

4 Domestic politics has in many cases regained the attention of the political class and the public. Manifestations of this tendency were the corruption scandal of Mani Pulite in Italy, the political crisis of the CDU in Germany, which is now occupying the German political agenda, and the rise of J. Haider in Austria, which has stirred a huge public debate.

5 See, one for all, Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.

6 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. London, 1958, and L. Lindeberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration. Stanford, 1963. For a recent restatement of neofunctionalist arguments, see Alec Stone Sweet, Wayne Sandholtz, "European Integration and Supranational Governance," *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 4 No. 3 (1997), 133-160.

7 A seminal article was written by Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1993), 473-524. Recently, Andrew Moravcsik has studied the whole history of European integration according to his theoretical

framework in Andrew Moravcsik, The Social Choice for Europe. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998.

8 For a debate on neofunctionalism vs. intergovernmentalism, see Jakob Øhrgaard, "Less than Supranational More than Intergovernmental: European Political Cooperation and the Dynamics of Intergovernmental Integration," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 2 No. 1(1997), 45-70; and Philip H. Gordon, *op. cit.*

9 For a research focused on the different levels of propensity to integrate into CFSP, see E. Brighi, "La Politica Estera e di Sicurezza in Euorpa: un' ipotesi sulla propensione all'integrazione," *Quaderno di Scienza della Politica*, Vol. IX. No.1 (2000), 61-105.

10 For a view of British, Germanic, French and Italian traditions in foreign policy with respect to European security (NATO, EPC/CFSP especially) see: Robert O. Keohane, ed., After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993; and Christopher Hill, David Allen, ed., The actors in European Foreign Policy. London: Routledge, 1996.

11 For an assessment of the British reversal, see: A. Missiroli, "Difesa Atlantica, Sicurezza Europea: l'iniziativa britannica e il futuro della PESC," *Europa Europe*, Vol. 8 No. 1-2 (1999), 85-94; S. De Spiegeleire, "The European Security and Defense Identity and NATO: Berlin and Beyond" and A. Missiroli, "Towards a European Defense Security and Defense Identity? Record-State of Play-Prospects," in M. Jopp and H. Ojanen, European Security Integration, Implications for Non-Alignments and Alliances. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1999.

12 During the last Helsinki meeting (December 10-12, 1999), it was agreed to progressively establish a Policy and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate and supervise European defense cooperation. Presently, these bodies have only consultative functions. In addition, the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force of about 60,000 troops has been considered as another aspect of the project, to be put into practice in a few years.

13 See De Spregeleine, "The European Security and Defense Identity and NATO: Berlin and Beyond," *op. cit.*

14 Christopher Hill, "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 31. No. 3 (1993), 305-328.

15 Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 111 No. 1 (1996), 1-39. K. Waltz explained European cooperation in terms of a positive by-product of bipolarism, see K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, *op. cit.*

16 Extreme positions were epitomized by the article of John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15 No. 1(1990), 5-56.

17 It has been argued that different issue-areas have different spillover potentials: see, for instance, G. Aybet, The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945-1991. London: MacMillan, 1997.

18 A. Missiroli, "Towards a European Defense Security and Defense Identity? Record-State of Play-Prospects," *op. cit.*



# CAN EUROPEAN IDENTITY COMPETE WITH NATIONAL IDENTITY?

BY RAIN EENSAAR

This article aims to point out a recent polemic, the burning issue of the legitimacy of the European identity as opposed to existing national identities. The concept is highly contentious, partly because there is a question of whether or not European identity is compatible with the maintenance of national or regional identities. It has been recently argued that if there is a European identity, it may conflict with national identities<sup>1</sup>. First, the article identifies the difficulties of finding a concise definition of “Europe” or “European.” Second, it explores the necessity of ritual, myth and symbol in the process of forging an identity. Third, it describes the latest instruments of unity, namely, the *Euro* and the concept of European citizenship. Fourth, it provides two examples, of where the “other” has played a major role in changing identities over time.

In order to grasp the peculiarity of the concept of European identity, it is essential to understand what is meant by “Europe” or “European.” Such a task is far from straightforward since despite, or perhaps because of, popular usage, there is no consensus on the term’s actual meaning. Is it a term that has as many definitions as people defining it? Is it a geographical term? If so, where is the eastern border of Europe? If it includes Turkey<sup>2</sup>, does it also include Russia? If defined geographically, European countries are still different culturally, linguistically and religiously. In fact, Samuel Huntington has proposed that since the ideological division of Europe has disappeared, a new division has emerged: the cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity and Orthodox Christianity, replacing the Iron Curtain of ideology with the Velvet Curtain of religion<sup>3</sup>.

Does being European mean possessing membership in the EU? The EU has gone through several enlargements; does it mean that new members became European, but were not before? Were Norwegians about to become Europeans while they were standing by the ballot boxes in 1973 and 1994?

Is European just the mix of its various national identities? Anthony D. Smith asks: “If “Europe” and “European” signify something more than the sum total of the populations and cultures that happen to inhabit a conventionally demarcated geographical space, what exactly are those characteristics and qualities

that distinguish Europe from anything or anyone else?"<sup>4</sup>. Further, he rightly argues that proposed geographical centers of Europe such as in Burgundy, along the Rhine River, Berlin, Prague, Budapest, and Vilnius, are all "historical claims, not geographical 'facts'"<sup>5</sup>.

Perhaps it would be better to leave Europe undefined. In the end, the question of who is or is not European may provoke more dilemmas than solutions. As with the camel: the practical approach is not to define it, but to describe it<sup>6</sup>.

According to Durkheim and several other scholars, ritual, myth and symbol play the key role in producing and maintaining solidarity among members of a community<sup>7</sup>. If so, then what is the European myth? What is the European memory?

Lene Hansen and Michael C. Williams argue in their recent essay on legitimacy and the crisis of the EU that:

...the entire argument concerning the mythic necessity of the EU hinges on an opposition between myth and rationalism that simply cannot be sustained, for the opposition between rationality and an historical, mythic culture of identity represents one of the most powerful and defining myths of the modern world – that of modernity as a whole<sup>8</sup>.

There might be some truth to this, but the European dilemma is moreover a choice between historical myths and memories on one hand, and a patchwork of decisions about creating a culture based on political will and economic interest, so often subject to change, on the other.

Europe, lacking a solid and unifying myth from the past, has instead proposed a myth for the future. Since the onset of the organizations that we today call the EU, it has been looking forward and denying the past. The myth of a common future has been emphasized to the detriment of working on the problems of the past. Even Helmut Kohl has stated that "Germany is my Fatherland, Europe is my future"<sup>9</sup>.

The problem that the EU had (and in fact still has) to solve is that shared memories, traditions, myths, symbols and values possess different meanings in different European nation-states. For example, Anthony Smith argues that such events "as the Crusades, the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment

affected some areas, peoples and states more than others, and few hardly at all<sup>10</sup>. In sum, all communities have participated in at least some European traditions and heritages to some degree, but at times they were allies with one another and at other times were bitter enemies. If there is something we can call a European experience, it will come into being over a long time-span and as a product of particular historical circumstances, often anticipated and unintentional. What experiences are common to all Europeans and in what way do they differ from the experiences of non-Europeans?

As seen above, all communities share both a sense of present identity and a past. Historical revision, in the case of the EU was a natural requirement. Norman Davies writes that the first stage in forging a common European identity seeks to root out the historical misinformation and misunderstandings that proliferated in all European countries. The second stage is to build a consensus on the positive content of a new “Eurohistory” that at best made sense only to the original “six”<sup>11</sup>.

One project that received support from the European Commission (initiated in 1989-91) was labeled “An Adventure in Understanding.” It was planned in three stages: a 500-page survey of European history, a 10-part television series and a school textbook to be published simultaneously in all eight languages of the EC<sup>12</sup>. Its authors made it clear that their aim was to replace history written according to the ethos of the sovereign nation-state and their nationalistic instincts. It defined Europe as the territory of the member states of the EC, with Scandinavia, Austria and Switzerland thrown in. However, the timing was unfortunate since it reached the market at the very time when its geographical frame had just collapsed. Therefore, the project was highly criticized; it was called “Half-truths about half of Europe” and “...Soviet-bloc historiography”<sup>13</sup>.

So far national educational systems, particularly the British system,<sup>14</sup> decide what to teach and are determined by national, not European, priorities. Most school history textbooks are national in content and intent. Until there is European standardization of the public education system, there is not much hope for “Eurohistory,” in spite of suggestions to move forward in this issue<sup>15</sup>.

The EU has, despite its short existence, already made attempts to introduce popular myths and symbols. In 1984, the European Council set up an *ad hoc* committee, chaired by Pietro Adonnino, remembered for its recommendations on the cultural and social aspects of the People’s Europe and on the symbols of

politics such as the Community emblem, flag, passport and anthem. Common passports and European frontiers might help to create an element of perceived common identity for those who travel beyond the European frontiers and for those who seek to enter them. But how many Europeans accept them as symbols of their new identity?

In any case, in a recent opinion poll<sup>16</sup> people were asked how they describe themselves and given four choices. The answers were the following: 45%, by nationality only; 40%, by nationality and European; 6%, by European and nationality; and 5%, by European only. Thus, there is little evidence yet that there exists European *demos*. Clearly, as Smith points out,

When it comes to the ritual and ceremony of collective identification, there is no European equivalent of national or religious community. There is no European analogue to Bastille or Armistice Day, no European ceremony for the fallen in the battle, no European shrine of kings or saints.<sup>17</sup>

Yet Paul Howe suggests that strengthening a European identity requires building the foundation for a European political community by introducing “community binding measures” like common passports, European citizenship and stronger political institutions at the European level. Moreover, Howe points out that this development of political structures and identity creates the conditions for the development of cultural underpinnings. “Slowly but surely beliefs about community will start to adjust to the political and legal infrastructure if that infrastructure protects a prosperous and peaceful community”<sup>18</sup>.

One of the latest great leaps towards European identity has been the introduction of the new currency. Currency conversion is almost entirely an economic project, but it is also intended to be a symbol of European identity. Olaf Hillenburger states in an official publication of the EU that this was one of the reasons why it was called the *Euro*. Another advantage of this name was that it is short and it can be written in the same way in all European languages<sup>19</sup>.

Another attempt to forge the European identity has been the introduction of the concept of European citizenship, which entered into force on the November 1, 1993, when every citizen of a member state of the EU became also a citizen of the EU<sup>20</sup>. However, despite the significance of the development, most citizens still identify themselves by their nationality. Why?

Perhaps there is some truth in the argument that the public is more concerned with practical matters: income, price stability, better working conditions, cleaner air, more recreational facilities, and does not care whether these amenities are provided by their national government or by Brussels as long as they are available. EU citizenship does not add significantly more rights to the member state's citizens than they already enjoyed under their national citizenship<sup>21</sup>.

In fact, EU citizenship is symbolic and has the same effect on individuals as if the treaty had referred to them as citizens of their member states instead of citizens of the EU. Citizenship in the EU does not yet embody duties towards the EU, although unspecified duties are mentioned in the Treaty's definition of citizenship<sup>22</sup>. Furthermore, the Treaty of Amsterdam made it clear, adding to article 8(1), that "[c]itizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship;" the competition between European and national citizenship will continue. Perhaps the citizenship of the EU needs time to settle; yet it is unlikely that, without substantial differences between national and European citizenship, it will have any real impact in the foreseeable future.

Despite strong arguments suggesting that citizenship does not necessarily adhere to the sovereign state, Brubaker argues that:

Those who herald the emerging post-national age are too hasty in condemning the nation state to the dustbin of history. They underestimate the resilience, as well as the richness and complexity, of an institutional and normative tradition that for better or worse appears to have life in it yet.<sup>23</sup>

Consider also Raymond Aron, who wrote 25 years ago that "[t]here are no such animals as 'European Citizens'. There are only French, German or Italian citizens<sup>24</sup>."

In general, people decide who they are by reference to who and what they are not; it is the same with identities. They are often forged through opposition to the identities of *other* communities. Thus, the question arises, what is Europe's *other*? A decade ago, the possible *other* of the ideological Cold War era ceased to exist. At present, there is no clear answer to the proposed question. Perhaps the United States has become the *other* against whom the EU measures itself.

The British have experienced a similar process, though it took place at least two centuries earlier and in a different setting. Since the Act of Union in 1707 that joined Scotland to England and Wales, the thorny march towards the one and only British national identity began. It can be argued that the march is not finished; instead, there are signs suggesting that the British are on a circle-road. Being an “invented nation,” Welshness, Scottishness and Englishness have remained powerful identities. Moreover, as so many of the components of Britishness have faded, there have been predictable calls for a revival of other, older loyalties – a return to Englishness, or Scottishness, or Welshness.

Linda Colley concludes in her fascinating book about the Britons that Protestantism (and its resistance to Catholicism) as a religion now has a limited influence on British culture. Wars with the states of continental Europe have in all likelihood come to an end, and the British no longer feel the same compulsion to remain united in the face of the enemy from without. And crucially, both commercial supremacy and imperial hegemony have been lost<sup>25</sup>. The essential cements have largely ceased to function. The British no longer have nor believe in a distinct and privileged identity. It is argued that any attempt to foster a European identity among citizens of the member-states will have negative implications for national identities. Yet there is no obvious reason why the question of identification should be conceived as a zero-sum game. On the contrary, it might have a positive effect, because the search for identity is sometimes a wish for the reassurance of existing identity. The case of Ireland confirms the latter possibility.

Before Ireland joined the European Community in 1972, many Irish genuinely feared that membership in a centralizing European organization would mean the end of their fragile, threatened national culture. Surrender of sovereignty in economic matters would, it was feared, lead to the surrender of national identity, the end of their particular national characteristics, and of their ability to protect their own culture. That Ireland may in fact have greater control over its destiny inside rather than outside the Community pervaded, however, with Ireland’s continued informal dependence on Britain. There was an overwhelming Irish vote in favor of EU membership: 83% voted yes<sup>26</sup>.

Almost 25 years of membership have supported the latter views. The Irish see that their limited surrender of sovereignty has given their small country rights which they previously did not have, the right to participate in decisions affecting them, and access to markets previously not open to them. In the case of

Ireland, membership into the EU and greater prosperity have enabled it to spend more on education, culture and the protection of national heritage. Wider contacts with other European cultures have led it to a deeper appreciation of its own language, music and literature<sup>27</sup>.

As seen above, the concept of European identity is running aground, both theoretically as well as practically. The main obstacle seems to be the fact that it is developed in the framework and terminology usually identified with nation-states. Hitherto, the people it attempts to unify show little enthusiasm for assuming a European identity in place of their national identity.

It might be argued that the concept of European identity, whatever it might be in reality, has instead strengthened national or regional identities, providing French, Germans, and other members of EU countries with the necessary *other* of being considered European instead. At the same time, it is also a popular tool of Euro-pessimists who cultivate uncertainty about the issue to their own ends.

If a European identity emerges, perhaps with the help of numerous EU initiatives, it must compete with existing national identities. An essential prerequisite for the European identity is the critical rereading of the common and separate past of all European nations. Otherwise it will not be possible to create a new, widely spread and accepted identity. The possibility and merits of multi-layer identities should not be disregarded, as in the case of the United Kingdom. However, the respective European process will be gradual and time-consuming.

In sum, whether the European identity project has any success or strength to compete with its national equivalent, deeply rooted in the past, is not clear. The outcome is important because it reflects the current conflicts among European states and peoples. Nevertheless, it must also be kept in mind that different people have their own constructions of identity, their own sense of what they are. Which thesis will be flawed in the long run, however, remains to be seen.

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- Treaty of Amsterdam, <<http://ue.eu.int/Amsterdam/en/amsteroc/en/treaty/treaty.htm>>.

## Notes

- 1 Anthony D. Smith, "National identity and the idea of European unity," *International affairs*, Vol.68, No.1 (Jan. 1992), 56.
- 2 Application of Turkish EU membership has not been turned down because of Article O of the establishing treaties, that allows any European state to join the EU.
- 3 Elizabeth H. Prodromou, "Paradigms, power, and identity: rediscovering Orthodoxy and regionalizing Europe," *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol.30, No.2 (Sept. 1996), 128-129.
- 4 Smith, 68.
- 5 *ibid.*, 69.
- 6 Norman Davies, "*Europe: A History*", Oxford University Press, 1996, 46.
- 7 David I. Ketzner, "*Ritual, Politics and Power*", Yale University Press, 1988, 61.
- 8 Lene Hansen and Michael C. Williams, "The Myths of Europe: Legitimacy, Community and the 'Crisis' of the EU," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.37, No.2 (June 1999), 240.
- 9 Paul Howe, "A Community of Europeans: The Requisite Underpinnings," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.33, No.1 (Jan. 1995), 31.
- 10 Smith, 70.
- 11 Davies, 43.
- 12 The European Community that has become the European Union.
- 13 Davies, 43-44.
- 14 On national historiography and teaching see Davies, 32-36.
- 15 On the latest proposal, see Luigi Berlinguer, "Ora Costruiamo i Cittadini Europei," *La Repubblica* (Jan. 7 2000), 15.
- 16 Figures from Eurobarometer Report Number 48, March 1998.
- 17 Smith, 73.
- 18 Howe, 37-42.
- 19 Olaf Hillenbrand, "The euro", *Europe from A to Z*, <http://euro.eu.int/>, (1996), 103.
- 20 Treaty on European Union.
- 21 The right to vote and stand in local and European elections may be considered an important principle, although most of the member states allowed this before (Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, etc.).
- 22 One could argue that obedience to the treaties is an all encompassing duty of a citizen of the EU.
- 23 Richard Brubaker, "*Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany*," Harvard University Press: 1996. 189.
- 24 Elizabeth Meehan, "*Citizenship and the European Community*," SAGE Publications, 1993, 172.
- 25 Linda Colley, "*Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837*," Hartford, CT: Yale University Press 1992. 372-374.
- 26 Bertrand Laffan, "Sovereignty and National Identity," in *Ireland and EC Membership Evaluated*, London: Printer Publishers, 1991.188.
- 27 Paul Keatinge (ed.), "*Ireland and EC Membership Evaluated*", London: Printer Publishers, 1991. 270-276.



# SPAIN AND MOROCCO: A STORY OF TENSION AND RECONCILIATION

BY JOSEP TORRES

## Introduction

Before Spain's entry into the European Community, during a long period of official international isolation, Spain dominated Morocco while ignoring closer countries like Portugal. It was often said that the only army the Spanish army could defeat was the Moroccan army. This comment demonstrates the disparaging attitude Spain adopted against Morocco due to indifference and ignorance about the country, its people and its culture. To visitors, it seemed Moroccan women did all the work while the men watched the world pass by. These were the stereotypes Spaniards had toward Morocco: a land of poverty and underdevelopment. The implication of the stereotypes was that if the Spaniards could not compete with their advanced European neighbours of the North, at least they could feel superior to their Moorish neighbours to the South

Once Spain became firmly anchored in the European Union and in NATO, relations between Morocco and Spain were normalized. Morocco is now of great importance to Spain, and the past relationship of disdain and ignorance has largely come to an end<sup>1</sup>. Problems certainly remain; trade tensions arise because of the competitiveness of Moroccan agricultural produce and its large fishing industry. However, most policy issues are resolved by EU policies for the Mediterranean region. Outside the political arena, at the level of the Spanish population, Morocco is popular with Spanish tourists. Cultural differences are now taken for granted and accepted without excessive criticism. This is no mean achievement. However, the presence of Moroccan immigrants in Spain results in present-day conflict. Hundreds of Moroccans have tried to cross the strait of Gibraltar<sup>2</sup>, and at least 400 people have drowned trying to get to Spanish shores<sup>3</sup> since 1998. For those who manage to make it to Spain, Catalonia is a main destination.

The present-day Muslim and Moroccan communities are identified and described herein with the object of reducing cultural tensions and racism. Beginning with the historical background and social context in which Moroccan immigration into Catalonia takes place, the article proceeds to an overview of the policy response of the Generalitat de Catalunya, the autonomous government of

Catalonia, in light of the increasing presence of Moroccan immigrants in Catalonia. The responses and reactions of Catalan society lead to a recommendation for a model of integration for Muslim Moroccan immigrants.

## **Moroccan Immigrants in Catalonia**

With the modernization of the Spanish economy and the re-industrialisation of Catalonia after the Spanish civil war, Spain changed from an exporter of economic immigrants to Northern Europe in the 1950's and 1960's, to an importer of immigrants<sup>4</sup>. This is a new social phenomenon for Spanish society, and one that has already sparked debate. At an average 1.7% of the Spanish workforce<sup>5</sup>, it is still quite low in comparison to the 5% of the EU. However, the official rate of unemployment in Spain is the highest of the EU member states at 16%.

Over the past years in Catalonia, the presence of Muslims and Moroccans in the cities and villages of Catalonia and the Balearic Islands is more and more visible, their participation in the workforce of some sectors is on the increase, and their contribution to society has risen substantially. What effects will immigration have on the local Catalan language and culture? What model should be followed for the integration in the receiving society of the new immigrants from Morocco?

## **The Origin of Moroccan Immigrants and Their Destination, Catalonia**

Two regions provide most of the Moroccan immigrants in Catalonia: the northern and Mediterranean regions of Rif and Jebala. This is according to the data collected in 1991<sup>6</sup> out of 16,000 cases of regularised residence permits. Emigrants from Rif are also found in Holland, Belgium and Germany; a more direct link to Spain exists in the case of Jabala.

Of the Moroccan residents in Catalonia, 38.5% come from the Rif region (5.9% from the Al-Hoceima region and 32.6% from Nador) and 32.7% come from Jebala (8.5% from Tangiers, 2.8% from Tetuan, 16.7% from Larraix and 4.7% from Xauen. The more southern the Moroccan region and the lesser the past Spanish colonial influence, the less the number of immigrants from these regions. Only 7.4% come from the oriental region (provinces of Oujada and Figuig), 6.6% were born in the central regions (Taza, 2.8% and Fes, 1.7%), and 8.5%

come from the Atlantic regions (Kenitra, Rabat, 4% come from Casablanca, Ben Slimane, Settat, El-Jadida, Safi and Essaouira). Only 1% comes from Marrakeix, the great capital of the South. Almost half of the Moroccans in Catalonia come from the provinces of Nador and Larraix. This provincial disequilibrium results from past unequal Spanish colonisation in Morocco. Northern Morocco used to be almost completely colonised by the Spanish; Northern Moroccan populations are predominantly Berber speaking. Therefore, the immigrants to Spain from Morocco tend to be primarily from Northern Morocco and speak Berber.

As to gender patterns in the origin of the Moroccan residents, it is interesting to point out that 46.9% of the men that immigrate to Catalonia do it directly from their *aduars* (traditional Moroccan settlements) of origin, while only 15.7% of women do. This is partly due to constraints placed on Moroccan women on travelling outside their homes. With these constraints, women cannot emigrate unless they follow their husbands. There is, however, direct emigration of women from urban settings: 58.3% in contrast to 20.7% of the men of the same origin. Of Moroccan women immigrants in Catalonia, 26% come from Larraix. Only among women of Rif origin is a majority from the rural medium<sup>7</sup>. The largest percentage of Moroccan women is found in the Barcelona area, at 41%. Male immigrants predominantly originate in areas where they are engaged in agricultural labor. There is a different pattern of migration for both the place of origin and the place of residence in Catalonia. The characteristic profile for the Moroccan immigrant is that of a young single male.

Catalonia has undergone various waves of immigrations throughout its history. Immigrants came from northern, central and southern Spain in the 1960's and 1970's. To a large extent, these economic immigrants adapted and integrated themselves into Catalan society. Integrating into Catalan society entails a certain amount of conscious effort on the part of any immigrant, as it would in any other circumstance of immigration. Immigrants to Catalonia face the challenge of acquiring Catalan language proficiency and culture; the lack of a wish to integrate on the part of the immigrant can lead to isolation and auto-exclusion. Spaniards who resettled in Catalonia learned the Catalan language to different degrees of fluency, but most understand spoken Catalan. Their children are schooled in Catalan and become proficient in both Catalan and Spanish by the end of secondary education. The latest influx of immigrants is made up of groups of people who do not have the same ease in adapting to Catalan society. Differences in language, culture, and religion, plus the unstable job market makes integration today a much

more complex process than it was thirty years ago. To this linguistic variety and its effects on adapting to Catalan society, a section is devoted later<sup>8</sup>.

### **Sociological Profile and Data for the Moroccan Immigrants<sup>9</sup>**

Moroccans are the largest group among foreign 'non-EU' residents and immigrants to Catalonia. Moroccan immigration to Catalonia started in the 1960's, and increasing numbers of individuals have immigrated to Catalonia since the 1970's. The influx of Moroccan immigrants rose steadily since the mid-1980's. At the end of 1995 the number of Moroccans with residence permits was 35,368, which amounts to 35% of the total of foreign immigrants in Catalonia. The Moroccans are the main group of immigrants in all four Catalan provinces. The bulk of them reside in Barcelona (69.5%), and the rest are divided between Girona, the northern province (17.5%); Tarragona, the southern province (8.9%); and Lleida, the Western province (4.1%).

As to demographic characteristics, the age pyramid is concentrated on the segments with the greatest access to the job market. There is a majority between the ages of 30 and 49 (43%), and of those between 16 and 29 years (37%). The presence of a second generation is still very much reduced; only 12% of legal residents in Spain originating from Morocco are under 16 years old. Gender distribution shows that there is a clear preponderance of men in all the age groups (79% men, 21% women).

Moroccan immigration to Catalonia is made up of a majority of single male adults (8,200 between age 15 and 49), but there is an increasing number of women (1,200). There are an indeterminate number of married people whose families remain in Morocco. Family groupings include those who have been residing in Catalonia for one or two decades and those who are recent immigrants.

Data show that there is already a second generation of Moroccans, a considerable part of whom were born in Catalonia. This second generation has an impact on the present-day school system. In the academic year 1995- 1996 there were 5,267 Moroccan pupils in the state schools: 69.3% in the primary schools and 22.4% in the pre-primary centres. Only 7.8% went on to secondary school and almost always to professional training (Formació Professional).

Insertion into the labour market takes place in very specific sectors. The majority works in construction (35%) or in services (31 %); there is another im-

portant group in agriculture (19%) and the rest in industry (14%). This general profile is modified in each of the Catalan provinces; in Lleida and Tarragona there is predominance of agricultural workers, and in Barcelona and Girona, construction and services predominate.

Most Moroccan workers receive a salary from an employer. Those who are autonomous workers or are self-employed take home jobs related to the textile industry, or go around to country fairs as vendors of goods and produce. They also work in the lumber industry or in construction by sub-contracts.

As for women, there is less employment outside the home (9%). Those who do work outside the home are usually unmarried and work as maids, in the tourism/hotel industry (21%) or in the textile industry (10%).

An overall analysis of the professional categories occupied by Moroccan immigrants demonstrates that there is a strong polarization towards the lower echelons of the job spectrum. Almost all of the Moroccan immigrant labor force is concentrated in unskilled jobs. These jobs are subject to strong restrictions and downturns in case of abrupt variations of the economic cycle.

The duration of work permits is an indicator of the juridical stability of Moroccan immigrants in the job market. Of Moroccan residents in Catalonia, 92% had work permits for one year, and only 8% (around 1,500 workers) were authorised to work for 5 years<sup>10</sup>.

Job stability allows immigrants to bring their families to Spain. In some families, certain members remain in Morocco. For example, eldest sons move to Spain only if there is a possibility for employment. Portions of salaries earned in Spain are sent to family members left in Morocco. These incomes are one of the most important sources of revenue for Morocco<sup>11</sup>.

Access to housing is frequently precarious for immigrants and their families. There is a difference between those who live in the city and those who live in the country. In the first case, most of the immigrants live in rented flats or stay in inexpensive hotels immediately upon arrival. Immigrants are usually housed in quarters of cities with the lowest rent costs. Racist attitudes of landlords lead to the exploitation of tenants or denial of rental. In rural areas, immigrants are frequently forced to live in isolated houses in the countryside provided by the em-

ploying farm. Other immigrants occupy abandoned houses or premises in squalid conditions. In some municipalities, groupings of houses and slums have already appeared. This is the case in Viladecans and Olesa de Montserrat.

The Moroccan position in the labour market threatens to paralyse them in a perpetual situation of instability and isolation. Despite the present strength of the Spanish economy, there is no easy short-term solution to the problems of racism and job and housing discrimination. Most immigrants have even fewer prospects to return to in their home countries.

### **Moroccans in Catalonia: Community, Identity and Religion<sup>12</sup>**

The link between community, identity and religion is important in Muslim society. Prevalent in Catalonia is the customary Muslim importation of cultural habits and close religious observance of Islamic law. The growing presence of Muslim communities in Catalonia is becoming more and more visible and assertive. This new phenomenon is taking place concurrently with the secularization of Catalan society and Western society in general. Spain is an aconfessional country where religious difference is accepted. Although Catalan society remains largely Catholic in culture, the working calendar and public holidays, religion has on the whole receded to the personal and private sphere. The growing presence of devout Muslim communities in a modernizing society has special implications.

In November 1992, the strong presence of the Islamic community in Spain was recognised by the Chamber of Deputies with the passing of the Cooperation Agreement between the Islamic Commission in Spain and the Spanish State. Through this law, the Islamic Commission guarantees and supervises religious practices, religious spaces and structural organisations related to Muslim residents in Spain. The application of the Cooperation Agreement has suffered due to internal disagreements in the Muslim community; no single religious authority has been appointed to act as its representative. There has been a lack of legal recognition and inscription of Muslim associations. This is also the case in local mosques located in rented flats or houses without adequate facilities. Problems occur in the legal and religious recognition of Moroccan *imams* and in the organisation of daily religious observance of the Muslim laws. For example, the preparation of food under Coranic law, the meat *halal*<sup>13</sup>, demands that Muslims may eat meat only from specially butchered animals. Finally, unresolved legal issues persist concerning the organisation of Ramadan and the religious education of the children of Muslim immigrants.

A special reference must be made to the role of mosques. Mosques are crucial to the practice of the Muslim religion and the education of children. They also function as a privileged identity nexus-locus for the larger community of believers, the *umma*. Oratories, which serve as small community mosques, have proliferated in Catalonia. The management and spiritual guidance of the *imams* associated with each mosque is crucial for the maintenance of Muslim identity and religion in light of immigrant displacement from their home society. The *imams* speak almost exclusively Arabic<sup>14</sup>; this leads to their isolation from the outside society, discourages their integration into the host society and limits their ability to resolve community problems in adapting to Catalan society. The evaluation of the role of the *imams* or their training, whether it should be the civil/religious authorities in the country of origin or that of European countries, is unresolved.

Another question concerning the immigrants' religious practices is that of spaces in the local cemeteries for Muslims. Between 1983 and 1995, 316 deaths of Moroccan citizens were certified in Barcelona. Repatriation of corpses used to be common practice, but became too costly for families. Negotiations with the local authorities are underway to allocate Muslims cemeteries so that Muslim funerary rites can be carried out accordingly<sup>15</sup>.

### **Trade and Muslim Religious Observance: The *Halal* Meat Markets in Catalonia.**

Religious laws and food habits are a fundamental issue in the cultural acculturation of Moroccan Muslims into Catalan society. *Halal* (licit or allowed) meat is meat sacrificed according to the Muslim law. Islamic presence in Catalonia has been accompanied by the ever more frequent inauguration of butcher shops run by Muslims in which *halal* meat is sold. *Halal* premises must abide by the same laws and hygiene regulations as the rest of Catalan butcher shops. Increasing demand for *halal* meat by established Muslim communities has created a network of production and commercialisation for it. The proliferation of *halal* meat brought the first business initiatives by local Muslim communities, and the health authorities of the European countries are keen on regulating this emerging market. Substantial commercial interests are at stake in the production, distribution and marketing of *halal* meat in the migratory context. Identity issues are central because all meat consumed in the home country is *halal*. *Halal* premises appeared in Barcelona even before many oratories did. Moroccans run the ma-

jority of halal establishments. Sensitive to this demand, Catalan slaughterhouses have taken on Muslim butchers to carry out the ritual and satisfy demand. There are no reports so far of animal rights activists in Catalonia opposed to this practice. The market in *halal* meat in Ciutat Vella de Barcelona, where most *halal* butchers are concentrated, is already showing signs of saturation. Some shops have gone out of business. Many *halal* butchers have expanded into grocery stores where many other products are sold until late at night, making them attractive to non-Muslim markets. In the period of Ramadan and in the *id al-kabir*, or Feast of the Lamb, sales increase substantially.

### **The Role of Cultural and Religious Associations**

There is an alleged lack of organisation in cultural and religious Moroccan associations. The lack of civil society in Morocco has been blamed for this<sup>16</sup>. Local administrations and the Generalitat have problems finding a valid interlocutor for the discussions of issues between the two communities. In spite of this, seventy-eight cultural associations exist in Catalonia, as shown by the Register of Associations of the Justice Ministry of the Generalitat updated July 20, 1998<sup>17</sup>.

To take two short examples of what these associations do, the sociocultural Association, "Ibn Batuta," was founded in 1994 by immigrants of Moroccan origin to guide their fellow countrymen in their difficult adaptation to immigration. The association now has 2,000 official members and serves 4,000. Most members are Moroccans, but there are also Algerians, Tunisians, Gambians and Senegalese. Sixty percent of the members are less than thirty years old. The association inaugurated new premises in the Raval quarter, one of the Arab *barris* of Barcelona<sup>18</sup>, in January 2000. It offers classes in Catalan, Spanish and Arabic after school and working hours. It also provides juridical counselling, information about job opportunities, help for women immigrants, and tutoring for schoolchildren. It also organizes outside sports tournaments. The new building contains a small room for prayer and a kitchen. Plans for future development include a library. The association also provides religious guidance and education for homeless Moroccan "street children"<sup>19</sup>. The President of the association, Mohamid Caib says:

The first generation of immigrants have no problems of identity. They want to have rights to housing and legal immigration documentation. They do not relate much to Catalan society. The second generation, however, has an identity problem<sup>20</sup>.

Another association is the Centre Abdelkrim<sup>21</sup>, named after the Rif leader that symbolised the anti-French and Spanish colonial fight of the Moroccans in the early 1900's. This association organizes cultural activities and university exchanges between Catalan, Moroccan and Egyptian Universities, most of them for Catalan students with an interest in North Africa. A great many of the members are political exiles and refugees that escaped from political repression by King Hassan II. The president of the association, Soliman El Morabet, took refuge in Barcelona in 1975 where he studied and graduated in economics.

### **The Project of a Great Mosque in Barcelona**

The Great Mosque of Barcelona has been one of the most important recent issues for the Muslim community in Catalonia. After the proliferation of ad hoc mosques and oratories for prayer in apartments, garages or cellars which do not have appropriate facilities to accommodate large numbers of people, a great Mosque commensurate with the Muslim presence in Catalonia now seems a certainty in Barcelona, as in other European capitals. Negotiations, albeit at an embryonic stage<sup>22</sup>, have been opened in Barcelona between the Generalitat and its Catalan Institut for the Mediterranean and the Barcelona municipality with a representative of the Saudi Embassy. King Fahd and Saudi Arabia are advocates of the enterprise and will give the economic support with no outstanding budget constraints. The Catalan Islamic Federation is, however, against a Saudi contribution to the Mosque in fear of a monopoly and does not accept the Saudi representative as the only interlocutor. The two directors of the previously mentioned Muslim associations oppose Saudi control of the funding. The public administration's position is to support a Mosque together with a multicultural center to be used by both societies in order to bridge the gap between Catalan and Muslim communities. The model of the Arab Institute of Paris has been rejected. The question of whether the Barcelonamunicipality will grant or facilitate a building site (of between 12,000 and 20,000 square meters) is still unresolved. The Mosque would have a capacity of 50,000, and would serve Moroccans who work in Barcelona and the surrounding area. It has been suggested that the surrounding area of the Mosque be devoted to a Muslim cemetery .

Building a mosque serves the aim of preparing Barcelona for the Forum of Cultures 2004, a cultural and political project for which it is crucial to have temples of the four principle religions of the world (Christianity, Judaism, Islam and Buddhism).

The reaction of the Catholic Church to the construction plan has been prompt, reactive and negative. The archbishop of Barcelona, Ricard Maria Carles states, "It would be elemental that for each mosque which is opened in Spain, France or Germany, a Catholic centre could be opened in Muslim nations, where it is totally forbidden. The situation is not balanced and should be reciprocal<sup>23</sup> ." Letters to the editor of *La Vanguardia* have also shown opposition to the Mosque.

### **Public Policies for Immigration: The Interdepartmental Immigration Plan of the Generalitat de Catalunya.**

Past policies of the administration addressed the problems and dislocation of the immigrant population at all levels of society<sup>24</sup>. Visas, work permits and border control fall under the jurisdiction of Madrid authorities. Once inside Catalonia, most of the social, educational and health services are run by the Generalitat.

On the 28th of September of 1993, the Generalitat approved the Interdepartmental Immigration Plan (PII). The approval of the plan entailed the beginning of a coordinated global policy for the promotion of the integration of foreign immigrants in Catalonia.

The PII has the following goals:

- Promoting a global policy of integration for immigrants.
- Establishing and carrying out a series of projects for resources and services aimed at the full personal and social development of immigrants.
- Promoting the participation of immigrants in the national construction of Catalonia, taking into account their contribution to the national and local identity and the collective heritage therein.
- Promoting information and awareness about immigration in Catalonia among the general population and professionals.

The PII distinguishes between:

- an assimilation position in which the unity of the national community of the country of reception is exclusive and denies any differences within from those coming from outside

- a segregation model in which there are differences and inequalities in rights and opportunities of certain members of collectives in respect to others<sup>25</sup>
- an intercultural model of immigration integration which includes a more active concept of interaction, interconnection, exchange of cultures and the balance of rights and duties between the local population and the immigrant contingent.

This last model is the one Catalonia desires in relation to the growing immigration population. This integration model finds a point of balance between the endogenous and exogenous attitudes of the reception society. If a society is too endogenous it rolls back on itself and does not open up to external influences. If a society is too exogenous and porous, the local population may feel that its society's characteristics and personality are threatened.

The model of integration intended by the Generalitat escapes the two extremes; Catalan identity is to be preserved and strengthened while accepting interaction with other cultural expressions as a form of enrichment, and therefore, respecting the sociocultural rights of the immigrant. This model of integration is also contrary to attitudes that would reject or marginalize the most underprivileged sectors of immigration. In a framework of respect for differences, it is intended that immigration policy lays emphasis on an equality of rights and obligations. To accept difference, it is necessary to understand the realities and background from which the immigrants come, as conceived in the PII.

### **Catalan, Spanish, Arabic and Berber: A Linguistic Model of Integration**

Catalan is the “vehicular” language of the education system and the instrument for achieving linguistic and cultural immersion in Catalan society and culture. The aim of secondary education is that all students are perfectly proficient in Catalan and Spanish, and this aim is largely achieved.

As shown above, the majority of Moroccan immigrants comes from Berber-speaking areas<sup>26</sup>. Following Ouakrim's study, it can be stated that Berber is mainly a spoken language, not written, although it has an old alphabet. A substantial part of the Moroccan population is not proficient in Arabic, even though it is one of the official languages of Morocco. Berbers from rural areas are schooled in Arabic or French, never in Berber. A movement of linguistic and ethnic recov-

ery to grant prestige to Berber is underway in the Berber regions of Morocco.

Many Moroccan immigrants in Catalonia speak the Berber language. This is reflected in the language they speak to their children. Ouakrim's study case of schools in Ciutat Vella de Barcelona shows that the cross-fertilisation between the four languages depends on the origin of the families and the degree of integration of the children. The study was done on the basis of 94 children; 64 had been born in Morocco and 29 in Catalonia. In the case of the schoolchildren of Ciutat Vella, the arabophones among the parents of the children predominated 2-to-1. This can be explained by the fact that Berbers may become arabophones through schooling, choice or change of previous residence in Morocco. The schoolchildren in the study showed a clear preference in almost all cases for Spanish; 84% prefer it for oral communication because they see it as the language predominating in the environment of Ciutat Vella because of new or former Spanish immigration there. They also perceive that Spanish is the language promoting their integration in the quarter. They are not hostile to learning Catalan, though, because they are aware of its importance at school (71 % express their desire to receive the classes in both Catalan and Spanish). As to the choice between Arabic and Berber they prefer by far Arabic (66% as against 26%).

The study concludes that Spanish occupies a central role in the socialisation of the children of Moroccan origin. This is explained by the sociolinguistic situation in Ciutat Vella; this cannot necessarily be extrapolated to other towns or villages where concentrations of Moroccans of mainly Berber language occur. Teaching the mother tongue, Arabic or Berber, to children would allow them to maintain their culture of origin and communicate with their parents. In fact, Ouakrim complains that the Moroccan consulate is not promoting this idea well enough. In addition, the children's knowledge of Spanish or Catalan and the ability to learn quickly gives them a privileged position in their family if the parents still have an imperfect mastery of the language; children serve an important function as translators and intermediaries between their parents and Catalan society.

There is a different predominance of Catalan and Berber in other areas of Catalonia outside Barcelona. For example, an attempt by the Moroccan consulate to carry out Arabic lessons ended in failure in the Osona school. The teacher sent by the Consulate spoke Arabic and Spanish, whereas the Moroccan children understood and spoke Catalan and Berber<sup>27</sup>, and thus no communication could occur between them.

The issue whether the Generalitat should try to maintain the language and the culture of origin is controversial. In January 2000, the Education department began introducing Islamic Culture in the Catalan schools as required. At present there are 7,422 schoolchildren from the Maghreb. Arabic language classes had been in past years on offer with little success<sup>28</sup>. The Education department has published an Arabic-Catalan dictionary, of which 445 copies have been distributed in associations and government offices frequented by Muslim immigrants. A visual Arab-Catalan dictionary has been published for schoolchildren, and 2000 copies have been distributed<sup>29</sup>.

One of the harshest critics of this policy of Arabization of the Moroccans in Catalonia carried out in the schools is by Alfons Quintà, a journalist and lawyer<sup>30</sup>. He accuses the Generalitat of a lack of historical consciousness by contributing to the persecution and oppression of the Berber language and culture with the policy of only promoting the Arabic language. He also condemns the alignment of the Generalitat with the official policies of the Moroccan Consulate. If two-thirds of Moroccans and 40% of Algerians, according to the data he gives, are Amazigh, commonly known as Berbers, and if of the alleged 80,000 Maghrebians in Catalonia 65,000 are Imazighen, how can the Generalitat deny this reality? If Catalans had to suffer the persecution of their own language, how can they forget this so easily and help in the stamping out of another valuable language and culture? Quintà points out that in Holland, Belgium and Germany the schoolchildren of Moroccan origin can receive complementary tuition in the Berber language. That is the model to follow and not the imposition of an imagined Arabic standard alien to their culture (sic).

The biggest problem the Generalitat faces, however, as regards its policy of schooling Moroccan and Maghrebian children, is that of segregation. Ghettos already exist in some quarters, and some parents of Catalan schoolchildren withdraw their children from school because they feel the presence of Moroccan children detract from the quality of teaching. Also the Moroccan children are thought to be a bad influence on their children. Some Muslim parents, moreover, do not permit their daughters to have physical training in the school as one of their subjects<sup>31</sup>.

The question of Catalan nationalism and immigration is also commented on by Salvador Cardús, a sociologist and well-known Catalan nationalist. He raises concerns that the Generalitat will not have the sufficient resources and po-

litical will to “Catalanize” the growing number of immigrants<sup>32</sup>. In no way should immigrants contribute to a Spanish reappropriation of Catalonia. Cardús recalls that with the help of the Francoist regime exclusively supporting Castilian, many Spanish-speaking immigrants of the 1960-70 period only weakly integrated into Catalan culture and society. Many never learned Catalan and do not speak it to date. It is imperative for the survival of Catalonian immigrants be brought into Catalan culture, and the Catalan language is again the key to integration. The policy of the Generalitat tends in this direction, in spite of the current fact that many immigrants in Barcelona do not speak Catalan.

### **Relative Success and Racist Incidents in Terrassa, July 1999**

Despite the fact that information campaigns have been addressed to the local population in order to address issues concerning immigration, some racist incidents against Maghrebians have recently taken place in Catalonia. These incidents have attracted much public attention and concern. The PII had already been aware of potential for conflict.

Some data from the PII report was found to represent obstacles to the inter-cultural model espoused by the Generalitat; for example, 29% of the citizens of Barcelona would not set up a business with Maghrebians, and 18% would not like to have Muslim neighbours. Negative attitudes against Arabs are to be found mainly in working classes which compete for the same scarce resources as the immigrants, or when foreign workers demand equal rights with the autochthonous Catalans. Approximately half of Moroccans in Catalonia (48.1%) declare having experienced discrimination<sup>33</sup>.

In July 1999, violent incidents broke out in the Catalan city of Terrassa (there are 3000 Muslims in Terrassa, of which 2220 are Moroccan), in the quarter of Ca'n Anglada. The incident seems to have started at the exit of a disco and resulted in several days of aggressions against Maghrebians, their shops and mosques<sup>34</sup>. The concentration of Maghrebians in Ca'n Anglada (1 in 5 residents is Maghrebian), the poor living conditions, deficient schooling, and drug problems seem to have exacerbated the problem<sup>35</sup>.

The reaction from Muslim associations to the problems of violence and integration has been varied. The Muslim congress held in Terrassa in November 1999, pointed out that despite racist incidents, Spain is a pioneer in opening up to

other cultures. The explanation given for the outburst of violence was some extraneous contagion coming from other sources<sup>36</sup>. The congress reminded the public that the Islamic community wants to participate in the Catalan and Spanish community but that it also wants to preserve its own identity.

Many comments on the outbursts of violence and the problems of integration come from Soliman El Morabet, the president of the Abdelkrim Centre. He sees the incidents in Terrassa as the first of a series that will grow progressively worse unless tough measures are taken by the administration. The incidents in Terrassa had been predicted two years ago by Moroccans, but neither the Terrassa municipality nor the Generalitat reacted at that time.

There is no political will to solve these problems, I am critical of all the political parties and the politicians. They put aside the problems of a people that do not interest them because they don't have a vote. The immigrants are only defended when problems break out and there are TV cameras. The immigrants have so many limitations and shortages that only by public help they will manage to come forward. The majority of Maghrebians have a total lack of knowledge of local customs, habits and laws. We have to teach them our cultural rules before demanding that they abide by them. In Terrassa there were never problems with the first immigrants. The problem now is their children; having been born and raised here they feel they are Catalan but they do not find success and do not integrate. Why if I am Catalan—even though my name is Said or Mohamed—I don't have the same opportunities? In isolated cases violence can be a way of rebelling against frustration and marginalization.<sup>37</sup>

In addition, the writer Tahar Ben Jelloun asserts that

“the Spaniards have not been prepared to receive foreign workers. Given Spanish colonial links with Morocco and the problem of Ceuta and Melilla, a great lack of understanding and mistrust takes place. And curiously enough Moroccans love Spaniards and Spain. Spain easily closes its eyes to its past, that of a country of emigrants. Spain is not a racist society but it has racist elements.<sup>38</sup>

## **Conclusions: Second-Generation Moroccans or Catalans of Muslim Origin?**

The presence of immigrants from the Maghreb, mainly from Morocco, has become an ever stronger reality in Spanish and Catalan society. Without constituting an avalanche of immigrants, there is a constant flow of immigrants pouring into Catalonia from Morocco. Moroccans are already the biggest group among foreign workers living in Catalonia. Immigrants, in spite of job market instability, have been gaining self-confidence, organised themselves into associations, brought over their families and chosen Catalonia as their land of residence and work. If they once were unnoticed by mainstream Catalan society, now the Moroccan and Muslim presence is expressed through shops of *halal* meat, mosques, and claiming public space for religious celebrations. If this development continues, new forms of Muslim culture may come about with a specific Catalan brand.

Cooperation agreements between the Spanish state and Muslim federations and between the Spanish state and the Moroccan kingdom remain undeveloped. An application of these cooperation agreements could enhance the legal status and organizational life of the Moroccan and Muslim communities in Catalonia.

There is still, however, a considerable lack of coordination within Muslim associations and a division of leadership. The future construction of a Great Mosque in Barcelona could either help pull efforts together or bring about more dissension, depending on whether this venture goes ahead exclusively under the management of Saudi capital and influence.

The Catalan model of immigration is one based on the intercultural model of active interaction between the receiving and the immigrant community. This interaction is, however, contingent on the acceptance of the Catalan language as necessary for the acquisition of Catalan identity and the existence of Catalonia. Considerable efforts are made by the public administration to favour integration of immigrants through the Catalan language as a means of gaining social and professional promotion. The immigration interdepartmental plan and schooling in the Catalan state schools, where Catalan is the dominant language are the tools through which second generation Moroccans can become Catalan citizens of Muslim origin. It is the sociolinguistic reality, however, that in many quarters of Barcelona, Spanish is the dominant language of socialization. It is questionable to teach Ara-

bic to the Moroccan pupils as a way of recovering their parents' culture and identity when many of them come from Berber regions.

Racist incidents have taken place in 1999, breaking the harmony of a relatively peaceful cohabitation between the two communities. More forceful action has to be carried out by the public administration in all areas of social policy and awareness raising so that these unfortunate actions may not happen again in the future.

Immigrant integration in Catalan society will only happen smoothly and completely when Catalan society recognises that the continuous presence of new Catalans of Muslim and Moroccan origin is a valuable contribution to its cultural and political identity. The new citizens must be recognized and given full rights and duties as whole participants in society. It seems likely that socialization dynamics in schools will turn the children of Moroccan parents and those already born on Catalonian soil into full members of Catalan society, once they become bilingual in Catalan and Spanish.

### **Post-Script**

In January and February 2000, violent and racist incidents against Moroccan laborers took place in Southern Spain. The events in "El Ejido," Almeria, Andalucia captured the attention of Europe and brought shame to the Spanish population. These were incidents of an unprecedented violent nature in Spain. The incidents seem to have started after the death of a local girl allegedly at the hands of a Moroccan. Locals then exacted revenge hands against Moroccans at large. Three days of attacks occurred which brought about havoc in the plantations where the laborers worked, damaged their property, and promoted violence between Spaniards and immigrants. Strikes and fear ensued. Negotiations and intervention by the police and government brought about peace to the area after a week. Large-scale investment in housing and infrastructure is now going to be undertaken in the area<sup>39</sup>.

These incidents show how sensitive the immigration issue may become in Spain in the future. It remains to be seen how the absolute majority won by the Popular Party (Center-Right Party) of Premier José María Aznar on March 12, 2000 will treat the subject of immigration and whether or not they will be able to avoid future incidents of the same nature. Already, laws (Ley de Extranjería) are

on the table, which would make penalties for illegal immigration attempts more severe, as desired by the Popular Party.

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## Notes

1 It is customary for Spanish prime ministers in the new democratic period after the Franco dictatorship to carry out their first official visit abroad to Morocco as a sign of the importance attributed to bilateral relations between the two countries.

2 For comments about the nature of the emigration, see "Why do the Maghrebians emigrate?" *El País*, October 31, 1999. Another view on the subject it is given by ATIME, Association of the Moroccan Workers and Immigrants in Spain: "The only way to finish the pateras traffic is to invest politico and economicaly in the countries of origin." *La Vanguardia*, July 27, 1999.

3 *La Vanguardia*, Barcelona, July 27, 1999, 23.

<sup>4</sup>According to one of the latest United Nations reports (*El País*, Sociedad section, Jan. 7, 2000), Spain will need 12 million immigrants from the year 2000 until 2050 if it wants to maintain its current labor force, at a rate of 240,000 migrants every year, while the Spanish government intends to allow in only 30,000. Spain is becoming one of the nation-states with the most aging population. Eighty percent of Spaniards believe that an 'invasion' of immigrants from poor countries will undoubtedly take place over the coming years (<http://www.elpais.es>: Survey for *El País*, Jan. 2, 2000). Another view about the subject of immigration and the official employment policies can be obtained in Ferran Cardenal, "Immigració i Politiques d'ocupació,"

*El Periódico*, Nov. 24, 1999.

5 Data from the IOE collective report, "Aproximación al Modelo Migratorio Español," as appeared in *La Vanguardia*, Nov. 26, 1999, 16.

6 Detailed analysis to be found in Marroquins a Catalunya, 129.

7 Dolors Roca, "Dona i emigració," *ICM*, 1998. "Jomades sobre les dones immigrades," 1994, *Ajuntament de Barcelona*. Las Presencias de la inmigración femenina: un recorrido por Filipinas, Gambia y Marruecos, Barna-Icària, Barcelona, 1999. An article dealing with the break-up of the patriarchal family structure in Northern-African because of emigration can be found in "Las Hijas rebeldes del Islam," (The Rebel daughters of Islam) *El País*, Dec. 8 1999. In the article it is argued that the patrilineal, endogamic and communitarian features of Arab society, such as arranged marriages, are threatened in the urban areas of Morocco by women who gain access to education and to jobs outside the home.

8 For a detailed analysis of the linguistic and cultural diversity in Morocco, see "Unitat i Diversitat al Marroc," Marroquins a Catalunya, Chapter 2.

9 All statistics are taken from the Official Catalan Government Statistics: <http://www.gencat.es/benestar.immigra>.

10 The conclusions from a recent study by the Autonomous University of Barcelona about levels of discrimination the immigrants suffer in terms of salary, promotions, extra-hours and general work conditions can be found in *El País*, Nov. 19, 1999, 6.

11 See Les Transferències dels Immigrants Marroquins cap al Marroc, ICM, Barcelona, 1997.

12 An up-to-date study on the subject of Muslims in Spain and more specifically in Catalonia is found in Jordi Moreras, Musulmanes en Barcelona- espacios y dinámicas comunitarias. Barcelona, 1999.

13 Coran, 2168. Blood may not be consumed by Muslims; therefore, it is necessary to bleed animals as much as possible prior to consumption. The slicing of the jugular vein with one cut while pronouncing the name of God is part of the ceremony.

14 Moreras, 206.

15 Demands for a Muslim cemetery and an improvement in the facilities allocated to the growing Muslim community exist also in Mallorca. *Diari de Balears*, Dec. 21, 1999, 15. "The Muslim Community wants a reserved space in the cemetery. The Muslim association Benteyeb asks for economic support from the municipality."

16 Moreras, 282 and following.

17 Some of these organizations may no longer exist. For a complete list and comment on their legal status, see Moreras, 341 and following.

18 All information about the Ibn Batuta association is gathered from <http://www.elperiodico.es>: *El Periódico de Catalunya*, Jan. 12, 2000.

19 The problem of the estimated 300 street boys roaming the Barcelona streets is handled in *Avui*, Nov. 29, 1999, 24. Forty percent of the boys from Moroccan origin are over 18 years old.

20 Personal interview, Barcelona, Dec. 20, 1999.

21 Information compiled from *La Vanguardia*, July 30, 1999, 4.

22 Information collected from *El Periódico de Catalunya*, January 9, 2000 and

January 12, 2000. For a discussion of the implications of the possible models of a location of the Great Mosque, see Moreras, 299 and following.

23 <http://www.el-mundo.es>: *El Mundo*, Dec. 24, 1998. Statement and reactions mentioned in Moreras, 302.

24 The original text of the plan was published by the Departament de Social, Generalitat de Catalunya, 1994. The report on the Plan for the years 1993-1998 can be found in <http://www.gencat.es/benestar/immigra/balanc>.

25 The report identifies with the concept of multiculturalism, implying the existence of compact segments of population representing different socio-cultural conceptions that hold no mutual relations.

26 For the case study, refer to Omar Ouakrim, "La realitat Sociolingüística dels immigrants Magesbrins a Catalunya," Barcelona, Institut de Sociolingüística: 1994.

27 II Informe sobre immigració, and Treball Social, Diputació Barcelona, Serveis Socials, 1997, 669. The articles also point out that many collectives and Moroccan associations oppose the courses set up by the Consulate so that they can avoid official control of their activities.

28 Information about the final introduction of Muslim culture from *Avui*, Nov. 18, 1999, 20. In a conversation with two officials of the Generalitat on Dec. 23, 1999, they commented that many parents preferred their children to learn English so as to advance their career possibilities in Western society.

29 *El País*, December 9, 1999.

30 "An Anti-nationalist Education Department," *Avui*, Aug. 31, 1999.

31 *ABC*, Nov. 28, 1999, 4.

32 *Avui*, July 30, 1999, 15.

33 "Es Barcelona una ciudad racista?" *La Veu del Carrer*, Barcelona, Sept/Oct 1999. 6. The conclusion is that the ethnic group suffering the greater level of racism or conflict is the gypsies, the rest being remarkably low. A survey in *El Mundo*, Dec. 21, 1999. 33, shows that 57% of university students believe that greater intakes of immigrants have to be stopped. Almost half consider themselves a 'bit racist' and 15% would expel Arabs and Gypsies from Spain.

34 *La Vanguardia*, Nov. 7, 1999.

35 Other conflicts in Spain against Moroccan workers are reported in Almeria; *La Vanguardia*, Sept. 27, 1999, 45.; and in Fuerteventura, *El Periódico*, Nov. 10, 1999.

36 *El País*, Nov. 7, 1999, 4.

37 *La Vanguardia*, July 30, 1999. See also Carles Senti, "Marroquins a l'Empordà," *Avui*, Sept. 5, 1999, 4. On the basis of the failure of the French model of integration of Algerians into French society, the writer argues, it is not advisable that Catalans should try and integrate the Maghrebians.

38 *La Vanguardia*, November 25, 1999.

39 *El País*, March 29, 2000.



# CAN MULTI-COMMUNAL DEMOCRACIES WORK?

BY IANNIS CARRAS

## **Introduction: Mill and Acton on the nation state**

Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a prime facie case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart... It is in general a necessary condition of free institutions, that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities. - John Stuart Mill<sup>1</sup>

That intolerance of social freedom which is natural to absolutism is sure to find a corrective in the national diversities, which no other force could so efficiently provide. The coexistence of several nations under the same State is a test, as well as the best security of its freedom. It is also one of the chief instruments of civilization; and, as such, it is in the natural and providential order, and indicates a state of greater advancement than the national unity which is the ideal of modern liberalism. -Lord Acton<sup>2</sup>

Though John Stuart Mill and Lord Acton were both members of parliament for the Liberal Party, they were unusual parliamentarians. Mill first stood as a parliamentary candidate for Westminster in 1865. The historian Lord Acton represented his Shropshire constituency from 1859 to 1865. Between them, Acton in "Nationality" and Mill in "Considerations on Representative Government," grappled with the question of the advantages and problems associated with the national or multi-communal state<sup>3</sup>.

Acton and Mill underline a dilemma that is very much with us today. In 1991-2, the European Union was divided over an appropriate response to the growing crisis in Yugoslavia. The principle of national self-determination triumphed; Croatia then Bosnia-Herzegovina were recognized as independent states. To paraphrase Mill, the sentiment of Croatian, Serbian, and perhaps even Bosnian nationality, existed in force so there was a prime facie case for separating the members of each nationality, granting each a government to themselves apart.

Though they may have disagreed over the details of separation, regional leaders seemed to agree on the principle of national self-determination<sup>4</sup>.

It would be a mistake to belittle Mill's arguments. The nation-state is an astoundingly successful and effective organizing principle precisely because it draws on sentiments of belonging, unity and fellowship. Judging the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman Empires of his day, and no doubt drawing on the twenty years from 1836 to 1856 when he had charge of the British East India Company's relations with the Indian states, Mill's claim that free institutions are nearly impossible to maintain in a country made up of different nationalities is reasonable. The former Yugoslavia, for example, was not a free state.

But Lord Acton too was perceptive:

By making the state and the nation commensurate with each other in theory, it reduces practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be within the boundary... the inferior races are exterminated or reduced to servitude, or outlawed or put in a condition of dependence.<sup>5</sup>

The creation of a nation state unconstrained by external forces or internal checks and balances undermines symbiosis. Where populations are mixed, fearful minorities have every reason to resist. The results are by now well documented:

You abolished our government, annihilated our laws, suppressed our authorities, took away our lands, turned us out of our houses, denied us the rights of men, made us outcasts and outlaws in our own land<sup>6</sup>.

The actions of Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia proved no exception.

This then is the dilemma left for us by Mill and Acton. Is it possible to create a free and democratic multi-communal state that enjoys the loyalty of its citizens? In other words, is it possible to create multi-communal democracies?

This article attempts to provide the necessary framework for an answer. The first section discusses how democracy combined with nationalism undermines multicommunal states. Nevertheless, an understanding of the basis of democracy provides guidance for the creation of the institutions that may help a multi-communal state work. In the second section, the mechanisms and institutions

of multi-communal democracies are touched upon, using the relatively short-lived experience of multicommunal democracy in Lebanon as an example. Finally, an electoral system for a multi-communal Bosnia-Herzegovina is proposed in light of Lebanon. Though there is no longer the possibility of a multi-communal Yugoslavia, a multi-communal Bosnia-Herzegovina may still be resuscitated.

This discussion is relevant for many countries in Europe and beyond: Northern Ireland, FYR Macedonia, Georgia and Sri Lanka to name but a few. It aims to reveal some of the particular difficulties faced by multi-communal democracies and to point towards possible solutions.

## **Democracy and the Multi-Communal State**

To understand the effect democracy has on multi-communal states, it is first necessary to ask what makes democracy different from other forms of government. The term is derived from *demos*, meaning people and *kratos*, power, thus democracy means the rule of the people. But the word is not enough; on a surface level, the rule of the people has certain distinguishing features, while on a deeper level it is justified by a set of political ideals.

Until this century, democracy's minimum distinguishing feature was universal adult male suffrage, which led to universal adult suffrage when the vote was extended to women<sup>7</sup>. A further distinguishing feature is that the vote should be genuinely free, resulting in significant changes in a democratic country's political scene from time to time.

Turning to the ideological framework that underpins democratic government, an examination of one of the earlier justifications of the democratic state proves useful:

The constitution is called a democracy because rule is not by the few but by the majority. In private disputes all are equal before the law... freedom is the hallmark of our public life, and as regards the pursuits of daily life, we do not frown on our neighbor if he does as he please... -Pericles<sup>8</sup>

As Pericles explains, the rule of the people was justified by liberty and equality. In the ancient world, liberty was also a crucial constitutional concept associated with political participation in the public sphere and personal freedom in the private

sphere<sup>9</sup>. Equality could mean natural equality or the democratic argument that any citizen's opinion was equally valid if not equally correct<sup>10</sup>. It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss the implications of liberty and equality in detail<sup>11</sup>. What matters here is that democracy is both a process and an ideology justified by a set of principles.

The democratic process may, however, undermine and weaken the ideology. As de Tocqueville put it: "Habits form in freedom that may one day become fatal to freedom<sup>12</sup>." Constitutions therefore restrict the unadulterated power of the majority, which is the democratic process, in order to ensure a democratic end. Such an end reinforces the logical and ideological basis for democracy.

The situation in multi-communal states should by now be evident. When there is a fixed majority and a fixed minority, democratic processes will usually dominate democratic ends or principles. The result will be tyranny rather than democracy as the majority always imposes its will on the distinct minority. Democracy may be justified on grounds of liberty and equality, but the minority population is both less free and less equal than the dominant group. Furthermore, the state will be unstable, resulting from fearful and resentful minorities sharing resources and living space with the majority group unwilling to share its power.

The introduction of democracy in multi-communal states by and large confirms this analysis. In the former Yugoslavia, each community's fears of becoming a political minority, and therefore less than free and less than equal in a democratic state manipulated by a hostile majority, was exploited by power-hungry politicians<sup>13</sup>. It follows that democratization was itself part of the process that led to war in the former Yugoslavia.

However, this division of democracy into processes and ideological principles also suggests a solution for multi-communal states. If normal democratic processes, such as "one person, one vote," undermine the ideology that justifies democratic government, it might be possible to redesign those processes. The experiment with multi-communal democracy in Lebanon between 1943 and the mid-1970's permits an investigation into the mechanisms and institutions that were designed to ensure that democratic processes did not result in an unjust distribution of power.

## **Mechanisms and Institutions: The Case of Lebanon**

The history of Lebanon during the last century is complicated; the international setting continually influenced the interaction between different communities in the country itself<sup>14</sup>. The aim here is not to outline Lebanon's modern history, and still less to comment on outside interventions that strengthened or weakened the Lebanese state, but to point to the country's internal complexity and to discuss the mechanisms and institutions created to allow the country to function.

Lebanon is a fragmented country. Although all Lebanese speak Arabic, it is divided on religious lines between Christians and Muslims. The Christians are themselves divided between Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and an array of other minority groups including Nestorians, Jacobites, several Armenian sects, Assyrians and Chaldeans. The Muslims in turn are divided among the Sunnis, the Shiites and the Druze.

The proportion of each of these groups is the subject of considerable controversy as the last government census was taken in 1932 during the French Mandate. In 1932 the Christians were 51.3% of the population. Of these, the Maronites were 28.8%, the Greek Orthodox 9.8%, the Greek Catholics 5.9% and other Christians 6.8%. Of the 48.8% who were Muslim, 22.4% were Sunni, 19.6% Shiite, and 6.8% Druze<sup>15</sup>.

Since 1932, only estimates can be made of the size of the different communities. Nevertheless, it is clear that emigration and lower birth rates have reduced the Christian proportion of the population from slightly over half to well under 40%. In contrast, the Shiites have become the largest community in Lebanon with about a third of the population<sup>16</sup>.

Lebanese demography is then extraordinarily complex. In the absence of an external power such as France, Syria or Israel controlling Lebanon by force, the need for a constitution that balances the interests of the various communities is evident. The system created for this purpose in Lebanon was confessionalism. Its aim was to ensure an equitable distribution of power between Lebanon's religious communities. In particular, no community was to be excluded from the democratic process. The rest of this section will discuss the structure, successes and failures of confessionalism.

The origins of confessionalism are to be found in the period when Lebanon formed part of the Ottoman Empire. By 1864, Mount Lebanon had been divided into seven districts, each of them sending representatives to the council in a confessional ratio. For example, the mixed area of Jazzin sent one Maronite, one Druze and one Muslim and so on. The councilors were chosen by the heads of the religious denominations rather than elected. When the French were awarded the Mandate of Syria and Lebanon in 1920, the seeds for confessional democracy had already been sown<sup>17</sup>.

The French enlarged the original area of Mount Lebanon, including the Biqa plain as well as the cities of Sidon, Tyre and Tripoli in the expanded state<sup>18</sup>. A Constitution for the new Lebanon was created under the auspices of the French Mandate and came into force in 1926. It largely corresponded to the wishes of the Beirut bourgeoisie as verified in an official poll of their preferences<sup>19</sup>. The text of the constitution was drawn up mainly by the writer Michel Chiha at the head of a Statutory Commission.

The 1926 Constitution served with a few modifications as the base for political authority in Lebanon after the declaration of independence from France in 1943<sup>20</sup>. In 1943, an unwritten National Pact between Maronite and Sunni leaders completed the process of developing a separate political identity. This Pact must be considered an integral part of the constitution<sup>21</sup>. How then did the Lebanese constitution work?

Executive authority was vested within the President of the Republic who was always a Maronite, as agreed in the National Pact. The President was elected by the Chamber of Deputies for one six year term and was eligible for reelection only after a period of six years out of office. The President appointed the country's ministers and Prime Minister and could also dismiss any of them.

According to the terms of the National Pact, the Prime Minister was always a Sunni Muslim. The ministers were also appointed on a confessional basis. In practice, the cabinet was extremely important; it was only by including all regions and all denominations in the cabinet that the government could be sure its authority would prevail even in the most remote, clannish and feudal regions of Lebanon. As a result, the cabinet contained its own opposition within it.<sup>22</sup> The head of the armed forces was always a Maronite and his deputy always a Druze.

Legislative authority was vested in the Chamber of Deputies, elected every four years. As in Ottoman times, each electoral district was appointed seats on a confessional basis. According to the National Pact, the Chamber always had to include a number of deputies divisible by eleven, so that there would be six deputies belonging to Christian communities for every five deputies belonging to Muslim communities. If an electoral district were to elect four councilors, two Maronites, a Druze and a Sunni for example, there would be three separate competitions in that district, one for each of the communities to be elected. Each voter voted in all the competitions, whether the candidate was from his own community or not. A voter in the above district would therefore vote three times. Similarly, the Druze deputy would have to appeal to all communities in the electoral district in order to win. Electoral lists could be formed in these multi-member constituencies so that candidates campaigning for the same votes, but not standing against one another, could maximize their strength<sup>23</sup>.

The Lebanese electoral system was one of the most successful features of the confessional state. It ensured that those elected to positions of power in the Chamber of Deputies had to appeal to the members of other communities apart from their own. In these circumstances, politicians seeking election had no interest in alienating other communities. On the contrary, the votes of other minorities were essential for each politician's political survival. Elections were frequently fiercely competitive and huge sums were spent to ensure victory. On average, the elected candidate won about 60% of the votes<sup>24</sup>.

However, in several aspects the Lebanese electoral system failed. As there were no parliamentary groups based on religion in the Chamber of Deputies, its members could not adequately represent their communities. As a result, specifically confessional problems were not sufficiently debated within the Chamber.

Furthermore, the whole electoral process was skewed by the power and prestige of the local clan leaders, or *zuama* (singular *zaim*). These clan leaders were particularly strong in the Maronite, Shiite and Druze communities and frequently exercised greater power than the government in their own constituencies. A *zaim*'s task was to provide patronage for his clients and constituents, create jobs, and settle disputes<sup>25</sup>. Electoral success was of great importance for a *zaim*. It legitimized his position and offered further opportunities for patronage<sup>26</sup>.

The power of the *zuama* meant that real political parties did not exist in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, except as temporary groupings of individuals. Furthermore, the absence of political parties and the lack of a set program for the deputies meant that though the Chamber of Deputies was supposed to be the legislature, in practice it was not able to legislate<sup>27</sup>. Those seeking political reform turned to parties outside the parliamentary system, such as the Maronite Kataib, which could maintain its ideological purity without the compromises required by participation in the Chamber of Deputies.

As a result, the Council of Ministers became a substitute for the Chamber of Deputies. The need for full regional and communal representation made the Council of Ministers in effect a smaller version of the Chamber of Deputies. The Council of Ministers also had the advantage of secrecy, allowing debate on communal questions. The dominance of the Council of Ministers also strengthened the Maronite President, who appointed all ministers, including the Prime Minister. Since the President was not directly elected himself, he did not have to appeal to the Lebanese electorate.

In theory, the Lebanese system was parliamentary; for all practical purposes, it was a presidential system. Such a system benefited the Maronites more than anyone else by ensuring the president would come from their community. However, as the demographic balance in Lebanon shifted, resentment from other communities grew, especially from the Shiites. The weakness of the Chamber of Deputies increasingly brought political changes taking place outside the democratic system into the spotlight. To survive, the confessional system in Lebanon had to reform, but reform was prevented through the power of the *zuama*. The system continued largely unchanged until a new influx of Palestinian refugees in 1967 divided the country. The Palestinians had no legal voice in the Lebanese confessionalist system. With many Maronites feeling threatened, Lebanon and the Lebanese confessionalist system were on the verge of the abyss<sup>28</sup>.

By the standards of the Middle East, the Lebanese confessional system worked well while it lasted. Elections were freely contested. Government positions changed hands in an orderly manner. There was freedom of the press and expression. Economic development in Lebanon during this period was greater than in neighboring countries, though the gap between rich and poor widened.

In addition, surveys seem to show that despite, or perhaps because of, the bloodshed of recent years, the majority of Lebanese believe confessional democracy is the only way to put their country together again.<sup>29</sup> For example, 80% of respondents in a trade union survey of 1982 supported the view that political decisions must be made only with the cooperation and agreement of all major religious communities.<sup>30</sup> The Document of National Understanding, which concluded the Taif negotiations in October 1989 and marked the beginning of the end of the Lebanese civil war, implicitly endorsed the National Pact with its emphasis on confessionalism and inter-communal cooperation<sup>31</sup>.

On the other hand, subsequent events have been a harsh judge of the Lebanese confessional system<sup>32</sup>. Though the electoral system succeeded in sidelining nationalism in the Chamber of Deputies, it did not succeed in creating a strong and efficient state. Time and again, external events showed the limitations of the Lebanese *modus vivendi*. The constraints of the Lebanese system prevented the resolution of political pressures with negative long-term results. In the end, the inability of the Lebanese confessionalist system to reform itself in light of the inadequacy of its constitutional structures, changing demography, and growing economic inequality proved to be a large part of its failure.

### **The Lessons of Lebanon and Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina**

The Lebanese confessionalist model is useful for discussing the constitutions of other multi-communal states, both in terms of its successes and its failures. It would be foolish to pretend that the experience of Lebanese confessionalist democracy could be easily transferred to other countries. Nevertheless, certain observations may shed new light on the problem of multi-communal states.

First, confessionalist democracy was the only viable democratic model for Lebanon. The Lebanese system may have been deficient or insufficiently flexible in its detail, but no other democratic system could ensure the collaboration and hence equality of Lebanon's many minorities. Communalism alters the processes of democracy in order to achieve greater freedom and equality for all the communities in a state.

Second, though the number of minority groups in Lebanon meant the nation state was not a viable alternative, even in Lebanon the creation of a multi-communal state was by no means easy.

Third, certain features of the Lebanese Constitution may encourage cooperation in other multi-communal states. Cross-voting for example, where one community contributes to the election of another community's delegates, ensured that elected Lebanese leaders had no incentive to stir up civil strife. However, any system of cross-voting applied elsewhere should not hinder the creation of political parties.

Fourth, certain features of the Lebanese Constitution should be avoided in other multi-communal states. For example a directly elected President combined with an appropriate electoral system would force the head of state to appeal to all communities in a country.

Finally, Lebanon shows that the constitutions of multi-communal states must allow sufficient flexibility for equitable reform. The possibility of demographic change must be taken into account. Multi-communal states must be efficient and effective states; otherwise, democratic structures become subservient to other factors, as was the case in Lebanon.

Bosnia-Herzegovina resembles Lebanon in some respects. In both Bosnia and in Lebanon, for example, a group that perceived itself to be the dominant majority in a region felt threatened by demographic and political change. In Bosnia, the Serb proportion of the population fell from 42.8% in 1961 to 31.4% in 1991, while the Muslim population increased from 25.6% to 43.7% over the same period<sup>33</sup>. Bosnia, however, did not have the same tradition of communalism as Mount Lebanon; the shift in the Bosnian population resulted in an even greater political shift with the introduction of democracy.

Furthermore, the large number of minorities in Lebanon compared to Bosnia makes achieving a balance of power there easier. *Prima facie*, the institutions for a multi-communal democracy are more easily created in Lebanon.

Though other comparisons and contrasts could be found, it is important to end with an analysis of solutions that could strengthen a multi-communal state like Bosnia. That such solutions are required is beyond question. Bosnia's economy is held hostage by political strife and the inadequacies of the country's constitution<sup>34</sup>. Whether the necessary will can be found is another matter. This essay will confine itself to the question of elections to the legislature.

One of the persistent problems emerging in contemporary semi-partitioned Bosnia is the unpopularity of politicians who try to build bridges with other communities. The solution, drawing on the analysis of democracy in multi-communal states, is to accept that citizens must be listed as belonging to one group or another and require them to vote, not just in the election of their own community's representatives, but in that of all the others as well. This is an extension of the Lebanese confessionalist electoral system<sup>35</sup>.

In Bosnia, seats in the legislature could be apportioned according to the relative populations of the three communities. However, each community would have a certain percentage in the other communities' elections, the actual votes cast being scaled down. Bosnian Serbs would have 33% of the seats in the federal parliament, but would also have 20% of the votes for Bosnian Muslim seats and 20% of the votes for Bosnian Croat seats. Similarly Bosnian Muslims would have 43% of the seats in the federal parliament, but would also have 20% of the votes for Bosnian Serb seats in parliament. This "Cross-Determination" can be combined with a party list proportional electoral system<sup>36</sup>.

This system, unlike the Lebanese system, would not prevent parties from developing. A Bosnian Serb politician may choose to ignore Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat votes, but a Bosnian Serb politician who chose to campaign for inter-communal harmony would have an inbuilt advantage because 40% of the vote for Bosnian Serb representatives would not be cast by Bosnian Serbs. The numbers are not important, but the principle of confessionalism most definitely is<sup>37</sup>. Reform of the Bosnian electoral system would be an important step towards the creation of a multi-communal Bosnian state<sup>38</sup>.

## **Conclusion**

Can multi-communal democracies work? Creating the institutions for multi-communal democracies is a difficult process, requiring an understanding of democracy and an appreciation of the historical successes and failures of multi-communal states. Establishing institutions is the first step towards developing attitudes that allow multi-communal democracies to work.

The preference for the preservation of multi-communal societies where they exist is both practical, moral and aesthetic. Practical, because in an increasingly interconnected world, division into national-states makes little sense; moral, because

dividing causes immeasurable hardship; and aesthetic, because diversity in human communities is both exciting and admirable.

Lord Acton claimed multi-communal states were “one of the chief instruments of civilization” and part of “the natural and providential order,” and perhaps he was right. But in the end, it is human beings who live in multi-communal states; whether they can live together peacefully according to Acton’s “providential order” depends, in part, on them<sup>39</sup>.

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## Notes

1 John Stuart Mill. Considerations on Representative Government. Ch.XVI. 1861.

2 Lord Acton. Nationality. 1862.

3 Multi-communal or multi-ethnic is used throughout the essay rather than multinational, because a state may be multi-communal long before the different communities visualize themselves as a nation with a right to their own state.

4 Warren Zimmerman in "The Last Ambassador," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April), 1995. Also R. Kumar, 1997.

5 Lord Acton, *ibid*.

6 A Cherokee Indian in the 1840s speaking to white Americans about the earlier forced expulsion of his people from Georgia in: Ronald Wright, Stolen Continents, The Indian Story. John Murray: 1992, 294.

7 Initially both in antiquity and in modern times excluding slaves. The vote was first extended to women in South Australia in 1894.

8 Pericles' funeral oration in Thucydides, Peloponnesian War. Book II. Thucydides makes clear these are not Pericles' exact words.

9 So liberty 'ἄλλοτρίαια' (elephtheria) was not praised by those favouring oligarchies and monarchies. The anti-democratic philosophers Plato and Aristotle reject it as a mistaken ideal. Plato. Republic. 557B ff. and Aristotle. Politics. 1310a26 ff.

10 For Athenian democracy among others: H. Hansen. "Was Athens a Democracy?" Historisk-filosofiske Meddelelser, 59.

11 Note the differences between positive and negative conceptions of liberty. Note also that liberty and equality are by no means necessarily two sides of the same coin – democracy does not attempt to reconcile these principles in a perfect but in an imperfect way. Nevertheless nearly all justifications of democracy as the term is understood today stress similar features. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Ch. 6. Also R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, where democracy is defined as the equal consideration of interests.

12 A. de Tocqueville. Democracy in America. Vol. 1 Ch. 14.

13 Note C. Bennet. "Voting for Fear" in *Transitions* for the same process in Bosnia-Herzegovina today.

14 J. Hurewitz, 1963; W. Harris, 1997.

15 "Fiches du monde arabe," 1699, Sept.20, 1980.

16 H. Cobban, 1985.

17 G. Hess and H. Bodman, 1954 p 14ff; H. Cobban, 1985.

18 The enlargement vastly decreased the Maronite proportion of the population.

19 P. Rondot, 1996, 130 ff. A report on the poll was written by the Lebanese statesman Chebl Damous. Associations of lawyers, doctors, municipal councillors and so on were asked about the future constitution of the state. So for example this group supported confessionalist representation in parliament by a majority of 121 to 11. The extension of the same to public officers and ministerial appointments was supported by only 100 with 32 against.

20 P. Rondot, 1966. 140 ff. The modifications include the elimination of the Senate, the tenure of the President extended to six years and the repeal of clauses relating to the rights of the French Mandate.

21 Apart from its constitutional arrangements, under the pact the Maronites agreed

to accept independence and to relinquish their dependence on France. The Sunnis also accepted independence and abandoned the idea of complete Arab unity. Salem E, 1979.

22 E. Salem, 1967, 498 ff.

23 P. Rondot, 1966. M. Hudson, 1966. C. Hess. and H. Bodman, 1954.

24 M. Hudson, 1966.

25 D. Gilmour, 1983.

26 Note also A. Hottinger, 1961 131 ff.: to be a deputy gives the zaim the consecration of modernity.

27 D. Gilmour, 1983; for example, during the years between 1950 and 1966 the Chamber of Deputies had not rejected one of the 384 bills put before it.

28 There were serious attempts at reform by Henri Pharaon in 1947, again in 1952 and finally with President Shihab from 1958 to 1964 who concentrated on regional development. None were successful in the medium term. H. Cobban, 1985, Ch. 4.

29 J. Halik, 1993.

30 T. Hanf, 1988. Note that 1982 was seven bitter years into the Lebanese civil war. Note also M. Deeb on the elaboration of Muslim positions in 1983.

31 A. Norton, 1991. Members of the last elected Lebanese parliament of 1972 met under the auspices of the Arab League in Taif in Saudi Arabia. Apart from changes to correct the pro-Maronite imbalance of the Lebanese Constitution the Taif Accord formalised Lebanon's "special" relationship with Syria. In fact though the trappings of confessionalism have been preserved, the reality is Syrian domination. See W. Harris, 1997.

32 H. Cobban, 1985. W. Harris, 1997. H. Sirriyeh, 1989. Note external factors played a crucial part in the demise of the Lebanese state.

33 S. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy. Table 2.2

34 V. Gligorov, 1999.

35 This is not the same as the proposal made by Beslagec, Mayor of Tusla, which was rejected by the OSCE. The electoral system described was proposed by the Greek Cypriot National Council in 1989 for Presidential elections as part of a future Cyprus settlement.

36 *Friends of Cyprus Reports*. 1992 / 1994 / 1995.

37 C. Carras, Briefing Paper: "Visions of Europe".

38 Reform of the electoral system can only be a small part of any solution. But if it helps elect politicians who can build bridges between the different communities it could prove to be a first step towards reconciling the peoples of Bosnia as a whole.

39 My thanks to Gisela Nauk for advice and discussion on these issues.



# **A NOTE ON THE PEOPLE AND WEALTH OF NATIONS AT THE DAWN OF THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY**

BY JEAN-CLAUDE CHESNAIS

## **Introduction**

In the 1960's, just after the era of African independence, most development economists agreed that the future of Asia would be bleak while the destiny of Africa would be great. The main rationale was the following: Africa was seen as a new continent of emerging promises with tremendous reservoirs of natural resources, in a context of low population density and long-awaited political independence. Asia, namely India, was perceived as the continent under the threat of massive famine. The green revolution in India and the mismanagement in Africa have changed the deal.

The present reality contradicts what was once the conventional wisdom. If we consider the planet worldwide, we find an unprecedented gap between the distribution of people and the distribution of income. The message is clear: peace, democracy and social cohesion, human organisation in other words, are more important than natural resources in the shaping of economic destiny.

Today, as yesterday and tomorrow, the vast majority of people (three out of five) live in Asia. The production of goods and services, however, is more than ever concentrated in the market economies of the European sphere on both sides of the Atlantic. At the conclusion of the 20th century, only one big Asian country, Japan, has been able to reach the European level, thanks to a stubborn effort beginning in 1868 (the Meiji era) and lasting more than one century.

## **The West**

### **NAFTA, EU-15 and Japan, or the "Triad"**

Two big commercial blocs dominate the world economy: NAFTA and the European Union (EU-15), with a similar demographic weight (about 1/16 of the planet for each) and representing 57% of the total world product (30% for North America and 27% for Western Europe). These two groups of nations generate the bulk of global income, while their population is only 780 million out of a world figure of 6 billion people. If we convert the corresponding value of the contribu-

tion to the world income expressed in dollars at prevailing exchange rates into international dollars<sup>(1)</sup> that would buy the same amount of goods and services in a country's domestic market as \$1 would buy in the United States (purchasing power parity method), the difference is not so clear-cut. This whole geographic area, after correcting international price differentials, remains largely predominant with a total share of 44% of world GDP.

The third pole of wealth is the East Asian region whose market economies are dominated by Japan. With only 9.5% of the population of the world, this pole is the source of 19% of world GDP (14% after correction for price distortions). The Japanese GNP, calculated at Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) in order to rectify the exceptionally high level of prices in Japan, represents nearly 8% of the world GDP compared to a population of only 2%. The ranking of the Japanese GNP per capita is striking; with a value of \$24,400 USD per head, out of 215 countries, it is number eight. This places it among fiscal paradises like Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Bermuda, Cayman Islands (between \$26,000 and \$30,000 per capita), the innovating United States (\$29,000) and oil-rich Norway (\$24,260). Very few other Asian countries rank among the top ten, and of those which do (Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan), all are offshoots of China and closely related to the Japanese economy. In other words, they are small insular economies with a corresponding total population of 33 million inhabitants and a GNP per capita of between \$25,000 and \$30,000 (USD-1997). South Korea lags far behind, ranking at 52<sup>nd</sup> with a per capita income of \$13,430 (USD-1997).

Thus, considered as a whole, with only 22.6% of world population, these three poles comprise a Triad that is the source of 78% of the monetary income and 58.5% of world income calculated in terms of PPP.

**Table 1: Population and Economy of the World, 1998-2000**

Region	Population 2000		GDP Billion dollars 1998	GDP/PPP Billion dollars (3) 1999	%
	Millions	%			
<b>NAFTA</b>	406	6.8	8835	8454	24.6
US	275		7825	7043	20.5
Canada	31		608	626	1.8
Mexico	100		402	785	2.3
<b>E U-15</b>	375	6.3	8091	6826	19.9
Germany	82		2100	1530	4.4
France	59		1390	1166	3.4
Italy	58		1145	1067	3.1
UK	59		1286	1110	3.2
<b>Far East</b>	595	9.5	5750	4810	14.0
Japan	127		4189	2515	7.3
Indonesia	214		202	630	1.8
<b>Russia</b>	145	2.4	450	671	1.9
<b>China</b>	1276	21.0	(470)	(2200)	(6.4)
<b>India</b>	1018	16.5	394	1471	4.3
<b>Latin America (1)</b>	419	6.9	1830	2300	6.7
<b>North Africa/ Middle East</b>	315	4.8	680	1140	3.3
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>	640	10.5	350	581	1.7
<b>Others (2)</b>	870	15.3	2760	5939	17.3
<b>World Total</b>	6020	100.0	29610	34385	100.0

(1) Excluding Mexico

(2) Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indochina, Burma, Turkey, Australia, FSU-bar Russia, Switzerland

(3) The GDP is an estimate calculated at Purchasing Power Parities under a given set of prices; the value is provisional; only gross order of magnitudes have a meaning.

Sources: World Bank Atlas, 1999. Washington, D.C.: 1999; provisional estimates of growth rates for 1998 (from the World Bank as well), and United Nations, World Population Prospects (1998), New York, 1999.

## **The Rest**

### **1. The Former Soviet Union**

The former Soviet Union (FSU) consistently falsified its economic accounts during the communist period in order to give the world the illusion of being a superpower and threatening the United States. Russia, which is the main component of the FSU and includes half of its total population, shows a very low monetary product: only 1.5% of the world total, or nine times less than Japan and 17 times less than the United States. In spite of its huge natural resources deposits (gas, oil, gold, diamonds), the Russian Federation shows a lower performance than the Netherlands, where the population is ten times smaller. Even after correction for price distortions, the Russian economy is a marginal share of world GDP. With a share of 1.9%, it is close to the level of Indonesia or Sub-Saharan Africa and far from the biggest economies of the European Union (Germany, France, Italy and the UK each have 3-4% of world GDP). Mexico's GDP per capita measured at PPP in international dollars is 90% higher than Russia's per capita income. As a basis for comparison, let us mention the values for Japan and the United States: \$24,400 and \$29,080 respectively. Hence, the real per capita income of the Russian population is seven times smaller than the American and six times smaller than the Japanese. This is a tremendous gap that illustrates the extent of the misinformation propagated under Communist rule and the collapse of the Russian GDP after 1989. The highest ranking of the former Soviet bloc, the Czech Republic, is still far from economic success at number 63 and a GNP of \$10,380 (USD-1997) per capita.

### **2. China and India**

The two demographic giants of Asia (China and India) exhibit contrasting results, but here it is important to be cautious. There is clear reliability in Indian accounts since India adheres to full transparency and respect of international norms in the computation of national account statistics. This is not the case with Chinese figures. A closer look at Chinese data exhibits anomalies, inconsistencies and bias, similar to those of the Soviet case. In any case, the share of the Indian economy (calculated in PPP's of world income at 4.3%) is more than double that of Russia.

India, in 1999, has just crossed the threshold of one billion people; its

GDP measured at PPP's is similar to that of individual Western European economies such as that of France, Italy, or the UK. India no longer hides its ambitions as a potential superpower; this is demonstrated by its nuclear and aerospace capacities. India's advantages are usually underestimated, while the reverse is true of China. India deserves more consideration. Consider its mastery of high technology, the number and quality of its emerging elite, and the 2 million students who get university degrees each year. Most Indians speak fluent English and thus can be involved directly in business and science. India has a long-standing pluralistic democracy, a high degree of international openness, successful population control, and the emergence of a large middle class eager to modernise and adopt Western lifestyles.

### **3. South America**

South America is in the fourth position, rather far from the three poles of NAFTA, the European Union, and the Far East capitalist economies. Its share of the world economy is 6.7%, or 3.5 times higher than Russia's share. In spite of benefiting from oil endowment and a small population, the countries of North Africa and the Middle East have a GDP only half of that of Latin America, which has no such valuable natural resource deposited and has a high population growth rate. With a real GDP per capita of about \$5,500 USD, Latin America stands between the more developed and less developed countries, but far ahead of India and China (at \$1500 and \$2000 per capita), and especially ahead of Sub-Saharan Africa (at less than \$1000 USD).

### **4. Sub-Saharan Africa**

Sub-Saharan Africa is farther behind than ever. With a total population similar to that of the market zone of the Far East, about 600 million people, it shows a much lower economic performance. If we put aside the economies of South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia, which are better organized and richer, the inequality is even more striking; the corresponding mean individual income ratio exceeds 10 to 1 in favor of the Far East<sup>2</sup>. What is most significant is that India exhibits a standard of living that is 50% higher than that of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Since the collapse of Communism, Africa has been completely marginalized. Every evil has fallen on it. India, the traditional symbol of misery, has tried to erase its backwardness with impressive growth rates of 5 or 6% annually since the

second liberalization program launched in 1990. International differences are thus increasing. The rate of technological progress is one reason behind this differentiating economic landscape. Mismanagement, as shown by the example of Sub-Saharan Africa, is another factor.

The picture is clear: the economic planet is divided between the West and the rest. The present divide is too clear-cut to be politically bearable in the long run. Many countries of the “West” face massive depopulation, especially in Europe and Japan, and will experience an economic slowdown, while new countries with high potential could emerge. China has unclear but deep weaknesses, among which are its closed economy, its lack of infrastructure and of freedom, the absence of democracy, and a huge degree of social inequalities, hence a strong potential for political unrest. India, which is conventionally viewed with pessimism, is likely to become Number 2, although still far behind the US, by the year 2020-2030.

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## Notes

1 Prices tend to differ widely from country to country, namely for services. Present economies are predominantly post-industrial, hence service economies. The physical output needs to be weighted by indexes other than local prices. This limits the impact of price distortions. The adoption of a common set of prices is not new; it began in the 1950s by seminal papers of KRAVIS (OECD).

2 This means that the average African person has a standard of living ten times smaller than the average inhabitant of the Far East.

# RISE OF THE AUSTRIAN RIGHT: EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION BY PROFESSOR PATRICK MCCARTHY

PETER JANKOWITSCH

PETER SICHROVSKY

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The formation of a government in Austria that represents a coalition of the People's Party and Jörg Haider's Freedom Party has provoked a boycott of Austria by its EU partners and worldwide publicity. The most useful service that an institution like the Bologna Center can offer is to debate the issues in a manner as calm and impartial as possible, without pretending that we enjoy a God-given insight or objectivity. So we invited representatives of the Socialist Party and of the Freedom Party who briefly presented their points of view and then answered many and varied questions from the students. The debate was lively but remained within the confines of academic discourse.

It seemed to me, as I listened to the speakers, that they each seized on one part of the central problem. This was and is that Austria needs a change of government because the Socialists and the People's Party have been in power too long and have created what one can only call a corporatist state, where politics plays too great a role at the expense both of the market and of civil society. But The Freedom Party's ability to cut back this corporatist state is weakened by the illegitimacy of its leader.

In turn this illegitimacy has two causes: Haider's views on immigration go beyond what is at present deemed acceptable in Western Europe (Britishers may remember that Enoch Powell ruined his career for the same reason). Secondly, Haider's occasional allusions to the Nazi past are the sign of an Austrian failure to confront truthfully its role in the years between the Anschluss and the 1945 defeat. This is not an exclusively Austrian failure: France was just as reluctant to face up to the reality that large numbers of Frenchmen were involved in collaboration and anti-Semitism. But one simply cannot be ambiguous about Auschwitz.

Ironically the Freedom Party will probably be unable to undertake its task of reducing the role of politicians because all its energy will be taken up defending one particular politician.

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**Mr. Peter Jankowitsch:**

Let me begin by looking at the beginning of the year, the new millennium, when most European democracies sailed rather peacefully into the new century. Austria, on the other hand, was greeted by a hailstorm of criticism and abuse, violent attacks on its past, on its present, and by a sudden chilling of relations with some of its closest partners and associates in Europe, namely the other fourteen members of the European Union.

What happened to make Austria a country avoided not only by many Western politicians, statesmen, but also by artists and writers, intellectuals, professors and even tourists? If a country's image abroad changes this rapidly, and there is no doubt that Austria's image has been severely damaged, a simple answer will not suffice.

Many of the simplest answers to this question are being sold on the media market. Some perceived sinister maneuverings by the power hungry "Eurocrats" of Brussels in the ostracism of Austria. They feared that Brussels was trying, by imposing sanctions on one of the smallest and newest members of the union, to change Austria's direction and coerce it to select a different type of government. Others suspected the invisible hand of the Socialist International was insulted by the fact that one of its member parties had lost a government position it had held for decades. Still others suggested that it was the Home Front, including the President of Austria himself, who had betrayed the new government by encouraging the current Portuguese Presidency and other leaders of the European Union to enact sanctions against Austria, including a freeze in bilateral relations between Austria and the other fourteen members of the Union. None of these answers, of course, carry the slightest credibility.

The political spectrum of those in Europe, and the Western world in general, who criticize Austria is much broader than that of the Socialist International. Such people as President Chirac of France, Prime Minister Aznar of Spain, and

the Foreign Minister of Belgium, who are often on the forefront in criticizing Austria, hardly qualify for membership in the Socialist International. No Austrian politician, including the President, could command such influence and power in Europe as to enact so quickly the sanctions that the fourteen members of the European Union imposed when they decided to show utter displeasure with the political situation in Austria.

In order to cause such a strong and lasting reaction, the reasons must be deeper and wider and have much to do with internal developments in Austria. There have been reactions not only in the member countries of the European Union, but also all over the West: the United States, Canada, and Israel- which was the only country that immediately withdrew its ambassador from Vienna.

The reason must be that today, to the chagrin of many Austrians, many people in the West feel that Austria is drifting away from the European mainstream and moving into new and largely uncharted waters. Such isolation engenders reactions as violent as the ones we have seen. This shouldn't be surprising to anyone who remembers the world's reaction to the election of Kurt Waldheim to the presidency of Austria. That a man not seen to be fit for the highest office in a Western democracy should be elected by a majority of Austrians was a first example of the type of falling out that I mentioned and that people now see.

Many Austrians still fail to understand how a new government can create such a furor, when on the surface, nothing could be more natural than such a change of government. Two political parties who together command a sizable majority in parliament conclude a government pact and are sworn in by the president in strict compliance with the constitution. Why then such a reception in the outside world and among a growing number of Austrians? Why are Austrians feeling more and more uncomfortable, not only due to international reactions, but also because of what they see happening in Austria?

One reason is the genesis of this government. It is true that when Austrians voted for a new Parliament on October 3 of last year, they wanted change of a deep and permanent nature. They therefore strengthened the two parties who are seen to be the most vocal in opposition, the Freedom Party of Jörg Haider and the Green party, which was led by Professor Alexander Van der Bellen.

The two parties that had since then formed a government coalition, the Social Democrats and the Austrian People's Party of Christian Democrats, lost a considerable number of votes, so much so that the Austrian People's Party landed in third place in the electoral spectrum and was for the first time ever in Austrian postwar parliamentary history overtaken by the Freedom Party. To judge by opinion polls taken after the election, however, this vote, although expressing deep displeasure with many particularities of Austria's political system, was not a vote for a new coalition, but rather for a new type of government; for a new, more transparent government.

A vast majority polled still expressed a strong preference for the head of the Social Democrats, Mr. Victor Klima, to remain Chancellor, as well as for a continuation of the present government formula. This coalition had given the country an undeniably unprecedented measure of prosperity, low unemployment, domestic and international security, and much international prestige, including a successful first presidency of the EU. Even those who had strengthened Haider's Freedom Party seemed to prefer him and his followers as a vocal and vigilant opposition rather than as a government party. For this reason, many voters seemed to disregard qualities of Mr. Haider's party and its leaders that had raised international criticism and concern.

Reacting to the evident wish of Austria's voters that the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats should try to come together as a coalition, the two government partners started long and protracted negotiations. These negotiations were complicated by the fact that the Austrian People's Party, shocked by its bad election results, decided to go into opposition and refuse to negotiate altogether. Had it remained in this position, it would have created a deep crisis in Austria, as the Social Democratic Party was known to have refused any government participation with a Freedom Party led by Jörg Haider.

Eventually, the Austrian People's Party consented to negotiate a new government with the Social Democrats. These negotiations took a full three months, from late October into late January. In these negotiations, the Social Democrats made wide-ranging and considerable concessions and a comprehensive government program was established, which included many reforms. During the negotiations, the Social Democrats were under the continuous threat of being dropped by the Austrian People's Party, which then planned to form a coalition with the Freedom Party. They went a long way to make a government without the Freedom Party possible.

When these negotiations were completed and duly approved by the respective party bodies, Mr. Schüssel, the leader of the Austrian People's Party, made a surprising about-turn and asked the Social Democrats to abandon the key portfolio in the government, that of Minister of Finance, and have a reluctant trade unionist sign a government pact that would have been very difficult for the trade unionists to accept. Schüssel was long suspected by public opinion to have done everything possible to make negotiations fail in order to turn to the Freedom Party, which had for weeks held out the prospective of making him rather than Mr. Klima Chancellor of Austria. When the leader of the Social Democrats, who had negotiated for three months and made enormous concessions, refused these demands, negotiations were broken off. After a final short episode in which Klima tried to form a Social Democratic minority government, the leader of the Austrian People's Party, Schüssel, rapidly concluded a deal with Jörg Haider.

This genesis shows one thing: even domestically the path to this government was all but straightforward and clear, more the result of clever tactics and shrewd maneuvering than of a clear mandate by the voters. Had indeed the People's Party and the Freedom Party campaigned openly and honestly that they wanted to form a government together, the result of this election may have been quite different. It is for this reason that many people in Austria now are to be found in the streets, accusing the new government of being certainly legal but perhaps not legitimate in a strictly democratic sense.

The second serious question this government has to face is its international acceptability. Here again there should have been few surprises for those familiar with public opinion in Europe. For many years, the political style of the leader of the Freedom Party has raised eyebrows in Europe and much of the Western world. The type of political weaponry chosen by Mr. Haider has isolated him and his political friends from every mainstream party in Europe.

The reasons why the Freedom Party is seen today by most observers to be on the far right of the political spectrum are manifold. They have to do with the fact that the leader of the Party and many of his faithful have time and again failed to show the type of distance from the darkest pages of Europe's and Austria's history that marks all other democratic parties. Apologies came, but they came late and were considered half-hearted.

The policies the Freedom Party proclaims vis à vis immigrants and for-

eigners cause reserve in the West and in the EU. While they may have brought votes in Vienna districts, they have found much less acceptance outside Austria. The same applies to the foreign policies proclaimed by the Freedom Party. Resolutely pro-Europe or pro-EU (or rather EC) before Haider's ascent to party leadership, the Freedom Party turned into the most anti-Europe party shortly before Austria's accession to the EU. In the referendum that confirmed Austrian EU membership by a 2/3 majority, Haider campaigned against membership, as he later campaigned against the Euro. Until his party joined the government, he opposed enlargement of the EU to the East and clamored for reduced Austrian contributions to the EU.

It is difficult to find a label for so strange a political animal as the FPÖ of Jörg Haider. It is very easy to call it neo-fascist or neo-nazi, but these terms are not appropriate. Populist may be more fitting a label, but even here I hesitate. Haider himself is certainly a revolutionary of the right, untiringly fighting the system that has always rejected him. Although he has gained limited access to the Austrian system, he continues to be rejected by the international system. What comes after the destruction of the system? The question arises as to what new system Haider would put in place of the one he wishes to destroy. Social tensions are certainly going to rise and the institutions of social partnership will no longer function as before. The same will be true for the political climate; it will never be as it was before. The long-standing cooperation between Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, a type of consensus born in the Nazi concentration camps where both of these parties were thrown, is a thing of the past and will be replaced by other alliances more to the left.

Even more difficult will be Austria's situation in Europe and in the West in general. A country firmly anchored in European institutions and European beliefs is now forced to operate in a venomous climate of suspicion. Sanctions against Austria put severe limitations on the government, but they also concern many ordinary people. There is now a kind of ill-advised race for inventing new sanctions against Austria. These sanctions hit ordinary people and not the government for which they were originally intended. Austria is being observed by the fourteen countries of Europe, and Austrians have to proclaim every day that they respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is a highly unsatisfactory and undignified state of affairs. Help and sympathy from our friends abroad will assist us a great deal; sanctions will not.

*Mr. Peter Sichrovsky is an international journalist and author. He is a member of the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party) and has been a member of the European Parliament since 1996.*

**Mr. Peter Sichrovsky:**

We have heard a very dramatic description of the disaster situation of Austrians within the country and abroad. I will give you a few examples of this drama. For example, the last time I was in Brussels, my taxi driver stated that he was not accepting any Austrian guests anymore. We tried to book a restaurant in the evening for a group of Austrians and the restaurant said "We do not serve any food to Nazis." We received the same reaction from other groups and from hotels in France and Belgium. Suddenly an anti-fascist collective behavior has come over Western Europe and finally recognized Austrians as the "pure devils of Europe." We have a group of assistants who work for us in the European Parliament. They are young students and are learning French. Their French teachers canceled their lessons because they said that they do not teach Nazis anymore. A student exchange was canceled with Austrian schools. Today I heard that in a riding competition in Grenoble, one of the Austrians was uninvited. I asked the council of Grenoble if the horse was still invited. I am still waiting for the answer to this query.

This situation may be analyzed on two levels. We can argue on a very rational, logical level and say that this is not fair. This behavior is directed against a government that has been elected. I see it in a different way than Mr. Jankowitsch. For instance, he didn't tell you that the Socialist chancellor, Mr. Klima, offered the Freedom Party three positions in his government if we would support his government. Then after two or three years, when everything has calmed down, they would form a coalition with us. When we refused, all of the difficulties began. So there is a different explanation for this, but I don't want to argue against everything Mr. Jankowitsch said. A lot has happened and a lot *will* happen in the future; it was not easy to end a government in Austria that had more or less governed Austria since the war. There had been a Socialist chancellor in Austria for forty years.

In Austria, we had a kind of democracy in which it was impossible to get anything without being a member of one of the two parties. When I was 19 years old and tried to move out of my parents' house, I went to the local community

center to get an apartment and they asked me whether I was Socialist or Conservative. When I said I was just 19 years old and wanted an apartment, they informed me that I had to be in one party or the other, otherwise I could not get an apartment. I wanted to work as a teacher before I finished my studies, so I went to the local school in the area, again the same question, whether I was Socialist or Conservative. When I said I wasn't a member of either, I was refused a job.

Not one position in a bank in Austria, in the railway system, or in the post office was available without membership in one of the two parties. Austria is the only democracy in Western society in which all of the high-ranking positions in the banking system, industry, telecommunications, were divided between the parties. The whole society was divided. It taught you as a young student that no career was possible if you didn't join one of the parties very early. This is one of the reasons so many intelligent Austrians left the country.

I can give you a few examples where I disagree with the propaganda directed against the Freedom Party. First, regarding immigration, I am constantly confronted with the belief that the Freedom Party only wins elections because it is anti-foreign and racist. We asked the Freedom Party supporters after the last election why they voted for the Freedom Party and immigration was only the fifth most important issue. Their priorities were anti-corruption, change of the system, anti-socialism, and liberalization of the market system. Immigration was totally unimportant as a motivation. The Viennese Freedom Party was heavily criticized after the election, having been the most aggressive on the issue of immigration.

In another poll, we found out that among the age group between 25-35, the Freedom party was the number one party of all the voters. We were the number one party among all professional women. This is not the party of the old Nazis. It is not so simple to answer the Austrian problem. The polls have changed. The last polls showed that the Austrian population definitely supports this government. Over fifty percent said that this government should be given a chance. It is not that fewer and fewer people trust this government. It is exactly the opposite. More and more people want this government to work for some time to find out if it functions, or if it doesn't function. This is a very normal development in democracy.

Why is Europe today, and also part of the Western world, so deeply concerned about an extreme right development in Austria and also deeply hurt by

any comment about the Second World War and the Holocaust, specifically regarding Austria? We have to be very open about our past. We have to accept that our governments in the past created a deep misunderstanding over the last forty-five years and also anger internationally by not accepting our responsibility concerning the Second World War. Incidentally, there never was a Freedom Party in these governments, and never a Freedom Party member as a chancellor. There was only a coalition for a short time. Ninety percent of the chancellors were Socialist, and for a short time Conservative chancellors.

It was the Socialist party who, after the War and deep into the 1950's, used an election poster that said, "Who Once Voted National and Socialist Can Today Vote for the Socialists." I remember also a slogan when Adolf Schaerf, the Austrian Socialist president was elected: "Who Once Voted for Adolf Can Do It Again." The Socialists also denied any kind of payment to the returning Austrian Jewish population. It was a long fight for the Jewish population who came back to Austria to get a little bit back from the Austrian government.

Austria continuously talked about how it was a victim of the war, how we never really took responsibility. This is one of the reasons why other European countries are very sensitive about Austria today. There is another level that has nothing to do with Austria. I tried to explain this and it is not easy to explain. About ten years ago I wrote a book called Born Guilty. It was a book with interviews of children who came from Nazi families. The children, who had been born after the war, talked about their relationship with their parents. In a strange way, the Austrian war generation never felt guilty about what happened in the war and never accepted its responsibility. Those who had participated in the war tried to stop history and start anew after the war. The result was exactly the opposite. By denying their responsibility for what they did, they passed the guilt on to the next generations. Today, the second and third generations after the war, young people, are much more sensitive and in a way feel guiltier than their own parents and grandparents.

We have a very specific sensitivity, almost a post-Holocaust sensitivity in Europe and throughout the world that forces us, and I think this is the biggest mistake of the Freedom Party, to be extremely sensitive when it comes to statements and descriptions of the Holocaust and the Second World War. This is a development we underestimated as the Freedom Party and also as Austrians, including the Socialists and the conservatives.



# JÖRG HAIDER: A DISCUSSION ON RHETORIC

BY RICHARD WIMMER

Jörg Haider's Freedom Party won 28.7 per cent of the vote at the last parliamentary election in Austria on October 3, 1999. The international press condemned the rise of the far right in Austria<sup>1</sup> and repeated once again what has been said about Jörg Haider over the last ten years: that he is a right wing extremist, that he leads a party which stirs xenophobic feelings in the population, and that he has not distanced himself from Austria's National Socialist past. He has been called a Nazi more than once when travelling abroad for press conferences. During a visit to London after the election he was surprised by a large group of anti-Nazi activists who yelled the slogan, "Nazi Out."

For those who have not followed the debate over Jörg Haider since 1986, when he took over as chairman of the Freedom Party in what some called a putsch, things are as simple as mentioned above. However, one discrepancy seems very conspicuous. The international analysis broadly speaking seems to be lagging behind the Austrian analysis of the phenomenon Jörg Haider<sup>2</sup>. He has dominated Austrian politics for fourteen years and has been an inexhaustible source for the writings of political analysts<sup>3</sup>. There is no doubt that the majority of the Austrian Haider-specialists argues in a less simplistic tone and does not think of him as a small reincarnation of Adolf Hitler.

One of the most interesting and often-mentioned aspects of the Haider phenomenon is his use of inflammatory rhetoric. It should be noted that Haider's verbal outpourings and deliberations on, or rather misinterpretations of, history are so numerous that I can only quote some of the most polarizing and most commonly known. It must be noted that it is difficult to translate these phrases or words appropriately into English because Haider and other party officials, covertly, maybe even unconsciously, resort to a type of Nazi rhetoric no longer used in today's "denazified" German language. Furthermore, Freedom Party politicians use what could be termed "coded" language. The language itself is not explicitly anti-immigrationist, anti-feminist, or anti-intellectual but the message is clear to anyone who is receptive to those codes. It also must be mentioned that journalists and commentators focus especially carefully on Haider's rhetoric. Words and phrases said by Haider arouse attention although politicians from other parties may have uttered the same phrases unnoticed before.

Anyone who has ever followed a discussion with Haider or other representatives of the Freedom Party will notice that it is very hard to approach their method of argumentation. First, they deny any charges against them. Second, they twist the argument by saying that their words were taken out of context, thereby accusing their opponents of unfair debating methods. Only if there is no way out do they use the apology argument: “Yes, this was said and it is not defensible. But in the stressful life of a twenty-four hour politician things might have been said over the last twenty years. We apologize. But do you keep records of what the others have said over the last twenty years?”

Most of the high-ranking politicians of the Freedom Party underwent professional media training, studying the guidelines of the so-called neo-linguistical school. Therefore it is difficult to win an argument against them unless you are armed with evidence or an attorney in a court of law. The following are a selection of some of Haider’s more controversial statements on a variety of topics.

#### **Straflager<sup>4</sup>**

When Jörg Haider was interviewed by the Austrian news magazine *Profil*, he spoke not of concentration camps or death camps during World War II but of “Straflager” which, literally translated, means disciplinary or punishment camps. Historians know that there were a variety of camps during World War II, and not all of them were used as extermination camps. However, from a post war perspective none of these camps qualifies as something like a prison where convicts served a sentence delivered by a legitimate court of law. Once again it must be said that this was an attempt at reinterpreting history. Jörg Haider studied history and is a well-educated man; he knew perfectly well what he was saying. He implied that the millions of people who were imprisoned and eventually died in the concentration camps were criminals who deserved to be deported there.

#### **Hitler, Stalin, and Churchill<sup>5</sup>**

In a recent interview for a local Viennese newspaper, Haider equated Hitler, Stalin and Churchill as brutal mass murderers. Of course, in several other interviews he acknowledges that the Holocaust was the worst crime committed against humanity and that the Nazi regime bears responsibility for that. He would argue that the bombing of the civilian population of Dresden in 1945 was not necessary for the achievement of the defeat of Nazi Germany. But when equating Stalin and Churchill with Hitler he also wants to exculpate the Germans (and his family) by saying that others were equally bad.

## **Blacks<sup>6</sup>**

“It’s really a problem with black people. Even when they have a majority they don’t get their act together. It’s a hopeless case,” Haider said during a television interview on March 1, 1995. This is one out of a series of racist remarks by a Freedom Party member regarding black people. During the last campaign for the general election, the local branch of the Freedom Party plastered the walls with posters denouncing black immigrants in general as drug dealers who ruin Austria’s children.

## **Intellectuals<sup>7</sup>**

Intellectuality for Haider is almost a swear word. For him it describes the despicable leftovers of the “ ’68 generation.” It is synonymous for moral and spiritual bankruptcy. He often describes (leftwing) intellectuals as “champagne glass Marxists.”

## **Women<sup>8</sup>**

In his “visionary” book, Die Freiheit, die ich meine, in which he contemplates a progressive society, Haider tells the reader about the role of women he envisages in that society: “The feminist illusion of women’s self-realization as professionals and mothers has proved to be a fatal error...The ideology which professes that only a professional woman is to be taken seriously has violated many women and has been at the same time very harmful to society as a whole because the job of a housewife is equally demanding.” Haider’s proposed policies towards women are very conservative, to say the least. During the last election campaign, he promised to pay each mother a check worth \$450 per child; this measure would supposedly allow women to stay at home with their children instead of working part-time. The reaction of women’s rights movements and other parties was fierce because they feared that this would keep women out of the labor market altogether. Labor market reinsertion is very difficult for people who have not worked for a long time. They argued that the money would be better invested in childcare institutions.

Based on a brief glance at his comments, the question arises of whether Haider is a Nazi. At first glance the answer might be obvious<sup>9</sup>. He has not distanced himself credibly from the Nazi past. He has made disturbing revisionist remarks about the National Socialist past. He belittles Nazi crimes and speaks of the members of the Waffen-SS as decent folks. Therefore, he is a Nazi. In my

opinion however, this explanation oversimplifies the situation and falls short of explaining his personality and his appeal to the masses.

Although Austria has not gone through the same intensive form of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, or addressing the issues of the past, as Germany has, it can safely be said that there is only a tiny number of Nazis left in Austria. Now that Haider's party has become the second largest political force in the country, he has increasingly distanced himself from the National Socialist era. He knows that elections are won in the middle and that he would deter many voters if he professed an ideology that merely constitutes a program for a negligible minority.

There is no doubt that Jörg Haider's Freedom Party must be carefully analyzed today. Austria has suffered from international isolation ever since his party was able to form a government with the Conservatives in February 2000. The fourteen other members of the European Union reduced bilateral relations with Austria. The Belgian foreign minister Michel Louis said it was immoral to spend holidays in Austria as long as Haider's Freedom party is in government. Israel called back its ambassador from Austria. The U.S. government recalled its ambassador for special consultations.

There is no denying that Haider's ideology can be described as right-wing populism and that his party sometimes stands for xenophobic policies. But there is also a long way between xenophobia or anti-immigration policies and National Socialism. The question still remains: why has Jörg Haider become so popular in Austria? Basing an answer on a general condemnation of him and his party as "Nazi" does not provide an answer or even an intellectual discussion.

*Richard Wimmer, Master of Law at the University of Vienna, 1997, is a student in international relations at The Johns Hopkins University-SAIS Bologna Center.*

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## Notes

1 See, for example, "Is Fascism Resurgent?" *The Economist* (October 9-15, 1999): 37-40.

2 For instance, the weekly supplement, *SZ Magazin* No. 50, 1999, directly compared Jörg Haider with Adolf Hitler.

3 Hans-Henning Scharsach, Haider's Kampf, 1991; Christa Zöchling, Haider - Licht und Schatten einer Karriere, 1999; Armin Thurnher, Das Trauma, ein Leben, 1999.

4 *Profil* No. 43, 1991.

5 *Der Falter* No. 45, 1999.

6 Haider in *Zeit im Bild II*, March 1, 1995.

7 Jörg Haider's aversion against intellectuals is so pervasive that he at least once during every interview utters a condescending remark. For example in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* No. 50, 1999.

8 Haider, Die Freiheit, die ich meine, 211-213.

9 During the first weeks of February 2000, he was directly compared with Hitler in French and Belgian newspapers.



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